One Out of Three

IMMIGRANT NEW YORK IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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1. *Introduction*

IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK CITY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

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New York is America's quintessential immigrant city. It has long been a gateway for the nation's new arrivals and is a major receiving center today. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, after nearly fifty years of massive immigration, just over 3 million immigrants lived in New York City. They have come, in the main, from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia, although sometimes it seems as if every country in the world is represented. In 1970, 18 percent of New York City's population was foreign-born, the lowest percentage in the twentieth century. By 2010, about one out of three New Yorkers were immigrants, or 37 percent to be exact. If we add the second generation—the U.S.-born children of the foreign-born—the figure is even more remarkable, an estimated 55 percent. How have immigrants affected New York City? And, conversely, how has the move to New York influenced their lives?

This collection of original essays offers an in-depth look at immigrant New York at the beginning of the twenty-first century as older post-1965 groups are replenished by new arrivals, as brand-new immigrant groups come to settle in significant numbers, and as a large and growing second generation takes its place in the city. The book's approach is two-pronged: it combines micro and macro levels of analysis. Case studies explore the move to New York City from the immigrants' viewpoint, analyzing the way New York has influenced their social and cultural worlds and the emergence among them of new meanings and new

social and economic patterns. The essays also demonstrate that the city itself has been deeply affected by the huge immigrant influx of recent decades. The presence of such large numbers of immigrants and their children has had a dramatic impact on the city's neighborhoods and economy and a host of social, economic, and cultural institutions. In fact, a dialectical relationship or interplay exists between the two kinds of changes. As immigrants change when they move to New York City, they affect the life of the city in particular ways. And as immigrants play a role in transforming New York City, this "new" New York in turn influences them.

The seven chapters on particular national origin groups deal with the experiences of a broad range of populations: Chinese, Dominicans, Jamaicans, Koreans, Liberians, Mexicans, and Jews from the former Soviet Union. These groups were chosen to give a sense of the diversity of New York City's immigrant population: with the exception of Liberians, they are among the most numerous immigrant groups in the city. All of the studies are based on in-depth research and long-term familiarity with the group in question.[1] In fact, many authors of the chapters are immigrants themselves.

Setting the stage for the case studies, chapter 2, by Arun Peter Lobo and Joseph J. Salvo, provides a detailed portrait of how immigration has been transforming New York City's population, as it has created a remarkable mélange of ethnic and racial groups and has fueled population growth. Chapter 3, by David Dyssegaard Kallick, examines the way that newcomers are fitting into and contributing to New York's economy. While the case studies of particular immigrant groups touch on the experiences of the second generation, chapter 11, by Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, and Mary Waters, focuses on the pathways and prospects of the children of immigrants as they have entered and begun to move through adulthood.

In this introductory chapter, I provide general background on the immigration of the last five decades and special features of New York as an immigrant city. As I sketch out the factors shaping the experiences of the newest New Yorkers—and the ways in which they are transforming the city—I point to common themes as well as differences among immigrant groups and raise some questions about patterns in the future.

WHY IMMIGRANTS HAVE COME

The huge immigration since the late 1960s is not the first large influx to New York City, but it stands out from earlier immigration waves in a number of ways. Compared to the great wave of immigration at the turn of the twentieth century, today's arrivals come from a much wider array of nations and cultures. Whereas immigrants in New York City a century ago were overwhelmingly

European—the vast majority Russian Jews and Italians—today they are mainly from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. More men than women came in the immigration stream a hundred years ago; in recent decades, female immigrants have outnumbered males (see chapter 2, this volume). Many arrive now, as in the past, with little education and few skills, but a much higher proportion of contemporary newcomers have college degrees and professional backgrounds. And while the proportion of immigrants in the city's population is lower than it was early in the twentieth century, as table 1.1 shows, the actual numbers are at an all-time high (see Foner 2000 for a full comparison of immigration today and a century ago).

The reasons for the current influx are complex and multifaceted. A crucial factor was the 1965 immigration act that repealed the national origins quota system favoring northern and western Europeans and amendments to the act in subsequent years (chapter 2, this volume; Kraly and Miyares 2001; Reimers 1992; Zolberg 2006). The big winners were Asians, who had been severely restricted from immigration before 1965, and natives of the English-speaking Caribbean, who had been subject to small quotas for dependencies. Since 1965, U.S. immigration policy has emphasized family reunification and, to a lesser extent, skills within the context of annual immigration ceilings, which, after a series of

TABLE 1.1. FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION OF NEW YORK CITY, 1900–2010

Year	*Total Population (in Thousands)*	*Foreign-Born Population (in Thousands)*	*Percentage of Foreign-Born in New York City*	*Percentage of all U.S. Foreign-Born in New York City*
1900	3,437.2	1,270.1	37.0	12.2
1910	4,766.9	1,944.4	40.8	14.3
1920	5,620.0	2,028.2	36.1	14.5
1930	6,930.4	2,358.7	34.0	16.5
1940	7,455.0	2,138.7	28.7	18.3
1950	7,892.0	1,860.9	23.6	17.8
1960	7,783.3	1,558.7	20.0	16.0
1970	7,894.9	1,437.1	18.2	14.9
1980	7,071.6	1,670.2	23.6	11.9
1990	7,322.6	2,082.9	28.4	10.5
2000	8,008.3	2,871.0	35.9	9.2
2010	8,185.3	3,046.5	37.2	7.6

Source: Foner 2000:5; chapter 2, this volume.

legislative changes, stood at a "flexible" cap of 675,000 per year at the beginning of the twenty-first century. (Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens—spouses, parents of citizens ages 21 and older, and unmarried children under 21—are admitted without numerical limitation.) Further, the United States has allowed the large-scale admission of particular groups as refugees, Soviet Jews and Cubans being especially prominent in the New York area. Recent refugees to New York come from other places as well, including Liberians (see chapter 8). The diversity visa program, created by the 1990 U.S. immigration act to provide permanent resident visas for those from countries with relatively few immigrants in the United States, has also led to new flows to the city, including Bangladeshis as well as Nigerians and Ghanaians.

Economic factors have also underpinned the large-scale immigration to New York City in recent years. Neither the resource base nor the levels of economic development in many immigrants' home countries are adequate to meet the needs and aspirations of their populations. New York City has held out the promise of employment, higher wages, and improved living standards. In chapter 7, Vickerman notes how migration has long been a flight response among West Indians from the Anglophone Caribbean who come from small, resource-poor economies plagued by high levels of unemployment and underemployment and an unequal distribution of land, wealth, and income. West Indians are well aware of American affluence and standards of living owing to the impact of American media and tourism and because so many have relatives in the United States. Chapters 9 and 10 also describe persistent harsh economic realities—low incomes and low standards of living—fueling migration to New York.

Political factors in sending countries have also played a role. Unstable or oppressive conditions have driven some people out of their homelands, Liberians perhaps the most dramatic case in this book, who fled a country torn by bloody civil wars that were marked by torture and other gruesome atrocities (chapter 8, this volume). Changing exit policies in some sending countries have enabled large numbers to emigrate in recent years. In China, as Min Zhou explains (chapter 5), emigration was highly restricted between 1949 and 1976 (the end of the Great Cultural Revolution), a period when communication with overseas relatives was seen as antirevolutionary and subversive. In the late 1970s, when China opened its doors, it also relaxed emigration restrictions. Another group described in this book, Soviet Jews, were only allowed to emigrate in significant numbers after 1971, although in the early 1980s Soviet authorities again slammed shut the doors. By the late 1980s, in the context of political changes in the Soviet Union, the policy toward Jewish emigration was again liberalized, a situation that leads Annelise Orleck to speak of a Fourth Wave of émigrés in the post-1989 period although, as she also notes, after 2006 the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union dropped off dramatically (see chapter 4, this volume).

Once begun, immigration tends to have a kind of snowball effect. Network connections lower the costs, raise the benefits, and reduce the risks of international migration. Every new migrant, as Douglas Massey has noted, "reduces the costs and risks of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives, and some of these people are thereby induced to migrate, thus further expanding the set of people with ties abroad and, in turn, reducing the costs for a new set of people, some of whom are now more likely to decide to migrate, and so on" (1999:43). By allocating most immigrant visas along family lines, U.S. immigration law reinforces and formalizes the operation of migrant networks.

"We opened the road," is how a Mexican migrant, Don Pedro, described the beginning of migration to New York City from the municipality of Ticuani in the early 1940s. Don Pedro and his two companions initiated a migration from the Mixteca region that now accounts for a significant portion of the city's Mexican population. By the start of the twenty-first century, new migration chains from other Mexican areas had taken hold so that more Mexican New Yorkers are from Mexico City as well as elsewhere (chapter 10, this volume; Smith 2001).

As in the past, New York City continues to be one of the major gateways for new immigrants in this country. (Los Angeles is the other major new immigrant destination, with large numbers also settling in Miami, San Francisco, Chicago, Houston, and Washington, DC.) New York City has a particular attraction for certain groups, the Caribbean connection being especially strong. In 2010, 43 percent of the Dominican immigrants, 37 percent of the Trinidadians, and 26 percent of the Jamaicans in the United States lived in the city. Alternatively, only about 2 percent of Mexican immigrants, by far the largest foreign-born group in the nation, lived in New York City.

Some groups, like West Indians, have a history of settlement in New York and initially gravitated there in the post-1965 years because of the presence of a long-established immigrant community (Foner 2001). In general, the presence of large numbers of friends and relatives continues to attract immigrants to the city and the surrounding region. Once an immigrant community develops, it tends to expand as compatriots are on hand to offer newcomers a sense of security and the prospect of assistance. "Moving to New York," as one Jamaican woman told me, "became the thing to do. Most of my friends were here" (Foner 1987:198). New York is also appealing because newcomers do not stand out; the city has a tradition of immigration, with many different immigrant and racial groups.

The city itself has an image that draws certain groups. With large numbers of Caribbean people in New York, the city has become, in the words of Bryce-Laporte, the special object of their "dream[s], curiosity, sense of achievement, and desire for adventure" (1979:216). The city is salient in Caribbean immigrants' mental map as a center of North American influence and power and as a logical entry point into the country. New York has become significant for other populations, too. Migration from Neza, the nickname for an area outside of Mexico City from which many recent migrants have come, has become so common these migrants often say that they live in "Neza York" (Smith 2001, 2006).

NEW YORK AS A SPECIAL IMMIGRANT CITY

"Our deity La Ciguapa, arrived in New York City," goes a poem by a New York–based Dominican. "The subway steps changed her nature" (quoted in Torres-Saillant 1999:44). The move to New York City has a profound effect on immigrants, and their lives change in innumerable ways when they move there. New York, as a major U.S. city, offers newcomers economic opportunities of an advanced industrial society and exposes them to values and institutions of American culture. But New York City is special in many respects. That immigrants have settled there rather than, say, Los Angeles or Miami influences them in particular ways.

A host of features make New York distinctive as an immigrant city. New York City served as the historic port of entry for southern and eastern European immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries so that by 1920, Jewish and Italian immigrants and their children made up over two-fifths of the population. In the newest wave of immigration, since the late 1960s, the city has continued to attract a significant share of the nation's new arrivals. From 1900 to 2000, around 10 percent or more of the nation's foreign-born population has lived in New York City—in 2010, it was slightly lower, at about 8 percent, but still a substantial share. For much of the twentieth century, a fifth or more of New York City's residents were foreign-born; the figure reached 41 percent in 1910 and by 2010 it was nearly as high, at 37 percent (see table 1.1).

The result of these inflows is that the vast majority of New Yorkers have a close immigrant connection. If they are not immigrants themselves, they have a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is. Many of the roughly 1 million Jewish New Yorkers have grandparents or great-grandparents who arrived at the turn of the twentieth century from eastern Europe; hundreds of thousands of others have roots in Italy and Ireland. New York's white population is dominated by first-, second-, and third-generation Catholics (Irish and Italians) and Jews, and white Protestants are practically invisible, if still economically and socially powerful (Mollenkopf 1999:419). Although Puerto Ricans are not considered immigrants—those born on the island are U.S. citizens at birth—the more than 700,000 Puerto Rican New Yorkers have their roots outside the mainland United States. Most African Americans in New York have their origins in the internal migration from the South between World War I and the 1960s, but many are descended from immigrants who arrived in the early twentieth century from what was then the British Caribbean.

A striking feature of New York City's immigrant population is its extraordinary diversity. No one, two, three, or even four countries dominate, and the city has attracted sizable numbers of many European as well as Asian, West Indian, and Latin American nationalities. In 2010, the top three immigrant groups accounted for under a third of all immigrants in the city—the top ten groups, just over half (55 percent). As chapter 2 shows, this is different from many other major gateways, where Mexicans are the overwhelmingly dominant group—in Chicago and Houston, Mexicans are close to half of all immigrants, and in Los Angeles, Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans are almost three-fifths of the foreign-born population (see also Foner and Waldinger 2013). In New York City, a substantial fraction (more than a quarter) of the non-Hispanic black and white populations are immigrants—something that distinguishes New York from most other major American gateway cities, where "immigrant" generally means Latino or Asian. To put it another way, in New York City, every major ethnoracial group—non-Hispanic blacks and whites as well as Asians and Hispanics—has a significant proportion of foreign-born (Foner 2007).[2]

Ethnic diversity is the expectation in New York—a fact of life, as it were. This is welcoming for many immigrants, although for some it can be confusing. Soviet Jewish teenagers whom Orleck studied in the 1980s were confounded when they entered high school, wanting to know where the Americans were. "It is . . . hard to know what we are supposed to be becoming. Everybody here is from someplace else" (Orleck 1987:295).

There is also a long list of "place-specific conditions" that mark off New York City as an immigrant destination. By U.S. standards, New York City's government provides a wide range of social, health, and educational services, including the City University of New York (CUNY), the largest urban public university system in the nation, with about 240,000 undergraduate students enrolled in 2011, the majority of them immigrants or children of immigrants. Owing to its immigrant history, the city is home to a wide array of institutions that owe their existence, or many features, to earlier European immigrants and their children—and that provide support and assistance to new arrivals. These include settlement houses, churches and synagogues, hospitals, and labor unions (Foner forthcoming). Immigrants in New York City profit from the fact that labor unions have been consistently strong and politically influential for many decades. Indeed, in 2010–11, 23 percent of all wage and salary workers in New York City were union members, higher than any other major U.S. city; among the foreign-born in New York City, the unionization rates of those who had become U.S. citizens and entered the United States before 1990 were comparable to or higher than those of U.S.-born workers (Milkman and Braslow 2011).

New York City's political culture bears the stamp of earlier European immigration and is used to accommodating newcomers from abroad. Ethnic politics is the lifeblood of New York City politics, and no group "finds challenge unexpected or outrageous" (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). In the 1930s, Fiorello LaGuardia—who some consider the city's greatest mayor—sprinkled his speeches with Italian and Yiddish, and in the postwar years aspiring leaders visited the three I's—Israel, Italy, and Ireland—the touchstones of so many Jewish and

Catholic voters (Wakin 2003). In the twenty-first century, Mayor Michael Bloomberg not only has made trips to Israel to woo the Jewish vote but, after two years in office in 2003, had already visited the Dominican Republic three times. In May 2005, he rolled out the first of his television campaign spots in Spanish.

Politics in the city "presents newcomers with a segmented political system, organized for mobilization along ethnic group lines, and a political culture that sanctions, indeed encourages, newcomers to engage in ethnic politics" (Waldinger 1996b:1084; see also Mollenkopf forthcoming). A large number of political prizes are up for grabs—including a fifty-one-member city council and more than seven dozen state assemblymen and senators. Despite the importance of party support in sustaining native white or minority incumbents in immigrant districts, New York City's primaries have proved to be an effective path for immigrant political mobility when one group becomes predominant in a district. As of the 2009 election, the city council had nine members with immigrant roots, including three West Indians, four Dominicans, and two Chinese. (Another seventeen were African American or Puerto Rican, giving minority representatives a bare majority of the total.) In that year, the city's second highest office, comptroller, was won by John Liu, born in Taiwan (Mollenkopf forthcoming; chapter 5, this volume).

Given New York's remarkable diversity and long history of absorbing immigrants, it is not surprising that the city's official commitment to cultural pluralism and cultural diversity stands out. Officials and social service agencies actively promote events to foster ethnic pride and glorify the city's multiethnic character and history. Even something as mundane as parking rules reflect a public recognition of ethnic diversity; alternate side parking regulations are suspended on thirty-four legal and religious holidays, including the Asian Lunar New Year, Purim and Passover, the Feast of the Assumption, the Muslim holiday of Idul-Fitr, and the Hindu celebration of Diwali.

In a city that prides itself on its immigrant history, New Yorkers—both old and new—generally feel comfortable with, or at least do not openly challenge the principle of, ethnic succession. If Italians "are yesterday's newcomers and today's establishment, then maybe Colombians are the new Italians and, potentially tomorrow's establishment. New Yorkers . . . are happy to tell themselves this story. It may not be completely true, but the fact that they tell it, and believe it, is significant and may help them make it come true" (Kasinitz et al. 2004:398).

FEATURES OF NEW IMMIGRANT GROUPS AND NEW PATTERNS IN NEW YORK CITY

Immigrants are inevitably influenced by New York's particular urban context, yet they do not become homogenized in a so-called melting pot in the city. The old and new blend in many ways in response to circumstances in the city—a kind of New Yorkization process (cf. Foner 1999). As Glazer and Moynihan wrote some fifty years ago, in New York immigrants become "something they had not been, but still something distinct and identifiable" (1963:14). The particular blend of meanings, perceptions, and patterns of behavior that emerges is shaped, to a large degree, by the culture, social practices, skills, and education that newcomers bring with them when they arrive—as well as by a variety of sociodemographic features of their particular immigrant group. Moreover, even as they settle in New York City, immigrants often continue to maintain ties with their homelands—and these transnational connections have consequences for their lives in the city.

PREMIGRATION CULTURAL AND SOCIAL PATTERNS

Immigrants come to New York City carrying with them a "memory of things past" that operates as a filter through which they view and experience life in the city. Some of their former beliefs and social institutions may persist intact, although usually they undergo change, if only subtly, in form and function in response to circumstances in New York. To put it another way, their premigration values, attitudes, and customs do not simply fade away; they shape, often in a complex fashion, how individuals in each group adjust to and develop new cultural patterns in New York.

Take something as basic as cooking and cuisine. Newcomers may add hamburgers, bagels, pizza, and fried chicken to their diets in New York City and concoct new dishes that use ingredients available there, but they still also eat such traditional foods as plantain and curried goat (Jamaicans), pickled herring and *shashlyk* (Jews from the former Soviet Union), and African peppers and cassava leaves (Liberians) (see, for example, Khandelwal 2002; Hauck-Lawson et al. 2008). Immigrant languages are alive and well in New York—indeed, lack of proficiency in English may limit patterns of association as well as the ability to obtain jobs in the mainstream economy.

Premigration family and religious patterns also have an impact. Of course, they may fill new needs and acquire new meanings in New York or be transformed in significant ways. South Asian families still often arrange their children's marriages or, in a modified "semiarranged" pattern, introduce suitable, prescreened young men and women who are then allowed a courtship period during which they decide whether they like each other well enough to marry (see Foner 1999; Khandelwal 2002; Kibria 2009; Lessinger 1995). In chapter 4, Orleck mentions that many Central Asian "Bukharan" Jews also continue to arrange their children's marriages in New York; when the children resist, serious conflicts, sometimes resulting in physical violence, may result. Child-rearing patterns may be

modified too. Although West Indian parents continue to believe that sparing the rod is a recipe for disaster, and are outraged if they cannot use corporal punishment the way they did back home, some parents seek to adopt new techniques that are more in tune with mainstream American norms, something that Ludwig also notes of Liberians (chapter 8; see Waters and Sykes 2009).

Religious beliefs and practices from immigrants' homeland cultures are what draw many to places of worship in New York. Many have been founded and built in the city to cater to the growing number of new arrivals, from Pentecostal churches among West Indians to Hindu temples among Indians and Muslim mosques among West Africans, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Middle Easterners; old-country beliefs also explain the continuation of customs like Haitian voodoo ceremonies (Abdullah 2010; Abusharaf 1998; Brown 1991; Guest 2003; Lessinger 1995; McAlister 1998).

TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

Home-country cultural patterns may be strengthened by ongoing ties with communities and people in the country of origin—what social scientists refer to as transnational ties. Immigrant New Yorkers often send money to relatives back home. Cheap phone calls, and the advent of cell phones, allow them to keep in touch with those they left behind, as does the Internet, through e-mail, instant messaging, and Skype. Frequent, fast, and relatively inexpensive flights, especially to nearby countries like the Dominican Republic, facilitate visits home and enable relatives and friends from the home country to visit New York, as well (see chapter 5, this volume). Given dual-citizenship provisions in a growing number of countries, many retain citizenship in their country of origin even after becoming U.S. citizens.

The consequences of involvement in home-country politics are complex—and sometimes contradictory. Although such involvement does not inevitably draw energies and interests away from political engagement in the United States, it can of course happen (see Jones-Correa 1998). Silvio Torres-Saillant and Ramona Hernández (chapter 9, this volume) note that while many Dominican New Yorkers see the U.S. political arena as the appropriate stage for their involvement—and younger local leaders are more committed to developing coalitions in New York than to homeland politics—others have their "hearts set on the affairs of one of the major political parties in the Dominican Republic." At the same time, concerns about the country of origin can provide a catalyst for engagement in U.S. politics, and involvement in homeland-based organizations can provide organizational skills and strengthen migrants' ability to mobilize a base of support for political issues and elections in New York (see Basch 1987; Guarnizo et al. 1999; Rogers 2006; Wong et al. 2011).

In general, an appreciation of the connections migrants maintain with the homeland should not blind us to—or detract attention from—efforts to build communities and develop a home in New York. Ties to the country of origin can go hand-in-hand with being deeply grounded in and attached to the United States. This is true for both the first and second generation. Second-generation Dominicans, for example, do not see loyalty to the United States as requiring cutting off links to the Dominican Republic, where they often maintain close affective ties to grandparents and other relatives (chapter 9, this volume).

For the vast majority of the U.S.-born second generation—who represent an ever-growing proportion of the Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean communities in New York City—the United States is truly home. Deep connections to the parents' country of origin and regular transnational practices are the exception, not the rule, Philip Kasinitz and his colleagues conclude from their large-scale study of the young adult children of immigrants in metropolitan New York. They found that few seriously considered living in their parents' homeland for a sustained length of time; indeed, visits there often made them feel more "American" than before (Kasinitz et al. 2008:262–64; chapter 11, this volume).

HUMAN CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC INCORPORATION

The concept of human capital refers to the knowledge or skills that individual migrants bring with them, but it can be applied to groups as well. Every group, of course, includes highly skilled people as well as those who are unlettered and have little training. Yet clearly some groups have human capital advantages that others do not share.

Asian and European groups in New York City have among the highest levels of education, many Latin American and Hispanic Caribbean groups among the lowest (Lobo and Salvo 2004). In 2010, about half of the adult Russian and Indian immigrants in New York City had a college degree—outpacing native-born New Yorkers—while this was true for only 5 percent of Mexican immigrants. Indeed, only about four out of ten Mexican immigrants in New York City were even high school graduates (chapter 2, this volume).

As one might expect, groups with high proportions of college graduates, like Russians and Asian Indians, do relatively well in New York's economy—though factors other than education and occupational skills also determine occupational success. Lack of U.S. job experience, credentials, and fluent English, for example, often prevents immigrants who held professional or highly regarded jobs in their home countries from getting work of comparable status here. Orleck speaks of an "intellectual holocaust" that has occurred as Jewish physicians, chemists, lawyers, and professors from the former Soviet Union have sometimes ended up

driving cabs, doing filing, or working as home health care aides in New York City (chapter 4, this volume). Well-educated immigrants who cannot find jobs congruent with their occupational backgrounds frequently turn to entrepreneurial pursuits as a better alternative than low-level service or factory jobs—one reason for the proliferation of small businesses in the Korean community. Not surprisingly, very few of the Korean second generation have gone into small business; armed with American college and university degrees, many have obtained high-level jobs in the mainstream economy (Kim 2004).

As David Dyssegaard Kallick brings out (chapter 3), immigrants are a remarkable 45 percent of New York City's resident labor force. In 2009, about three-quarters of immigrant men and nearly three-fifths of immigrant women were in the city's labor force—which put the women on a par with, and men above, their native-born counterparts. Immigrants are well represented in occupations from the top to the bottom of the economic ladder, with nearly half working in white-collar jobs—a good number in managerial, technical, and professional occupations. To anyone familiar with the city, it would not be a shock to learn that three-quarters of New Yorkers who work as construction laborers and nursing aides are immigrants. It may come as a surprise, however, that immigrants are half of the accountants, a third of financial managers, and two-fifths of physicians living in New York City. Taken as a whole, immigrants have slightly lower poverty rates than the native-born, although for some groups the rates are higher—Mexicans and Dominicans are two prime examples (chapter 2, this volume).

Many immigrant groups are heavily concentrated in specific occupational niches. Kallick mentions Mexicans in food preparation services, Pakistani taxi cab drivers, and Haitian health care workers (chapter 3). Other chapters bring out different concentrations—Korean nail salon owners, Jamaican nursing aides and nannies, and Chinese restaurant workers, to mention a few. Immigrant occupational specialties take hold for a variety of reasons. They reflect a combination of the skills, cultural preferences, and human capital within a group as well as the opportunities available when they arrived. Sometimes members of a group come with previous experience in fields for which a demand exists—Filipino nurses, for example. English language ability plays a role in steering some groups into jobs where interpersonal communication is important. By the same token, lack of transferable skills and fluency in English limits immigrants' scope. Sheer happenstance can be involved, too, as a few pioneers from a group go into a particular line of work and pave the way for others. Once a group becomes concentrated in an industry or occupation, this facilitates the entry of additional coethnics through job referrals and training so that ethnic niches become, as Roger Waldinger (1996a) puts it, self-reproducing (on the making of ethnic niches in the city, see also Foner 2000; Model 1993).

Much depends on the kinds of niches a group establishes. Koreans have benefited from their concentration in small business—and their web of trade associations, ethnic media and organizations, and churches that have reinforced, supported, and encouraged entrepreneurial activity (Min 2001). Jamaican niches in health care and public employment have not provided anything like the opportunity to employ coethnics, accumulate capital, or establish credit that small business ownership does. In fact, educational credentials and bureaucratic requirements limit the scope of network hiring in white-collar and especially in public sector employment (Kasinitz 2001). On the positive side, concentration in health care and social assistance jobs largely accounts for high unionization rates among Jamaican as well as Guyanese, Haitian, and African immigrants; unionized jobs typically provide higher wages and more job security than non-union jobs (Milkman and Braslow 2011).

The young adult children of immigrants, as chapter 11 shows, have largely exited from parental occupational niches owing to greater opportunity as well as distaste for "stereotypical ethnic jobs." The most common jobs among the second generation in their study were mainstream retail, white-collar manager, and clerical positions. "I don't do that factory thing," said one young man of Colombian origin, explaining why he would not follow in his father's footsteps. Or as the daughter of a Chinese immigrant jewelry store owner put it when asked if her father would like her to take over the business: "No, he doesn't hate me that much!" (chapter 11, this volume).

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The demographic composition of an immigrant group can have an impact on patterns that develop in New York City. The group's sheer size as well as spatial concentration influences, among other things, whether it can support a sizable number of ethnic businesses and provide enough votes to elect its own candidates. Dominicans' concentration in northern Manhattan as well as neighborhoods in other boroughs has been an asset at the ballot box in putting Dominicans into office; residential segregation among West Indians, while clearly disadvantageous in many respects, has helped them gain seats in the city council and New York State legislature. Conversely, as Smith (chapter 10, this volume) argues, Mexican immigrants' geographical dispersion contributes to making political mobilization among them problematic.

Gender and age ratios in each group affect marriage and family patterns. For example, a markedly unbalanced gender ratio will encourage marriage outside the group or consign many to singlehood or the search for spouses in the home country or elsewhere in the United States. A sizable proportion of old people in an immigrant group's population may, as among Russian Jews in Brighton Beach, ease the child care burden of working women (Orleck 1987). Korean families have often brought elderly relatives to New York City for this reason. Pyong Gap

Min has described how his own mother-in-law came to this country in 1981 "at the age of 58 as a temporary visitor to help with childcare and housework as my wife and I were struggling with three children, a small business, and my Ph.D. program. The next year my wife, a naturalized citizen, filed petitions for her parents' permanent residence" (1998:87). The presence of an elderly mother or mother-in-law in Korean immigrant households has other implications—it puts less pressure on husbands to help out and thus may end up reinforcing patriarchal practices.

RACE, RELIGION, AND LEGAL STATUS

Immigrants' race has crucial consequences for their experiences and reactions to New York life. Nativism, or opposition to groups because they are foreign, may not be strong in New York City, especially compared to other parts of the United States, but racial inequality is deeply entrenched (Waters forthcoming). Whereas whiteness is an asset for newcomers of European ancestry, dark skin brings disadvantages. People of color continue to experience prejudice and discrimination, and residential segregation between whites and blacks in New York City persists at remarkably high levels. In an analysis of black-white segregation in fifty American metropolitan areas with the largest black populations in 2010, New York was the third most segregated area, just behind Detroit and Milwaukee (Logan and Stults 2011; see also Beveridge et al. 2013).

Immigrants with African ancestry develop new attitudes and perceptions of themselves in New York City, where their racialization as blacks reflects different racial conceptions than those in their home societies. As chapter 7 shows, Jamaicans may identify as Jamaican or West Indian, but other New Yorkers often just see them as "black." Jamaican immigrants find it painful and difficult to cope with the degree of interpersonal racism they encounter in their daily lives (see Waters 1999). Apart from everyday slights and insults, racial discrimination places constraints on where they and other black immigrants can live and affects treatment by the police and opportunities on the job (see Foner 1987, 2000, 2001, 2005; Vickerman 1999; Waters 1999). Other immigrants of color confront racial discrimination too, but this tends to be less problematic than for immigrants of African ancestry who are defined as black. Indeed, research shows that dark-skinned Latino immigrants face barriers and discrimination that their light-skinned coethnics do not experience.

For the vast majority of immigrants, who are Christian or Jewish, religion is not a barrier, indeed tends to facilitate acceptance in New York (Foner and Alba 2008). However, Muslim newcomers from South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, India) and the Middle East, whose numbers have grown in recent years, may face difficulties. In the backlash after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade

Center, some have been victims of discrimination, harassment, and occasionally even hate crimes owing to their religion or nationality. "Why you live here, go back to your country," a Palestinian woman in Brooklyn found written on her door, to give one example (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009:144). The public controversy in 2010 over building a Muslim community center a few blocks from the World Trade Center—which was vocally supported by the Lower Manhattan Community Board and Mayor Bloomberg but attacked by many Republican politicians such as former mayor Rudolph Giuliani—also no doubt reflected and reinforced anti-Muslim prejudices among many New Yorkers.

Lack of legal status is a significant basis of inequality and exclusion for large numbers of Latino, Caribbean, and Asian immigrants. In 2010, an estimated 499,000 immigrants in New York City were undocumented (chapter 2, this volume), but because they often live in mixed-status families—for example, with U.S.-born citizen children—a much larger number are affected by legal status issues. As Robert Smith indicates (chapter 10), a remarkably high proportion of Mexican immigrants live in the legal shadows. The undocumented are particularly vulnerable in the labor market, commonly found in low-paid jobs with unpleasant, sometimes dangerous, working conditions (chapter 3, this volume). Without legal status, they are ineligible for most federally funded social welfare and health benefits (emergency Medicaid is one exception), and the record number of deportations in the United States in recent years—nearly 400,000 in fiscal year 2011—has heightened fears among them.

New York City is sometimes referred to as a sanctuary city, which follows practices to protect undocumented immigrants—in 2006, for example, the city distributed a letter in eleven languages assuring immigrants that no one would question their legal status when they sought care at the city's public hospitals, and undocumented immigrants in New York State are eligible for in-state tuition at public colleges. But New York City has little influence on federal policies which, as Smith notes (chapter 10), reign supreme when it comes to the all-important matter of legalization. As of this writing, federal laws have yet to provide a path to legalization and ultimately citizenship for the undocumented.

IMMIGRANTS' IMPACT ON NEW YORK CITY

The massive immigration of the last five decades has been remaking New York City in profound ways. At its most basic, immigration has brought about a dramatic demographic transformation; it is a major factor fueling population growth and has led to remarkable ethnoracial diversity, as chapter 2 describes in detail.

Many groups have been continually replenished by new members—Dominicans, Chinese, and Jamaicans, to mention three that have been in the top ten for several decades. New arrivals, fresh off the plane, often join compatriots

who have been in New York for decades as well as the U.S.-born children—and grandchildren—of the earlier arrivals. Some belong to groups that are new to the city's immigrant scene, Liberians among them, who only began arriving in significant numbers in the last ten or fifteen years. The Mexican population, which was practically invisible before 1990, has grown by leaps and bounds, now ranking as the third largest immigrant group in New York City official statistics. Taken together, the millions of new New Yorkers and their children have been changing the sights, sounds, and tastes of the city as well as a wide range of institutions and communities.

NEIGHBORHOODS AND COMMUNITIES

The more than doubling of the city's immigrant population since 1970 has given rise to dense ethnic neighborhoods. With continuing immigration, new ethnic neighborhoods and ethnic conglomerations have cropped up in every borough.

Many neighborhoods of the city have taken on a distinct ethnic character. In Crown Heights, Flatbush, and East Flatbush in central Brooklyn—and many bordering neighborhoods like Canarsie—West Indian beauty parlors, restaurants, record stores, and bakeries dot the landscape, and Haitian Creole and West Indian accents fill the air. "[When I walk] along . . . Nostrand Avenue," the novelist Paule Marshall (1985) has noted, "I have to remind myself that I'm in Brooklyn, and not in the middle of a teeming outdoor market in St. George's, Grenada or Kingston, Jamaica." Several neighborhoods in the northeastern Bronx (Wakefield, Williamsbridge, and Baychester) and southeastern Queens (Laurelton, St. Albans, Springfield Gardens, Rosedale, and Cambria Heights) also now have a definite West Indian flavor. In chapter 8, Bernadette Ludwig describes a new immigrant neighborhood—Little Liberia—on the northern end of Staten Island, which now has an outdoor market where women sell African foods.

Several chapters show how the number of settlements in different groups has multiplied in response to growing immigration. Although Brooklyn's Brighton Beach, or "Little Odessa," remains an emotional and cultural home base for Russian Jews across the New York area, they have spread out to nearby Sheepshead Bay, Manhattan Beach, and Bensonhurst. A community of Central Asian Jews flourishes in Forest Hills and Rego Park in Queens, where 108th Street is now known as "Bukharan Broadway"; the neighborhood, according to Orleck (chapter 4), is affectionately known as "Queensistan." Manhattan's expanding Chinatown has spilled over into adjacent districts, including the City Hall area, Little Italy, and the Lower East Side, and two new satellite Chinatowns are thriving in Flushing and Sunset Park; visible Chinese clusters can also be found in places like Woodside and Elmhurst in Queens and Bay Ridge, Bensonhurst, and

Sheepshead Bay in Brooklyn. Dominicans have branched out from their ethnic enclave in upper Manhattan's Washington Heights to areas of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. By 2008, the Bronx, with heavy Dominican concentrations in neighborhoods in the southwest such as Morris Heights and Tremont, had surpassed Manhattan as the most popular borough for people of Dominican ancestry, with 39 percent of all Dominicans as compared to 29 percent in Manhattan (Caro-Lopez and Limonic 2010).

Immigrants have created not only large and dense ethnic settlements but also polyethnic neighborhoods that are amalgams of newcomers from all parts of the world. The number 7 train that connects Times Square in Manhattan with Flushing in Queens has been dubbed the International Express, as it weaves through multiethnic neighborhoods in Queens that have no parallel in previous waves of immigration. Queens is in fact the most ethnically and racially diverse county in the United States (chapter 2, this volume). Elmhurst, to mention one Queens neighborhood, is a true ethnic mélange, with large numbers of Chinese, Colombians, Koreans, Mexicans, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Dominicans, and Ecuadorians. Although Flushing (also in Queens) is often referred to as a new Chinatown, it is home to a growing number of Central and South American as well as Chinese, Indian, and Korean immigrants who join a native-born white population that, though declining, remains substantial. At the other end of Queens, Astoria, once a predominantly Italian and Greek neighborhood, has attracted large numbers of Bangladeshis, Brazilians, Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and Middle Easterners, among others, thereby becoming another ethnic stew.

As the chapters on the different groups in the volume demonstrate, clusters of recent immigrants have given rise to new ethnic businesses and have affected the composition of schools and places of worship all over the city. Neighborhood-based immigrant institutions and organizations like community centers, voluntary associations, and political groups have emerged and grown as have new churches, mosques, and temples.

Immigrants have played a central role in revitalizing many neighborhoods. When immigrants began arriving in Brighton Beach in the mid-1970s, the neighborhood was in decline: apartments stood empty as elderly Jewish residents died or moved to Florida, and the main commercial avenue was a dying strip of old stores. Soviet Jews filled apartments and turned the avenue into a thriving commercial center, with nightclubs, restaurants, state-of-the-art electronics stores, and clothing boutiques selling European designer clothing (chapter 4, this volume). Another Brooklyn neighborhood, Sunset Park, was in the "throes of a long twilight" that began in the 1950s when the area was devastated by, among other things, a drastic cutback in jobs on its waterfront and in industry and the exodus of tens of thousands of white residents to the suburbs. Louis Winnick argues that in Sunset Park, as in many other city neighborhoods "outside the yuppie

strongholds of Manhattan and other favored areas of Brooklyn and Queens," immigrants have been the leading factor in neighborhood revitalization. "Owing to their high employment rates and multiple wage earners, the new foreigners have injected large doses of new purchasing power into the rehabilitation of an aging housing stock and the resurrection of inert retail stores" (Winnick 1990:62). The Chinese—who make up a growing proportion of Sunset Park's population—have opened numerous retail stores, service businesses, and garment factories where they and their coethnics work and shop, and they have bought, and fixed up, many of the two- and three-story houses in the neighborhood (chapter 5, this volume). The process has been repeated in the Queens neighborhood of Richmond Hill, where Indians and Indo-Caribbeans have established an array of new businesses—roti stands, sari stores, and groceries—that draw not only local customers but also immigrants from the suburbs looking for Indo-Caribbean and Sikh products. Throughout the five boroughs, immigrants have expanded the number of businesses, many of them catering to a growing ethnic market, one of the ways that new arrivals have contributed to economic growth in the city (chapter 3, this volume).

CUISINE AND POPULAR CULTURE

Immigrants have added to the city's cultural and culinary life. Restaurants and groceries run by newcomers have exposed New Yorkers, native and immigrant alike, to new cuisines and foods. Some thirty years ago, Bernard Wong (1982) wrote about Chinese immigrants broadening New Yorkers' tastes beyond Cantonese cooking to regional dishes from Shanghai, Hunan, and Szechuan. Since then, Indian, Thai, Vietnamese, Korean, and Jamaican restaurants—to name but a few—have become common on the city's restaurant scene. Korean food, relatively unknown to New Yorkers twenty years ago, has become more familiar with the proliferation of Korean restaurants in "K-Town" in mid-Manhattan. In the wake of the huge Mexican immigration, New York, one journalist quipped, finally shed its reputation as a city with terrible Mexican food (Asimov 2000). The city's ubiquitous street food vendors serve up a multicultural feast, from chalupas to souvlaki; the winner of New York City's sixth annual Vendy award—for the best street food vendor—was a Palestinian-born "falafel king" who normally parked his van in Astoria (Pearson and Schapiro 2010).

Musically, too, immigrants have had an influence, from Jamaican reggae and dance hall to Dominican merengue (Allen and Wilcken 2001; Austerlitz 1997; Flores 2000). Hip-hop was originally as much a creation of Afro-Caribbean and Latino youth in New York as it was an African American form, and many famous hip-hop artists have Caribbean origins, including Biggie Smalls (Brooklyn-born Christopher Wallace of Jamaican parents), rapper-producer Wyclef Jean, whose work celebrates his Haitian origins, and the Jamaican-born Kool Herc (born Clive Campbell) (Kasinitz forthcoming; chapter 7, this volume). Music and visual arts with immigrant roots have imported, built on, and altered cultural forms from the homeland in the New York context. "African American young people dance to Jamaican dance hall music and imitate Jamaican patois," Kasinitz (1999:29) has written; "Puerto Ricans dance to [Dominican] merengue."

New ethnic parades and festivals represent practically every immigrant group in the city. The largest is the West Indian American Day Parade, which attracts between 1 and 2 million people every Labor Day on Brooklyn's Eastern Parkway and has become a mandatory campaign stop for politicians seeking citywide office. The annual Dominican Day Parade, described by Torres-Saillant and Hernández, held every August in midtown Manhattan, also attracts politicians of all stripes and provides an opportunity for Dominicans to "flaunt their ethnicity, their flag, and their resolve to affirm their belonging in the city" (chapter 9, this volume). Since 2004, the city has sponsored an annual Immigrant Heritage Week honoring "the vibrant immigrant cultures, heritages, and communities found in every corner of the City" through film screenings, art exhibits, walking tours, and other programs. The ethnic media are flourishing. By one count in 2001, at least 198 magazines and newspapers were publishing in thirty-six languages, including seven New York daily newspapers in Chinese with a combined circulation of half a million (Scher 2001). There are also many radio and television stations with programs that draw listeners and viewers in different ethnic constituencies.

A spate of novels emerging out of the experiences of recent immigrants and their children has enriched the city's literary tradition, among them *Typical American* by Gish Jen (1992, Chinese); *Native Speaker* by Chang-Rae Lee (1995, Korean); *Breath, Eyes, Memory* by Edwidge Danticat (1995, Haitian), and *Russian Debutante's Handbook* by Gary Shteyngart (2003, Soviet Jews). The literary output in the Dominican community is a subject of chapter 9 as part of the analysis of the creation of a Dominican American culture, which considers, among others, the award-winning *The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao* by Junot Díaz (2007) and *How the Garcia Girls Lost Their Accents* by Julia Alvarez (1992).

RACE AND ETHNICITY

The massive immigration of recent years has changed the racial and ethnic dynamics of New York City. In street-level and popular discourse, New Yorkers think of a four-race framework: white, black, Hispanic, and Asian. The proportion of Asians and Hispanics has mushroomed; the proportion of whites has

been steadily declining. Between 1980 and 2010, non-Hispanic whites went from 52 to 33 percent of New York City's population, Hispanics from 20 to 29 percent, Asians from 3 to 13 percent, and non-Hispanic blacks held fairly steady, 24 percent in 1980, 23 percent in 2010.

Gone are the days when Hispanic meant Puerto Rican; in 2010, Puerto Ricans accounted for just under a third of the city's Hispanic population, outnumbered by a combination of Dominicans, Mexicans, Ecuadorians, Colombians, and other Latin Americans. Asian no longer means Chinese but also Asian Indian, Korean, Filipino, and Bangladeshi (to name the largest non-Chinese groups). The black population increasingly has been Caribbeanized—and Africans are adding more diversity. By 2010, the Caribbean- and African-born populations were about a third of non-Hispanic blacks, up from less than 10 percent in 1970 (chapter 2, this volume).

This new racial and ethnic amalgam has been changing perceptions of race and ethnicity as well as creating new alliances, relationships, and divisions. All over the city, countless examples exist of amicable relations developing among immigrants from different countries, as well as between immigrants and the native-born, in workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods. Among the second generation, these patterns are especially pronounced, as young people mingle with each other and native minorities (less often with native whites) and become comfortable with those from different national backgrounds and take for granted the incredible ethnic mix in their classes, on the subway, in stores, and on the streets as a basic part of life in the city. As Kasinitz and his colleagues write, they may feel the sting of disadvantage and discrimination, but members of the second generation "move in a world where being from 'somewhere else' is the norm" and being ethnic is taken for granted as part of "being an American New Yorker" (2004:397, 286). Because established minority and second-generation young people in New York City under the age of eighteen dominate their age cohort, they have a great deal of contact with each other in their neighborhoods and a variety of institutions. Most respondents in the New York second-generation study had a diverse group of friends, describing social networks that included a "veritable United Nations of friends" (Kasinitz et al. 2008:339–40). Many defined themselves as "New Yorkers"—meaning people who "could come from immigrant groups, native minority groups, or be Italian, Irish, Jews, or the like" (Kasinitz et al. 2004:17).

Less happily, conflict is also part of the story. In this volume, Min Zhou writes of tensions between immigrant Chinese and longtime white residents in Flushing, as the remaining whites in what was once a virtually all-white area often feel locked out of what has become an Asian majority neighborhood (chapter 5). Black boycotts of Korean stores were visible in the city in the 1980s and 1990s (Min 2006), although they seem to be a thing of the past, according

to Min (chapter 6), who argues that the reduction in the number of Korean businesses and growing racial and ethnic diversity in black neighborhoods help to explain the change.

In chapter 7, Milton Vickerman gives a nuanced picture of relations between Jamaicans and African Americans, which are characterized by both distancing and identification; Jamaicans seek to assert their ethnic identity and show they are different from African Americans at the same time as they feel a shared bond with African Americans as blacks and victims of racial discrimination (see also Foner 1987, 2001; Vickerman 1999; Waters 1999). Among the second generation, he argues, evidence suggests a gradual blurring of boundaries between African American and West Indian youth. Immigrants in other groups, too, engage in strategies to avoid being lumped with, and experiencing the same kind of discrimination as, African Americans and Puerto Ricans. Torres-Saillant and Hernández (chapter 9) report that members of the Dominican second generation may use Dominican-inflected Spanish to avoid being taken for African American, while also attempting to distance themselves from the anti-Haitian and antiblack prejudices prominent in the Dominican Republic (also see Itzigsohn 2009). According to Robert Smith (2006), Mexicans see themselves as "not black" and "not Puerto Rican" although, interestingly, some academically successful Mexican youths in New York City high schools identify and seek out their black counterparts as a way to become incorporated into the African American middle-class culture of mobility and facilitate their own upward path.

ETHNIC DIVISION OF LABOR

As immigrants have entered New York's economy and set up businesses, they have changed the ethnic division of labor—and perceptions of it. If you hail a taxi, your driver is likely to be South Asian; if you are a patient in a hospital, it is a good bet that the nursing aide taking your temperature will be West Indian; the vendor at the corner newsstand is Indian.

Nearly half of all small business owners living in New York City are immigrants, making up a whopping 90 percent of owners of dry cleaners and laundries, 84 percent of small grocery store owners, and 70 percent of beauty salon owners in the New York metropolitan area, to name a few (chapter 3). As particular groups concentrate in certain specialties, they often put their own stamp on them. Koreans reinvented the corner grocery, adding salad bars, deli counters, and bouquets of flowers, although Korean retail stores—grocery, produce, and fish stores—have recently declined in number owing in good part to the emergence of chain megastores. Koreans have also pioneered businesses, such

as the now-ubiquitous nail salons, by taking what were once more exclusive products or services and making them cheaper (Lee 1999). Nail salons and dry cleaners are now the two major Korean businesses in the New York–New Jersey metropolitan area. By 2006, Koreans owned the vast majority of the nail salons in this area—about 4,000 in all, a nearly threefold increase since 1991 (chapter 6; for an ethnographic account of Korean nail salons in New York City see Kang 2010). The number of Korean-owned dry cleaners has also grown astronomically, up to about 3,000 in the New York–New Jersey metropolitan area in 2006 and constituting around half of all such establishments (Min 2008:37–38). West Indians have brought the concept of a privatized network of passenger vans to New York City, as their jitneys ply the streets of Queens and Brooklyn, offering lower prices and more frequent and convenient services than city buses (chapter 7). West African merchants have altered the city's street-vending business, bringing high-end items like "Rolex" watches and "Prada" bags to the street corner (Stoller 2001).

MAINSTREAM INSTITUTIONS

Immigrants are leaving their mark on a broad range of mainstream institutions in the city, from schools and hospitals to churches and museums.

The surge of immigration has led to major increases in public school enrollment, which is now over the 1 million mark, with the majority of students either immigrants or children of immigrants. With so many students and a limited budget, the public schools are squeezed for space. Although many immigrant students are doing remarkably well in the schools, there is no denying they bring with them a host of special needs. Many have to overcome poor educational preparation in their home countries or, at the least, unfamiliarity with subjects, teaching methods, and the discipline used. In addition to adjusting to new norms and customs in New York, many have a language problem to contend with. The diverse mix of immigrants in New York City means a dazzling array of languages. In one Queens elementary school, nearly 80 percent of the incoming students arrived speaking no English; among them the children in the school spoke thirty-six languages (Hedges 2000). In 2010–11, about 154,000 students in New York City's public schools were classified as English language learners (not proficient in English), with 168 home languages represented among them; Spanish was the home language for some two-thirds, and another quarter spoke Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese, and other dialects), Bengali, Arabic, Haitian Creole, Russian, or Urdu (New York City Board of Education 2010–11). In response to the immigrant influx, the city has opened a number of schools specifically designed for recent immigrant children with limited English proficiency, the most well-known being the International High School in Long Island City. Higher up the educational ladder, new ethnic studies programs have emerged at universities and colleges, most notably CUNY, including one (the Dominican Studies Institute) headed by an author in this volume (Ramona Hernández). CUNY has recently instituted an outreach program, based on an agreement with the Mexican Consulate, to promote education in the city's Mexican community, including a Web site offering information about CUNY in English and Spanish (chapter 10, this volume).

The city's Roman Catholic schools have also experienced an influx of immigrant children. Although many newcomers have formed their own churches, temples, and mosques—witness the more than 500 Korean Protestant churches in the New York–New Jersey metropolitan area (chapter 6, this volume; Min 2010)—large numbers have been drawn to the Catholic church and established Protestant congregations. New York's Catholic church has a growing Latino presence, and an increasing number of Catholic churches conduct masses in Spanish as well as other languages, including Haitian Creole (McAlister 1998). Catholic churches in Washington Heights have emerged as Dominican congregations, holding mass in Spanish and inviting officials from the island to participate in church activities; elsewhere in the city, Mexican immigrants have been "Mexicanizing" many Catholic churches, including adding devotional practices dedicated to the Virgin of Guadalupe, the patron saint of Mexico (Galvez 2009; Semple 2011; Smith 2006; see Ricourt and Danta 2003 on the Latinization of the Catholic church in Queens).

The composition of the staff and patients of the city's hospitals has changed as well. The nurses, aides, and orderlies are often West Indian or Filipino; patients, especially at municipal hospitals run by New York City's Health and Hospitals Corporation, are frequently non-English-speaking immigrants who bring with them their own set of cultural values regarding health and medical treatment—which, in the New York context, means a bewildering assortment of patterns. New York City hospitals have established programs to address the need for better interpreter and translation services (language assistance is now mandated by law), and some have programs to serve the cultural and medical needs and health risks of particular groups. Lutheran Medical Center, for example, a nonprofit hospital close to Sunset Park, has special language, food, and cultural services available to the Chinese community (Zhou et al. 2013); Coney Island Hospital, a municipal hospital in southern Brooklyn, touts its treatment of the high incidence of thyroid cancers among Ukrainian and Russian survivors of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident and a healthy heart program geared to nearby Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. In general, however, what is available in the health care system, in terms of language services and responsiveness to cross-cultural health care, is unfortunately still often inadequate

(Tung 2008; see Guo 2000 on the problems elderly Chinese immigrants face in New York in dealing with the health care system).

Immigration has also been reshaping mainstream cultural institutions. New York City's public library branches offer a growing number of books, DVDs, and CDs in many languages. In 2012, non-English titles made up 12 percent of items in the stacks of the Queens system, which had large collections in Spanish and Chinese as well as Korean, Russian, French, Hindi, Italian, and Bengali (Berger 2012). New museums have sprouted up to spotlight the history or arts of Asian and Latino groups. Two notable additions are the Museum of the Chinese in America in lower Manhattan, founded in 1980 and moved in 2009 to a building designed by the architect Maya Lin, and El Museo del Barrio in East Harlem, created in 1969 to focus on the Puerto Rican diaspora but since then changed to include all Latin Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States. Older museums dedicated to Ellis Island–era immigrants are taking steps to include the post-1965 arrivals; the Tenement Museum has added "then and now" walking tours on the Lower East Side, and the Ellis Island Immigration Museum is slated to open a new section on the post–Ellis Island era in 2013.

CONCLUSION

Immigrants, it is clear, are not only influenced by social, economic, and political forces in New York City, but are also agents of change in their new environment. The newest New Yorkers have radically transformed the city—and more changes are in store. Predicting the future is a risky business, yet it is worth reflecting on some ways that the influx of newcomers will leave its stamp on the city and the lives of immigrants and their children in the years ahead.

The signs are that high levels of immigration will continue, at least in the near future. The United States is likely to remain an immigration country for many years to come, allowing hundreds of thousands per year to enter; New York City can expect to receive a substantial share, if only because of the networks that link newcomers to settlers. Immigrants from abroad will not be the only new arrivals, of course. As Lobo and Salvo show, New York City receives large numbers of domestic, often college-educated, migrants from other parts of the country, who will remain a part of the demographic picture (chapter 2). At the same time, immigration is bound to continue to play a critical role in the city's population vitality, especially in the context of a growing proportion of elderly and the exit of many native-born New Yorkers to greener pastures in the suburbs and elsewhere. If first- and second-generation immigrants are the majority in New York City today, we can expect this to be the case for some time to come.

Continued inflows will enrich and replenish the city's ethnic communities. With fresh memories and connections to the homeland, new arrivals will help to keep alive old-country traditions and orientations as well as actual transnational ties. A number of trends already evident in New York's racial-ethnic dynamics are also likely to continue—and indeed, may well accelerate. Puerto Ricans' share of the city's Latino population is bound to shrink; the proportion of Dominicans, Mexicans, Ecuadorians, and Colombians will rise. In addition to ongoing immigration, many Latino groups have high fertility rates, which will add to their numbers (chapter 2).

The Caribbeanization of the city's black population will no doubt persist—and its Africanization will become more prominent. Although the number of Africans is still relatively small, legal immigration from West African countries has grown substantially in the last two decades. Given the network-driven nature of immigration, the dominant role of family preferences in the allocation of immigrant visas, and push factors in West African sending countries, the African influx is sure to accelerate. The proportion of Asians in the city will also grow, owing to immigration as well as fertility. Here, too, new players will be increasingly important, among the most notable Bangladeshis, who have gone from a tiny population in 1990 to one of the top twenty immigrant groups in 2010.

The growing number of newcomers—and naturalized and birthright citizens—will make immigrants (and especially their children) more important in New York City's political arena. Dominicans and West Indians, with their large numbers and geographic concentration, are likely to build on their history in the past two decades of electing coethnics to city and state positions. The Chinese, another large population, have begun to elect their own to city offices, including Taiwanese-born John Liu, who won the race for comptroller in 2009 through significant African American as well as Asian support in addition to the endorsement of many of the city's ethnic newspapers and other media outlets (chapter 11). In 2012, Grace Meng, the Queens-born daughter of Taiwanese immigrants, became the first Asian American elected to Congress from New York City, representing a newly drawn Queens district. Mexicans, a large and fast-growing group, are poised to make gains, although as Smith (chapter 10) argues, they have been hampered by residential dispersion throughout the city, a high proportion of undocumented, and a crowded field of ethnic politics with longer-established Latino groups.

Of course, immigrants' political influence is limited by the fact that noncitizens cannot vote—and continued large influxes will swell this population. In the late 1990s, John Mollenkopf wrote that "the full [political] incorporation of the Caribbean, Dominican, and Chinese populations must await the political maturing of the second generation, just as the full impact of the turn-of-the-century immigration was not felt until their children voted for the New Deal"

(1999:419). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are fast approaching this time—in 2008, immigrants and their children accounted for nearly half of voting-age citizens in the city. Although they have yet to enter the city's political leadership proportionate to their numbers, immigrant-origin candidates have won seats in the city council, the state assembly and senate, and the U.S. Congress. Young people from immigrant backgrounds are also emerging as leaders of student groups and nonprofit organizations (chapter 11, this volume; Mollenkopf forthcoming). How their political influence will be felt, and how they will enter the precincts of power, in the years ahead are critical questions.

As chapter 11 suggests, first-generation immigrants along with their second-generation children—born and bred in New York City—will provide fresh, and no doubt surprising, twists and turns in the process of creating a new kind of multicultural city out of the mixture and interplay of their different cultural backgrounds. The New York second-generation study conducted by Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters provides many grounds for optimism about the prospects for the children of immigrants. Contrary to fears about second-generation decline, most of the young adult children of immigrants in the survey were moving into the economic mainstream. The young adults were generally comfortable with racial and ethnic diversity, having grown up in neighborhoods where almost everyone's family was from somewhere else. They were at ease with their American and ethnic identities, seeing themselves as Americans and New Yorkers, albeit ethnic ones.

Yet there are some clouds on the horizon. The second-generation study was done in good economic times, before the recent recession, and one question is whether New York City will provide sufficient economic opportunities to absorb the children of immigrants now coming of age. Another question posed in chapter 11 is whether the city's schools and higher educational system can meet the challenge of preparing newcomers and their children for managerial and professional jobs of the twenty-first century. In addition, will racial inequalities continue to create barriers for many immigrants and their children? Issues of legal status also loom large. As chapter 10 makes clear, the prospects of Mexican immigrants are of particular concern, in good part because so many are undocumented and thus lack basic rights and opportunities. The U.S.-born children of undocumented parents, despite birthright citizenship, often grow up with economic insecurity, the threat of parents' deportation, and limits on their access to an array of government programs (Yoshikawa 2011). In looking ahead, a crucial question is whether the federal government will enact legislation providing a pathway to legal status, and ultimately citizenship, for the many undocumented immigrants in the city, young and old alike.

These are just some of the questions about the shape of immigrant New York in the years to come. If the United States is a permanently unfinished

country, as Nathan Glazer (1988:54) has written in another context, to an even greater degree the same can be said for New York City. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, fresh immigrant recruits keep entering New York City; newcomers who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s are by now old-timers; and a huge second generation is growing up and entering the labor market. The chapters that follow provide a view of immigrant New York after a half century of massive inflows. They offer insights and raise questions that will enrich our understanding of the newcomers in America's ever-changing and quintessential immigrant city and, in the end, also broaden our perspective on immigration generally.

NOTES

1. There is a growing number of full-length ethnographic accounts of contemporary immigrant groups in New York City (see, for example, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Pessar 1995, and Ricourt 2002 on Dominicans; Roth 2012 on Dominicans and Puerto Ricans; Margolis 1994, 1998 on Brazilians; Kang 2010, Park 1997, Min 1996, 1998 on Koreans; Khandelwal 2002 and Lessinger 1995 on Asian Indians; Chen 1992, Chin 2005, Guest 2003, Guo 2000, Lin 1998, Louie 2004, Wong 1982, and Zhou 1992 on Chinese; Bashi 2007, Kasinitz 1992, Vickerman 1999, and Waters 1999 on West Indians from the Anglophone Caribbean; Brown 1991, Pierre-Louis 2006, Laguerre 1984, and Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001 on Haitians; Jones-Correa 1998, Ricourt and Danta 2003, Sanjek 1998 on Latinos in Queens; Markowitz 1993 on Russian Jews; Smith 2006, and Galvez 2009 on Mexicans; Stoller 2002, and Abdullah 2010 on West Africans).

2. According to the pooled 2005–10 American Community Survey, a little over a quarter of non-Hispanic whites and almost a third of non-Hispanic blacks were foreign-born, as compared to 72 percent of Asians and about half of Hispanics (Waters forthcoming).

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2. *A Portrait of New York's Immigrant Mélange*

Arun Peter Lobo and Joseph J. Salvo

The success of any great city lies in its capacity to reinvent itself over time. What aids New York in this enterprise is the vitality provided by the inflow of people from all over the globe who have made the city their home. The energy unleashed by a city continuously remaking itself demographically—and by the dreams of upward social mobility that immigrants embody—allows it to reinvent itself socially, culturally, and economically. Immigrants are an integral part of the changing social and economic fabric of New York City, which helps explain why the city has benefited from immigration throughout its history.

New York City has been an ethnic mélange since its earliest years under the Dutch and English. Later, in the 1830s and 1840s, famine and oppression in Europe drove large numbers of Irish and German settlers to the city, but by 1880 immigrant origins had shifted to southern and eastern Europe. New York grew even larger when it was incorporated as a city of five boroughs in 1898, with its population of more than 3 million living primarily in lower Manhattan and northwestern Brooklyn. It was a very densely settled place, with more than two-thirds of the population living on less than 10 percent of the city's land mass. Population densities in the tenements of the Lower East Side were above 500 persons per acre (by comparison, today's high-rise neighborhoods of the Upper East Side or Upper West Side rarely exceed 300 persons per acre).

Starting in 1904, the subways became the circulatory system for the creation of new neighborhoods in the boroughs outside of Manhattan. These new neighborhoods helped relieve population pressures in Manhattan, a result of the surging inflow of Italians and Jews from southern and eastern Europe. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, New York City absorbed large numbers of these immigrants, who went on to build the great infrastructure that was to become the backbone for a population that rose to 6.9 million by 1930. By the 1940s, the mélange now included hundreds of thousands of domestic African American migrants from the South and Puerto Ricans from the Caribbean island.

It was the 1965 Immigration Act that put an end to country quotas and opened up immigration to the world. The law allowed for multiple family and employment pathways to the United States that brought another great surge to New York, which would once again put the city on a course to reinvent itself. Largely unanticipated was a great wave of immigrants from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia—immigrants seeking opportunities in an increasingly service-based economy. While New York City lost 10 percent of its population in the 1970s, it avoided the collapse experienced by many older cities in the East and Midwest. Immigrants and their fertility buffered losses in the 1970s and then propelled the city to new heights in the 1980s and 1990s. By 2000, New York reached an official population of 8 million for the first time, formed on the heels of immigration flows that brought an unprecedented mix of ethnicities to the city.

New York's growth continued into the first decade of the twenty-first century, with its population reaching nearly 8.2 million in 2010. Its mix of population has become even more varied, with a further diversification by country of origin. Immigration is still part of the continuous cycling of population, as people who have lived in the city move on and are replaced by immigrants. This "demographic ballet" is a source of strength for the city because it provides a supply of talent upon which its institutions rest. This stands in contrast to cities that have been unable to attract people and face demographic and economic decline. New York offers a social and economic environment that continues to attract newcomers, making the city a major hub for those across the globe searching for opportunities.

GROWTH AND CHANGING ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN-BORN, 1970–2010

The 1965 Immigration Act is the seminal piece of federal legislation that has shaped the demography of New York City for nearly half a century.[1] The law repealed immigration quotas of the 1920s that favored northern and western Europe and, for the first time, placed all countries on an equal footing. The



FIGURE 2.1. FOREIGN-BORN BY REGION, NEW YORK CITY, 1970–2010. *Source:* U.S. Census Bureau, 1970–2000 Census; 2010 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

1965 act made family reunification the main pathway of entry to the United States, but also created a path for those with needed occupational skills and for refugees and asylum seekers (Lobo and Salvo 1998). When the law was passed, New York's foreign-born population was aging and in decline, since immigration had not fully recovered after having dropped precipitously during the Great Depression and World War II. The foreign-born were enumerated at 1.4 million in the 1970 census (figure 2.1); they accounted for just 18 percent of the city's population—a twentieth-century low—of 7.9 million.

The new law and its subsequent amendments were crucial to the resurgence of immigration to the city. By 1980, New York City's foreign-born population had grown to 1.7 million, increasing to 2.1 million in 1990. Immigration law was revised with the Immigration Act of 1990, which provided immigrants expanded opportunities to enter the nation. These additional avenues included an increase in the number of employment visas and a new diversity visa program which, since 1995, has made 55,000 permanent resident visas available by lottery annually to those from countries that sent relatively few immigrants to the United States (Lobo 2001). Diversity visas provided an entry path for those with no close relatives in the United States and who were thus unable to take

advantage of the family-based visas under the 1965 law. Partly as a result of these changes, immigration continued to surge and by 2000, the foreign-born numbered nearly 2.9 million. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the pace of growth had slowed, with the city's foreign-born numbering just over 3 million in 2010—still an all-time high. However, the immigrant share of the population (37 percent) was below the peak attained in the preceding century—41 percent in 1910. The United States as a whole was nearly 13 percent foreign-born in 2010.

The last four decades have seen a surge in immigration, but also a dramatic change in the origins of the city's foreign-born. In 1970, Europe accounted for 64 percent of the city's foreign-born. The top five countries of origin of the foreign-born were Italy, Poland, the (then) USSR, Germany, and Ireland; the United Kingdom ranked eighth and Austria ranked ninth (figure 2.2). The only non-European countries in the top ten were Cuba (ranked sixth), the Dominican Republic (seventh), and Jamaica (tenth). By 2010, Russia was the only European



FIGURE 2.2. TOP SOURCES OF NEW YORK CITY'S FOREIGN-BORN, 1970 AND 2010.

*Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan.

**If the former Soviet Union existed, it would rank fifth.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census; 2010 American Community Survey, FactFinder; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

country to make the top ten list, coming in at number ten, with 69,000 immigrants. Due to continued large flows from Russia and Ukraine, the former USSR was the only European entity that actually saw its numbers increase significantly between 1970 and 2010; if the USSR still existed as a country, it would have ranked fifth in 2010, compared to third in 1970. The flow of Russians and Ukrainians has helped increase the number of European-born persons modestly, from 496,000 in 1990 to 504,000 in 2010. But since overall immigration has increased dramatically, the share of Europeans among the foreign-born has declined to just 17 percent in 2010.

In 2010, Latin America was the top area of origin, accounting for nearly one-third of the city's immigrants. Three Latin American countries were among the city's top ten sources of immigrants: the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Ecuador. China, with 348,000 residents, was the second largest source country of immigrants; India was the only other Asian country that figured among the city's top ten foreign-born groups. However, an additional four Asian countries figured in the top twenty: Korea (eleventh), Philippines (thirteenth), Bangladesh (sixteenth), and Pakistan (eighteenth). Asians accounted for over one-quarter of the foreign-born in 2010.

Non-Hispanic Caribbean countries were disproportionately represented among the city's top immigrant groups. The top ten included fourth-ranked Jamaica (174,000 immigrants) and fifth-ranked Guyana (139,000), as well as Haiti (seventh) and Trinidad and Tobago (eighth). The diversity visa program helped Africans establish a foothold in New York. Africans were nearly 4 percent of the foreign-born population in the city, but no African country made the top twenty list of source countries.

New York's immigrant diversity is unique among large cities in the United States in that no one group dominates the immigrant population (figure 2.3). In New York, Dominicans, the largest immigrant group, comprise just 13 percent of the immigrant population, and it takes the top eight immigrant groups to account for half of the immigrant total. In comparison, in Los Angeles, Mexicans, the largest group, account for 38 percent of immigrants, and along with Salvadorans make up nearly half of immigrants in that city. In both Chicago and Houston, Mexicans account for 46 percent of all immigrants. In most other cities as well, one or two groups dominate the immigrant population, compared to the mosaic of groups in New York City, each with a substantial population. Among other things, this immigrant diversity leads to multiethnic constituencies that often coalesce around specific issues, since no one group commands a majority. The city's immigrant diversity is also likely to increase, thanks to the diversity visa program. These visas have helped countries such as Bangladesh and West African nations, particularly Ghana and Nigeria, to gain a firm foothold in New York. Given that these visas are aimed at those underrepresented



FIGURE 2.3. TOP SOURCES OF THE FOREIGN-BORN FOR MAJOR U.S. CITIES, 2010.

*Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; 2010 American Community Survey, FactFinder; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

in the immigration stream, it is a built-in mechanism in immigration law to further diversify the sources of immigration.

BOROUGH AND NEIGHBORHOOD OF SETTLEMENT

New York City's five boroughs have unique patterns of immigrant settlement. There are distinct ethnic enclaves across the city, as neighborhoods that are home to one immigrant group tend to also attract more recent entrants (Winnick 1990). Figure 2.4 maps immigrant concentrations across the city's community districts and highlights the major immigrant neighborhoods within these districts,[2] while table 2.1 shows the top immigrant groups in each of the city's five boroughs in 2010. Some immigrant groups were concentrated in specific boroughs—and in specific



FIGURE 2.4. TOTAL NEW YORK CITY FOREIGN-BORN BY COMMUNITY DISTRICT, 2008–10.*

*Approximated by 55 Public Use Microdata Areas.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; 2008–2010 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

community districts within boroughs—while other groups were found across the five boroughs. Two-thirds of immigrants made their home in just two boroughs—Queens and Brooklyn. Queens was home to over 1 million immigrants, and the top immigrant neighborhoods were Flushing, Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, and Jamaica. The Chinese were the largest immigrant group in Queens, with a significant presence in Flushing, one of the city's three Chinatowns. Queens was home to a diverse array of immigrant groups, with no one dominant group. The Chinese, for example, accounted for just 14 percent of all immigrants in the borough, and they were followed by immigrants from Guyana, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Together, these countries accounted for just 38 percent of the overall foreign-born population of Queens, indicative of the diverse nature of the foreign-born in the borough. As a result of its large and diverse immigrant population, Queens would qualify as the most racially and ethnically heterogeneous county in the United States.

TABLE 2.1. PLACE OF BIRTH OF THE FOREIGN-BORN BY BOROUGH, 2010

BRONX	*Number*	*Percent*
Total	**1,386,657**	**100.0**
Foreign-born	**475,734**	**34.3**
Foreign-born	**475,734**	**100.0**
Dominican Republic	161,957	34.0
Jamaica	49,053	10.3
Mexico	47,164	9.9
Ecuador	22,029	4.6
Honduras	18,372	3.9
Ghana	17,449	3.7
Guyana	10,085	2.1
Italy	6,584	1.4
Trinidad and Tobago	6,156	1.3
China*	5,626	1.2

BROOKLYN	*Number*	*Percent*
Total	**2,508,340**	**100.0**
Foreign-born	**948,052**	**37.8**
Foreign-born	**948,052**	**100.0**
China*	126,309	13.3
Jamaica	69,550	7.3
Dominican Republic	59,145	6.2
Trinidad and Tobago	57,590	6.1
Mexico	55,222	5.8
Haiti	54,248	5.7
Guyana	45,457	4.8
Ukraine	43,667	4.6
Russia	43,359	4.6
Ecuador	26,642	2.6

MANHATTAN	*Number*	*Percent*
Total	**1,586,698**	**100.0**
Foreign-born	**451,770**	**28.5**
Foreign-born	**451,770**	**100.0**
Dominican Republic	104,031	23.0
China*	59,622	13.2
Mexico	21,389	4.7
Ecuador	13,001	2.9
United Kingdom	12,803	2.8
Canada	11,840	2.6
India	11,311	2.5
Korea	9,871	2.2
Japan	9,685	2.1
Philippines	9,145	2.0

QUEENS	*Number*	*Percent*
Total	**2,233,841**	**100.0**
Foreign-born	**1,066,262**	**47.7**
Foreign-born	**1,066,262**	**100.0**
China*	150,274	14.1
Guyana	77,628	7.3
Ecuador	71,895	6.7
Dominican Republic	55,697	5.2
Mexico	51,592	4.8
Jamaica	49,600	4.7
India	48,879	4.6
Korea	48,106	4.5
Colombia	46,399	4.4
Philippines	34,333	3.2

STATEN ISLAND	*Number*	*Percent*
Total	**466,676**	**100.0**
Foreign-born	**97,228**	**20.8**
Foreign-born	**97,228**	**100.0**
Mexico	8,345	8.6
China*	7,565	7.8
Italy	7,482	7.7
Ukraine	5,548	5.7
Russia	5,087	5.2
Philippines	4,561	4.7

(continued)

TABLE 2.1. *continued*

STATEN ISLAND	*Number*	*Percent*
India	3,649	3.8
Poland	3,371	3.5
Korea	2,755	2.8
Pakistan	2,563	2.6

*Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey, FactFinder. Staten Island only: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008–2010 American Community Survey, FactFinder. Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning

Brooklyn's 948,000 immigrants were concentrated in neighborhoods such as Bensonhurst, Canarsie, and Flatbush, as well as Sunset Park—Brooklyn's own Chinatown. As in Queens, the Chinese were the largest immigrant group in Brooklyn, followed by immigrants from Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico. These five groups made up just 39 percent of the immigrant population; Brooklyn now rivals Queens in terms of diversity of its immigrant population.

The Bronx was home to 476,000 immigrants, with large numbers concentrated in the borough's western and northern neighborhoods—Highbridge, University Heights, Wakefield, Williamsbridge, and Norwood. The Dominican Republic accounted for over one-third of all immigrants in the Bronx, followed by Jamaica and Mexico. These three sources together accounted for over half of the borough's foreign-born; every other group accounted for under 5 percent. Newly emerging immigrant groups in the city, such as Ghanaians, have a relatively large concentration in the Bronx, which places them among the borough's top ten groups.

Manhattan was home to 452,000 immigrants, and the largest concentrations were on either end of the borough: Washington Heights to the north and Chinatown to the south. Washington Heights was home to a great number of Dominicans, who were the largest immigrant group in Manhattan. The Chinese, the second largest group, were concentrated in the city's original Chinatown in lower Manhattan. The Dominicans and Chinese together accounted for over one-third of the borough's immigrant population. The third largest group, Mexicans, accounted for just 5 percent of the borough's immigrants, making their homes primarily in East Harlem. Every other immigrant group accounted for less than 3 percent of the immigrant population in the borough.

Staten Island's 97,000 immigrants were heavily present in the northern part of the borough. Though Staten Island's growing immigrant population is relatively small, its diversity rivals that of Queens and Brooklyn. The top five source countries in the borough were Mexico, China, Italy, Ukraine, and Russia, which together accounted for 35 percent of the borough's foreign-born; the top ten accounted for just over half.

In terms of immigrant concentrations, Queens ranked first: its 1.1 million immigrants comprised 48 percent of the borough's population. Brooklyn was next, with immigrants comprising 38 percent of its population, followed by the Bronx (34 percent), Manhattan (29 percent), and Staten Island (21 percent). Unlike the other boroughs, immigrant concentrations in Staten Island and the Bronx reflect major increases since 2000.

As we will discuss later, New York's population is characterized by huge immigrant inflows and an even larger outflow of city residents to other parts of the United States. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when whites left a neighborhood (usually en masse, giving birth to the term "white flight"), they were succeeded primarily by native-born minority groups. This pattern of "invasion-succession" led to all-minority neighborhoods and high levels of segregation in the city—and in inner cities across the Northeast and Midwest. Today, departing native-born whites have been joined by native-born blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, and outflows from the city are now seen as part of a life cycle. Moreover, in the past three decades, as neighborhoods in the city have continued to absorb immigrants from Latin America and Asia, the wholesale racial turnover of neighborhoods is no longer as evident. Rather, many neighborhoods, especially in Queens, have become integrated (Lobo et al. 2002)—integration being defined as neighborhoods including both whites and racial minorities—and have stayed that way.

Figure 2.5 presents two kinds of integrated neighborhoods: melting pot integrated neighborhoods and two-group integrated neighborhoods. In melting pot integrated neighborhoods, whites and at least two other groups (from among blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) each comprised at least 10 percent of the neighborhood's population. In two-group integrated neighborhoods, whites and one minority group each comprised at least 10 percent of the population. In 2010, there were 690 melting pot integrated neighborhoods in the city and 413 two-group integrated neighborhoods, for a total of 1,103 integrated neighborhoods—up from 1,055 in 2000.[3] In both 2000 and 2010, integrated neighborhoods accounted for over half of all neighborhoods in the city. Thus, while many new immigrants move into enclaves—for example, Dominicans moving into Washington Heights or Chinese from across the diaspora moving to Chinatowns—in which they cluster with coethnics, the presence of immigrants across the city has also resulted in a relatively new pattern of stable, multiracial neighborhoods. This pattern has



FIGURE 2.5. INTEGRATED NEIGHBORHOODS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2010.*

*Census tracts used as a proxy for neighborhoods. Excludes tracts with population less than 100.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Public Law 94–171 Files; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

also been found across the larger New York region (Alba et al. 1995; Logan and Zhang 2010).

Stable, melting pot integrated neighborhoods in New York, however, are more likely to be composed of whites, Asians, and Hispanics, and are generally less inclusive of blacks (Flores and Lobo 2013). Non-Hispanic blacks in New York City—both native- and foreign-born—remain the group most segregated from whites.

SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS

The diverse patterns of immigration to New York are reflected in the disparate social, economic, and demographic characteristics of immigrants. Initial gender patterns of immigrants, for example, are reflected in the sex ratio, defined as

the number of males per 100 females (table 2.2). This can be clearly seen among Mexican immigrants in New York City, who had among the highest sex ratios, 144 males for every 100 females. Mexicans are relatively recent, young entrants. Mexicans, as well as Ecuadorians, start out with very high sex ratios, with males first establishing themselves before being joined by their spouses and children, which will eventually lower the sex ratio. This pattern of immigration also holds true for the city's myriad South Asian groups.

In contrast, immigrants from the non-Hispanic Caribbean had the lowest sex ratios, with the Trinidadian and Tobagonian sex ratio at 66, and Jamaicans and Guyanese at 75 and 83, respectively. For these groups, females are in the vanguard of immigration and are later followed by males. Often an immigrant group disproportionately uses certain classes of immigration law that can benefit one gender, as with Filipinos, who have a sex ratio of just 52. Filipinos have made use of a special provision in U.S. law that allows for the entry of nurses into the United States, and these nurses are overwhelmingly female.

Given that most immigrants come from non-English-speaking countries, it is no surprise that many do not speak English well. In 2010, half of the foreign-born and 24 percent of city residents overall were limited English proficient (LEP), defined as those speaking English "less than very well."[4] The city's LEP population totaled 1.8 million (data not shown), with those speaking Spanish at home accounting for one-half of the total, followed by Chinese (17 percent), Russian (6 percent), and Haitian Creole and Korean (each with 3 percent). Thus these top five languages accounted for nearly 80 percent of the LEP population. Among the city's top ten immigrant groups, 83 percent of Mexicans, 78 percent of Chinese, and 77 percent of Ecuadorians were LEP. By comparison, immigrants from Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, where English is the lingua franca, had very low LEP levels.

Educational attainment among immigrants was significantly lower than the New York City average. Among adult immigrants, just 72 percent had completed high school and 26 percent had a college degree, compared to 79 percent and 33 percent, respectively, for the city overall. Mexicans, who had the highest proportion who were LEP, had the lowest educational attainment: just 42 percent had completed high school and just 5 percent had a college degree. Educational attainment was also below average for Dominican, Ecuadorian, and Chinese immigrants. Among the top ten immigrant groups, college attainment only for Indians (53 percent) and Russians (49 percent) was higher than that of the city overall, and even higher than that of the native-born (40 percent).

The labor force participation rate is defined as the percentage of people working or looking for work. Among males ages sixteen to sixty-four, the foreign-born had a labor force participation rate (83 percent) higher than that of their native-born counterparts (70 percent); for the city overall, the rate was 76 percent. The

TABLE 2.2. SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW YORK CITY'S TOP TEN FOREIGN-BORN GROUPS, 2010

	Total Population	Sex Ratio	Limited English Proficient (%)[2]	Educational Attainment[3]		Labor Force Participation Rate[4]		Income and Poverty	
				High School Graduate or Higher (%)	College Graduate or Higher (%)	Males	Females	Median Household Income	Poverty Rate
Total	8,185,314	90	23.7	79.3	33.3	75.9	66.7	$48,366	20.3
Native-born	5,138,863	93	6.5	86.2	39.7	70.3	67.1	$51,792	21.3
Foreign-born	3,046,451	87	50.0	71.7	26.3	83.2	66.1	$44,335	18.6
Dominican Republic	378,199	71	69.9	55.6	10.7	77.6	66.4	$30,229	25.9
China[1]	351,314	89	78.3	59.9	25.1	76.7	66.4	$40,506	21.5
Mexico	187,086	144	83.3	42.2	4.8	94.3	48.9	$37,282	28.5
Jamaica	169,863	75	0.7	77.9	19.3	78.8	82.9	$49,374	13.4
Guyana	138,549	83	2.3	77.2	19.0	81.7	76.5	$60,457	9.0
Ecuador	138,097	112	77.0	58.8	9.8	89.1	59.8	$43,731	17.2
Haiti	97,516	72	50.2	79.7	17.6	80.8	74.4	$44,940	16.2
Trinidad and Tobago	84,347	66	0.4	86.3	15.9	80.4	77.2	$42,320	14.3
India	72,803	112	37.9	81.9	52.8	81.9	56.5	$61,667	13.1
Russia	70,123	70	63.5	91.3	49.3	83.2	73.3	$42,320	14.8

[1]Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan.
[2]Persons 5 years and over.
[3]Persons 25 years and over.
[4]Persons 16–64 years old.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

labor force participation rate for each of the city's top ten immigrant groups exceeded the city's overall rate. Among females, the overall labor force participation of the foreign-born (66 percent) was similar to the city average. However, women from the non-Hispanic Caribbean had higher-than-average labor force participation, particularly Jamaicans (83 percent) and Trinidadians (77 percent).

Given the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants, it is not unexpected that they have a lower median household income ($44,000) than the city overall ($48,000). But three groups, Indians ($62,000), Guyanese ($60,000), and Jamaicans ($49,000) had household incomes at or above the city average, primarily as a result of the high labor force participation of household members. At the same time poverty was lower for immigrants. Immigrant poverty stood at 18.6 percent, compared to 20.3 percent for the city; at 21.3 percent, the native-born had the highest poverty rate. Income among the native-born was concentrated, while the income distribution was more equitable among immigrants, resulting in a lower poverty rate. Dominicans, Mexicans, and Chinese were the only groups in the top ten with a poverty rate higher than the city average.

Immigrant groups arrive in the United States with disparate skills, which partly accounts for differences in their socioeconomic attainment. Some groups are also comprised primarily of recent arrivals who have just entered the U.S. labor market (Lobo et al. 2012). Newly arrived immigrants often accept lower-level jobs than they may have held in their home countries. But after acquiring experience in the U.S. labor market and becoming more proficient in English, earnings tend to increase. Thus, groups such as Mexicans in New York City, who are overwhelmingly composed of recent entrants, tend to have among the lowest socioeconomic attainment.

IMMIGRANTS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION

The entry of immigrants to New York City has had a major impact on the wider New York metropolitan region. In addition to the city's five boroughs, the metropolitan region encompasses twenty-six other counties, for a total of thirty-one counties spread over 12,600 miles across portions of New York State, New Jersey, and Connecticut (figure 2.6). While the initial impact of post-1965 immigration was felt primarily in New York City, over time many of these immigrants left the city to settle in the region's suburban towns, villages, and cities. They were joined by many entering immigrants who bypassed the city altogether and moved directly to the suburban counties of the New York metropolitan region. While New York City accounted for nearly 8.2 million, or 37 percent of the 22 million residents in the region, it remains the epicenter of immigrant settlement, being home to over half of the region's 5.9 million immigrants.



	Total Population	Foreign-born Population	Percent Foreign-born
NY Metro. Region	22,080,357	5,887,078	26.7
New York City	8,185,314	3,046,451	37.2
Inner Counties	8,509,959	2,213,099	26.0
Nassau	1,341,135	286,207	21.3
Westchester	945,825	239,838	25.4
Outer Counties	5,385,084	627,528	11.7
Suffolk	1,494,394	214,160	14.3

FIGURE 2.6. FOREIGN-BORN IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION BY COUNTY, 2010.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; 2010 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

The subregion adjacent to New York City also had significant immigrant concentrations. This subregion, composed of the twelve counties closest to the city, labeled "inner counties," was one-quarter foreign-born. The percentage foreign-born in these counties ranged from a high of 42 percent for Hudson—second in the entire region only to Queens—to a low of 19 percent for Morris. The subregion comprising the fourteen counties farthest from the city, labeled "outer counties," was only 12 percent foreign-born, but this was up from 7 percent in 1990.

Neighborhoods in the region with high immigrant concentrations tend to have low income and a housing stock that includes older, multifamily, rental units, which produce high population densities. However, many immigrant neighborhoods—such as Edison, West Orange, Fair Lawn, Dix Hills, Morganville, and Princeton North—have socioeconomic characteristics superior to those of the subregion in which they were located (Lobo and Salvo 2004).

NEW YORK'S UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION

A major issue in the United States is policy concerning unauthorized immigrants. For New York City, a key question is the size of the unauthorized population and its pace of growth. In 1986, that segment of the unauthorized population which continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 1982, and those employed as seasonal agricultural workers became eligible for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (Salvo and Lobo 2005). In New York State, 174,000 unauthorized immigrants were legalized under this program, 125,000 of whom were in New York City. Just four years later, New York State's unauthorized immigrant population was estimated at 358,000 (figure 2.7), 261,000 or 73 percent of whom lived in New York City. Most unauthorized immigrants in New York City entered the country with a valid visa. But by overstaying their visas, that is, staying in the United States beyond the required departure dates, they become part of the unauthorized population. The growth in this



FIGURE 2.7. ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE, NEW YORK STATE, 1990–2010.
Source: Robert Warren, Unpublished estimates; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

population is the net effect of those entering and those leaving unauthorized status—the latter being an important, though often overlooked, component of change in the unauthorized immigrant population.

In the 1990s, the addition to New York State's unauthorized immigrant population averaged 57,000 each year. At the same time, an average of nearly 26,000 unauthorized immigrants exited each year—either returning home, moving to another state, or becoming legalized (through marriage to a U.S. citizen, for example). Thus, in the 1990s, the number of those entering the unauthorized population each year was, on average, more than twice as large as those leaving. The net effect was an increase in the unauthorized immigrant population by nearly 32,000 each year, resulting in the total unauthorized immigrant population increasing 88 percent over the decade, to 674,000 in 2000. Indeed, unauthorized immigrants were the fastest-growing component of the state's foreign-born population in the 1990s. This growth continued in the early years of the twenty-first century and, by 2004, New York State's unauthorized population reached a high of nearly 799,000, of whom 583,000 are estimated to have lived in New York City.

But patterns changed dramatically by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, with those leaving the unauthorized population exceeding those entering, resulting in a decline in unauthorized immigrants. By 2009, those entering the unauthorized population numbered only 8,000, while those leaving this population numbered over 43,000, resulting in a net loss of 35,000. By 2010, the unauthorized immigrant population in the state had dropped to 705,000, with 499,000 living in the city. The unauthorized population is estimated to comprise between 15 and 20 percent of the city's foreign-born population.

A CITY DEPENDENT ON IMMIGRATION

As is already clear, immigration is a central element in understanding how New York City has been able to grow and reinvent itself demographically. But it is interesting to place these inflows in the context of broader demographic trends in the city and in other cities across the nation. In 2000, New York City's population was enumerated at just over 8 million, and in the following decade the city added approximately 167,000 people (bottom tier of figure 2.8). Growth is often viewed as a small increment added to the existing population, but the underlying dynamic is more complicated. Between 2000 and 2010, New York City had a net loss of 1.4 million people through domestic migration, that is, the number of city residents who left for the rest of the country exceeded those who arrived from within the United States by 1.4 million. But the city gained back a big portion of that loss—926,000—through net international flows, which reflects the exchange of people with other countries. The net result was a loss through



FIGURE 2.8. COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE FOR NEW YORK CITY BY DECADE, 1970–2010.
Source: Adjusted U.S. Decennial Census data 1970–2000; 2010 Decennial Census as revised by Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

migration of 474,000 people. Despite this loss, the city's population continued to grow, thanks to natural increase (the difference between births and deaths) of 641,000, resulting in a population increase of 167,000.

Thus, what may seem like a small population change can mask large movements of people into and out of the city. Each day, new people move into the city, while even more leave. Outflows from the city take place for a host of reasons, including the desire for a larger home, a new job, and retirement. The inflow—the constant injection of new energy into the city—is what makes New York City special. It may seem that there is something unusual about a city that had a net loss in a decade of 1.4 million people through domestic exchanges with the fifty states. But there is nothing inherently wrong with this dynamic. The fact that population losses are largely ameliorated through immigration inflows is a testament to New York City's demographic dynamism.

One way to illustrate this point is to examine the top ten cities in the United States in 1950 and then again in 2010 (table 2.3). New York was the largest U.S. city in 1950, followed by Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. The fifth-ranked city was Detroit, followed by Baltimore, Cleveland, St. Louis, Washington, DC, and Boston, but by 2010, none of these cities were among the nation's ten largest.

TABLE 2.3. TOP U.S. CITIES IN 1950, AND GROWTH BETWEEN 1950 AND 2010

Rank			*Population*			2010
1950	2010	*City*	1950	2010	*Growth (%)*	*Foreign-Born (%)*
1	1	New York City, NY	7,891,957	8,175,133	3.6	37.2
2	3	Chicago, IL	3,620,962	2,695,598	−25.6	20.7
3	5	Philadelphia, PA	2,071,605	1,526,006	−26.3	11.6
4	2	Los Angeles, CA	1,970,358	3,792,621	92.5	39.1
5	18	Detroit, MI	1,849,568	713,777	−61.4	4.8
6	22	Baltimore, MD	949,708	620,961	−34.6	7.1
7	43	Cleveland, OH	914,808	396,815	−56.6	4.5
8	50	St. Louis, MO	856,796	319,294	−62.7	7.2
9	25	Washington, DC	802,178	601,723	−25.0	13.5
10	23	Boston, MA	801,444	617,594	−22.9	26.9

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1950 Census; 2010 Decennial Census, Summary File 1; 2010 American Community Survey, FactFinder; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

All had lost population, with St. Louis, Detroit, and Cleveland losing more than half their 1950 populations. These cities could not attract immigrants (as they once did) to replace those leaving; indeed, but for Boston and Washington, DC, the percentage of foreign-born in these cities was in the single digits in 2010.

In contrast to this one-sided population (out) flow, New York's population movements are dynamic, with immigrants replacing those who leave. The city remains a magnet for immigrants, who come to take advantage of the opportunities the city has to offer and are attracted by the large communities of coethnics who live there. As a result of immigrant inflows, New York remained the largest city in the nation in 2010, followed by Los Angeles, which saw a near doubling of its population, also due to a heavy inflow of immigrants. New York's population dynamic is not of recent vintage, as can be seen in figure 2.8. However, in the 1970s, a period of grave economic crises, immigration and natural increase could not mitigate the large outflows from New York City, resulting in a population decline of around 806,000. This decline was primarily due to a high level of out-migration; while natural increase added nearly 339,000 persons to the city's population, a net of 1.15 million persons left New York, resulting in a substantial population loss for the city. The decline would have been much greater were it

not for the entry of 783,000 immigrants in that decade. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, outflows moderated, and thanks to higher immigration and to natural increase, the city enjoyed renewed population growth. As noted earlier, this trend has continued in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In addition to the direct effect of immigration on population growth, immigrants have an indirect effect by way of their fertility. Immigrants are heavily concentrated in the younger childbearing ages, and immigrant fertility is higher than that of native-born residents. Table 2.4 shows that in 2010, 54 percent of the 115,000 births in the city of New York were to foreign-born women—62 percent of these newborns had a foreign-born mother or father. Women from five countries accounted for nearly one-quarter of all births in New York City: the Dominican Republic, Mexico, China, Jamaica, and Ecuador. Being younger, immigrants also have lower mortality; thus higher immigrant fertility and lower mortality disproportionately contribute to positive natural increase in New York. With respect to the overall population, immigrants and their U.S.-born offspring account for an estimated 55 percent of the city's population.

While inflows to New York continue to be smaller than outflows, the start of the twenty-first century has shown a change in the relative profiles of those

TABLE 2.4. BIRTHS IN NEW YORK CITY TO FOREIGN-BORN MOTHERS, 2010

	Number	*Percentage*
Total births	114,908	100.0
Foreign-born mothers	61,671	53.7
Dominican Republic	7,635	6.6
Mexico	7,378	6.4
China*	7,144	6.2
Jamaica	2,947	2.6
Ecuador	2,905	2.5
Guyana	1,921	1.7
Bangladesh	1,755	1.5
Haiti	1,522	1.3
Trinidad and Tobago	1,440	1.3
Pakistan	1,263	1.1
India	1,250	1.1

*Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Source: Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, New York City, 2010; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

NEW YORK CITY COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY

entering and leaving the city (table 2.5). Historically, those coming to the city have had a lower socioeconomic profile, compared to those leaving. For example, during the 1985–90 period, in-migrants to the city had lower earnings compared to out-migrants ($45,100 vs. $54,900), lower household income ($50,900 vs. $56,000), and higher poverty (21.9 percent vs. 17.2 percent). The lower socioeconomic profile of in-migrants relative to out-migrants was also evident in flows between 1995 and 2000. However, there was a shift in the first decade of the twenty-first century, with socioeconomic characteristics of in-migrants in the 2008–10 period similar to those of out-migrants (in the case of mean earnings and median household income), though poverty remained significantly higher.

This shift is related to another major source of in-migrants—domestic migrants—who are also critical to the vitality of New York City. The higher socioeconomic profile of in-migrants at the beginning of the twenty-first century was partly due to a compositional change in inflows to the city (figure 2.9). In the 1995–2000 period, the inflow to New York City was almost equally divided between domestic migrants coming from the fifty states and immigrant flows

TABLE 2.5. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS TO AND FROM NEW YORK CITY: 1985–90, 1995–2000, 2008–10

	1985–90	1995–2000	2008–10
Mean earnings, 21 years and over			
In-migrants	$45,130*	$57,959*	$54,760
Out-migrants	$54,880	$61,857	$58,463
Median household income			
In-migrants	$50,933*	$54,304*	$54,761
Out-migrants	$56,026	$58,884	$51,564
Percentage below poverty			
In-migrants	21.9*	23.9*	24.5*
Out-migrants	17.2	15.7	20.8
Percentage college graduates, 25 years and over			
In-migrants	39.0*	46.0*	55.0*
Out-migrants	32.4	37.4	47.9

*Difference with out-migrants is statistically significant at the .10 level.
All dollar figures in 2010 constant dollars.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990–2000 censuses; 2008–2010 American Community Survey, Public Use Microdata Sample; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

from outside the United States. Domestic migrants from the fifty states have traditionally had higher socioeconomic characteristics compared to those coming from abroad, which remains true even today. Domestic migrants entering between 1995 and 2000 had mean earnings of $65,000, compared to $41,000 for immigrants entering during this period, a differential that has narrowed—though is still present—in the years since 2000 (data not shown). The lower earnings of immigrants have historically pulled down the overall socioeconomic profile of those entering the city.

In 2008–10, however, the share of domestic migrants increased to 67 percent of all in-migrants, and there was a concomitant decline in the share of immigrants, to 33 percent (figure 2.9). Thus, while immigrants remain an important part of the flow, the city has become a more attractive destination for domestic migrants, who now comprise a larger share of the total inflow to the city. Many of them are college-educated young adults who move to New York—primarily to Manhattan, but increasingly to Brooklyn and Queens—for jobs in vibrant sectors of the economy, including financial services, the arts, and publishing. The higher socioeconomic attainment of domestic in-migrants, coupled with their increased share of the total inflow to the city, has resulted in a higher socioeconomic profile of all



FIGURE 2.9. CHANGING ORIGINS OF IN-MIGRANTS TO NEW YORK CITY, 1995–2000 AND 2008–2010.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census; 2008–2010 ACS Public Use Microdata Sample; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

in-migrants to the city. It is too early to tell whether this pattern will continue, but these changes testify to the dynamic nature of migration flows to New York City, and the dramatic effect they can have on the city's overall well-being.

THE CHANGING FACE OF NEW YORK CITY

In the nearly five decades since the passage of the landmark 1965 Immigration Act, the large influx of immigrants from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean has transformed the racial and ethnic composition of New York City, from one that was largely white non-Hispanic to a diverse mix where no one group is in the majority. While white non-Hispanics were still the largest group in 2010, they comprised just 33 percent of the population (figure 2.10), down from 63 percent in 1970. Hispanics were the largest minority group in 2010, with a 29 percent share, followed by blacks (23 percent) and Asians (13 percent). (These figures include both the native- and foreign-born in each group.)

The role of immigration in the changing racial and ethnic distribution is even more apparent when we look at the borough level (figure 2.10). In the Bronx,



FIGURE 2.10. NEW YORK CITY'S RACE/HISPANIC GROUPS BY BOROUGH, 2010.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census, Summary File 1; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

where immigrants are primarily from Latin America and the non-Hispanic Caribbean, Hispanics, not surprisingly, were over half of the borough's population, while blacks were at 30 percent. In Brooklyn, where immigrants are mainly from the non-Hispanic Caribbean and Europe, whites and blacks each comprised approximately one-third of the population. In Manhattan, whites were just under half of the population, with immigrant enclaves in the northern and southern sections of the borough accounting for the strong presence of Hispanics and Asians. Immigration has made Queens the most diverse county in the country. Whites and Hispanics each comprised 28 percent, while Asians and blacks accounted for 23 percent and 17 percent, respectively. Staten Island is the only borough in the city where whites comprised a majority (64 percent)—in 1970, each of city's five boroughs was majority white.

There is also increasing ethnic diversity within each of the four major ethnoracial groups in the city. The Caribbean- and African-born populations, for example, made up approximately one-third of the black non-Hispanic population in 2010, up from less than 10 percent in 1970. In 2010, the Hispanic population, long synonymous with Puerto Ricans, had no single ethnic group with a majority. Puerto Ricans remained the largest group, but accounted for under one-third of Hispanics in 2010 (data not shown), and were followed by a host of other ethnic groups, including Dominicans (25 percent), Mexicans (14 percent), Ecuadorians (7 percent), and Colombians (4 percent). Among Asians, the Chinese were a near majority (49 percent) in 2010, but down from their 59 percent share in 1970. They were followed by Asian Indians (19 percent), Koreans (9 percent), Filipinos (7 percent), and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, each with a 4 percent share of the Asian non-Hispanic population.

Immigration has had an especially profound effect in changing the ethnoracial composition of the youngest age cohorts, who represent the city's future. Indeed, one can peek at the demographic future of the city by examining its ethnic and racial population by age (figure 2.11). In 2010, among the city's population ages 65 years and over, close to half was white non-Hispanic, mirroring the city's demographic past. In contrast, children under 18, who represent what the city will look like, demographically, in the years ahead, were disproportionately nonwhite. Hispanics were the largest group (36 percent), followed by black and white non-Hispanics (each with 25 percent), Asian non-Hispanics (11 percent), and those of multiracial non-Hispanic backgrounds (4 percent).

New York City continues to grow, with an estimated population of nearly 8.25 million in 2011, but irrespective of its pace of growth, it will see further changes in its overall ethnoracial composition. In the coming decades, as older New Yorkers—who are disproportionately white non-Hispanic—pass on, the city will reflect the makeup of its extremely diverse younger age cohorts as they move into adulthood and old age.



FIGURE 2.11. NEW YORK CITY'S RACE/HISPANIC GROUPS BY AGE, 2010.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census, Summary File 1; Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning.

CONCLUSION

Recent statistics about the racial and ethnic diversity of New York City's population tell a remarkable story. The words of Major Samuel Shaw of Boston, referring to New York in 1776 as "a motley collection of all the nations under heaven" (Shaw and Quincy 1847) are even more appropriate today. New York City is arguably more multiracial and multiethnic than at any time in its history. No single chart or graph can adequately characterize this diversity. Indeed, categories that are available in the decennial census and the American Community Survey barely do the city justice on this subject. As we have seen, in just a few decades, New York City has shifted from a place consisting largely of the descendants of European immigrants to a city that now has no dominant racial, ethnic, or national origin group. And the latest data show that New York City is continuing in the direction of unprecedented diversity.

As we move forward, in this decade and into the next, two factors will come to dominate the demographic landscape. First, the descendants of earlier European immigrants will enter retirement age in very large numbers, owing to the size of the aging baby-boom cohorts—a process that has already begun. Second,

the economy of New York City will continue to depend on the flow of young working age people—many of them from other parts of the world—in search of economic opportunities.

Given the aging of New York City's population, the reliance on immigrants is as important today as it was in past eras. In every city, there is a demographic balance between those who supply labor for the economy and the elderly who are dependent on it. In demographic parlance, this is expressed as the aged dependency ratio, which refers to the ratio of persons 65 and over to those 20 to 64 years of age. While an increasing ratio is an issue of national concern, it is also relevant at the city level. The fact is that some places do a better job than others at attracting workers who are the essence of a vital city. As populations age, as they are doing in a number of American cities, the capacity to provide services will depend on ensuring that dependency does not rise to unsustainable levels. New York City has been able to benefit from the strength of its immigrant flows to maintain a diverse and vibrant labor force, one that keeps its dependency ratio in check. Just as immigrants a century ago provided New York City with the labor necessary for creating its infrastructure, the city now relies on its immigrants to shore up its labor force and to provide services for its aging population. Looking ahead, there is every reason to expect that the incorporation of what is likely the most diverse mélange of immigrants it has ever seen will reaffirm New York City's status as a great, open, and welcoming city.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank Vicky Virgin and Donnise Hurley for their research assistance. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of City Planning, where they are employed, or the City of New York.

NOTES

1. Data used in this chapter include decennial data from the 1950–2010 censuses, vital statistics data for the years 1970–2010 from the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 2011 population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, and unpublished estimates of the undocumented population in New York State by Robert Warren, former head of the Statistics Division of what was the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Data on social and economic characteristics, such as place of birth and income, have historically come from the decennial census long form. The long form was discontinued with the 2010 census, and data on socioeconomic characteristics are now obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS). The

ACS utilizes a monthly sample of the nation's population, which is "rolled up" to create estimates of characteristics for places throughout the nation. These estimates can be for one, three, or five years, depending upon the size of the geographic area for which estimates are created. The one-year ACS data used in this analysis include summary files as well as the Public Use Microdata Samples from the 2010 releases. Thus, for the same year, the estimate of the foreign-born may differ, depending on which source of data is used. These differences, however, are within sampling limits. Due to sample size constraints with the one year ACS, three years of pooled data were used from the 2008–10 ACS to examine subcounty settlement patterns of the foreign-born and the socioeconomic characteristics of recent domestic and international migrants to New York. For more information on the ACS and the correct use of these data, please see Salvo et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2012).

2. There are fifty-nine community districts (CDs), which are part of New York City's government structure. Each CD has a community board whose members are charged with identifying local needs and articulating neighborhood concerns. To protect data confidentiality, the Census Bureau combines a few small CDs in the Bronx and in Manhattan and provides data for the resulting fifty-five Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), which are largely coterminous with CDs. Figure 2.4 maps immigrant concentrations for these fifty-five areas. For more information on the use of ACS data for CDs or PUMAs, please see Salvo and Lobo (2010).

3. Data are presented at the census tract level, which is used as a proxy for neighborhoods. Data at two time points were made comparable by aggregating 2000 census block data into census tracts that matched 2010 tract boundaries. While there has been an increase in melting pot integrated neighborhoods, they are more likely to be composed of whites, Asians, and Hispanics, and are generally less inclusive of both native- and foreign-born blacks.

4. Those who were ages five and over and spoke a language other than English at home were asked whether they spoke English "very well," "well," "not well," or "not at all." According to the Census Bureau, data from other surveys suggest a major difference between the category "very well" and the remaining categories. Thus, those with LEP were defined as persons who spoke a language other than English at home and who spoke English less than very well; i.e., it included those who spoke English "well," "not well," or "not at all." The percent LEP was obtained by dividing the LEP population by the population ages five and over.

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3. *Immigration and Economic Growth in New York City*

David Dyssegaard Kallick

Immigration has dramatically changed the face of New York in the past several decades, and with it the New York economy. The immigrant share of the city's population has rebounded from a twentieth-century low point of 18 percent in 1970 (and 27 percent of the resident labor force) to 36 percent (and 45 percent of the resident labor force) in 2009.[1]

The increase in the number and proportion of immigrants in the city has fueled economic growth, filled in neighborhoods that had become underpopulated during the 1970s, and helped make New York the extraordinarily diverse global city it is today, with immigrants working in a wide range of jobs from the top to the bottom of the economic ladder.

Immigration has brought some challenges as well. There are legitimate worries about the effect of immigration on some U.S.-born workers, as well as concerns about immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, being caught in—and perhaps fueling—an unregulated labor market.

At the same time, there are serious problems in the New York economy that affect both U.S.-born and foreign-born workers. New York's economy has expanded over the past decades, but it has also grown increasingly polarized. In providing an analysis of immigrants' role in a changing New York economy, I show how immigrants make up a large and growing part of the city's labor force,

and have been part of virtually every aspect of the city's economic picture over the past four decades.

IMMIGRANTS AS A KEY COMPONENT IN NEW YORK'S REBOUND FROM THE 1970S

POPULATION CHANGE

A substantial part of New York City's post–World War II history can be read from the simple trend line of the city's overall population change, which mirrors its economic trajectory. From 1950 to 1970 the population was fairly stable, followed by a steep drop in the course of the 1970s, and a strong rebound from 1980 to the present.

A closer look at that rebound, however, shows that the post-1980 population increase was driven by immigrants. As figure 3.1 shows, from 1980 to 2009, the U.S.-born population changed only slightly—and in a downward direction. The total population grew because of increases in the foreign-born population.

FISCAL CRISIS IN THE 1970S

New York City's population numbers reflect underlying economic trends. In the 1950s and 1960s, the economy was humming along at a good clip. True, white middle-class residents were leaving in significant numbers for the suburbs, attracted by the promise of green lawns, and lured by government policies—from federal mortgage agencies that graded white suburban areas as safer areas for banks to make loans than racially mixed urban areas, to road construction that literally paved the way for an outflow from the city (see, for example, Jackson 1987; Dreier et al. 2004). During the 1950s and 1960s, however, the decrease of the white population was offset by an increase in the number of blacks, who were moving to New York from the South, and by Puerto Ricans, who were moving to New York from the island, as figure 3.2 dramatically shows.

Then came the 1970s. In mid-decade, a serious national recession hit the city hard. The already established white population decline escalated to a more panicked "white flight" as race riots around the country and deteriorating city services made the suburbs feel like a necessary haven for many of the city's middle-class white residents. Modest increases in the city's black and Latino populations between 1970 and 1980 were not enough to offset the substantial decline in the city's white population.



FIGURE 3.1. TOTAL NEW YORK CITY POPULATION BY NATIVITY.
*In the 1950 census, foreign-born included only foreign-born whites.
Source: New York City Department of City Planning, analysis of census data 1950–2000; Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of 2009 American Community Survey.

The cost of providing government services had been rising for some time, but in the 1960s the city was able to rely on greater federal and state aid to cover part of what it owed, and turned to short-term borrowing rather than tax increases to cover the rest. In the course of the 1970s, total city population fell by almost a million residents—which meant that substantially fewer people were paying city taxes. The recession pushed tax revenues down further and the cost of providing city services increased, while federal and state aid to the city decreased. The result was a severe fiscal crisis, a defining moment in New York City politics, when the city seemed at risk of defaulting on its bonds.

The story of how New York got into the fiscal crisis, and how it was finally addressed, has been extensively documented. Civic-minded leaders of finance and labor unions were crucial in what was often referred to as "saving New York." So was a financial control board designed to reign in as well as provide transparency to the city budget. Eventual aid from reluctant state and federal governments was a third crucial factor in solving the crisis (Shefter 1985; Freeman 2000).



	1950–60	1960–70	1970–80	1980–90	1990–2000	2000–2010
White	-836,800	-1,080,500	-1,269,300	-540,100	-361,833	-78,363
Black	335,000	462,700	168,800	152,500	115,154	-100,859
Hispanic/Latino	366,300	666,000	127,800	377,100	377,054	175,522
Asian	25,500	64,700	149,400	261,500	555,303	170,555

FIGURE 3.2. GROWTH AND DECLINE IN WHITE, BLACK, LATINO, AND ASIAN POPULATIONS OF NEW YORK CITY, 1950–2010.
Source: Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning; Hispanic population for 1950 through 1970 imputed from characteristics such as Puerto Rican origin and language spoken.

Once the city's finances were put on a stable basis, however, reversing the declining population was a crucial factor in keeping the city fiscally solvent and economically vibrant. Some residents remained fiercely committed to the city through the years when "the Bronx was burning," memorialized in Spike Lee's movie *Summer of Sam*. (The phrase "the Bronx is burning" was famously used by sports announcer Howard Cosell to describe to a national audience the spectacle of buildings near Yankee Stadium being torched by absentee landlords to collect on insurance money; "Summer of Sam" refers to a series of murders committed in the same year, 1977, by a man who called himself the Son of Sam.)[2] In the 1970s, many people played a role just by remaining in the city and going about their lives as usual at a time when others were leaving. But many longtime New Yorkers also pushed hard to rebuild their neighborhoods, by forming civic groups and community organizations, cleaning up neighborhoods, and pushing city, state, and federal governments to reinvest in the city.

The 1980s and 1990s were crucial decades in the city's history—a time when urban planners shifted from 1970s discussions of "planned shrinkage" to more recent concerns about low- and moderate-income people being squeezed out by gentrification and scarcity of affordable housing. Yet, looking back on these

TABLE 3.1. DECLINE IN U.S.-BORN POPULATION BETWEEN 1980 AND 2009

	Change in Population, 1980–2009					
U.S.-born	1980	1990	2000	2009	*Change 1980–2009*	
0–19	1,816,820	1,609,103	1,814,223	1,905,141	88,321	4.9%
20–34	1,361,760	1,307,347	1,132,224	1,249,095	−112,665	−8.3%
35–64	1,674,160	1,653,803	1,592,980	1,676,522	2,362	0.1%
65 and older	564,300	647,665	594,197	575,421	11,121	2.0%
All	5,417,040	5,217,918	5,133,624	5,406,179	10,861	−0.2%
Foreign-born	1980	1990	2000	2009	*Change 1980–2009*	
0–19	215,280	249,299	320,389	193,581	−21,699	−10.1%
20–34	426,200	619,298	798,001	734,146	307,946	72.3%
35–64	649,140	891,568	1,401,819	1,614,591	965,451	148.7%
65 and older	384,540	302,023	350,926	442,569	58,029	15.1%
All	1,675,160	2,062,188	2,871,135	2,984,887	1,309,727	78.2%

Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of decennial census and American Community Survey 2009.

years, it is clear that immigration was also a crucial part of the story of reviving the city's underpopulated neighborhoods. Although there were many U.S.-born newcomers—the city population is constantly churning, with people coming and leaving—figure 3.1 shows that the result of this churning was a U.S.-born population that was a little smaller in 2009 than it was at the low point in 1980. All of the net population growth was due to immigration.

Even more striking is the 8 percent drop—after 1980—in the number of U.S.-born young adults (24–34 years old), a decline of 113,000 between 1980 and 2009. The number of U.S.-born 35–64-year-olds remained about flat over this period; the only increase among the U.S.-born over these four crucial decades is for those over 65 (the result of an aging population) and 19 and under (driven in part by U.S.-born children of immigrants) (see table 3.1).

IMMIGRANTS AND LABOR DEMAND

The 1965 change in federal immigration law made it possible for immigrants to come to the United States in much larger numbers than in the previous decades. But what was especially important in drawing immigrants to New York City (and not, for example, in substantial numbers to St. Louis or Pittsburgh) was increased labor market demand: the economy was expanding while the working-age U.S.-born population was declining.

As the city's economy began to revive and grow in the 1980s, it also significantly changed. New York in the mid-twentieth century was an important center for manufacturing. As the city found a more solid economic footing after the 1970s, it did so on a foundation of growth in high-end jobs in finance and business headquarters, as well as in low-end jobs in the service sector—with a substantial shift away from jobs in manufacturing (Mollenkopf 1992; Waldinger 1996; Wright and Ellis 2001). The low-end service sector jobs included restaurant workers, retail clerks, child care workers, home health care aides, dry cleaners, security guards, beauty salon workers, and a host of other jobs that provided inexpensive and convenient services to city residents.

As the city added low-wage jobs, it shed many of the middle-wage jobs that had been the underpinning of the city's middle class. Disappearing manufacturing—unionized and with solid wages by midcentury—on average paid considerably higher wages than newly created, generally nonunion service jobs. In addition, a large number of the manufacturing jobs that remained were in the by-then poorly paid apparel industry. At the same time, wages went up at the top, as management and finance industry executives received increasingly exorbitant salaries.

Immigrants were part of all aspects of the city's changing economy. Large numbers ended up working in the newly created service jobs—by 2009, 63 percent of service workers living in the city were foreign-born, compared to the 45

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percent immigrant share of jobholders overall. Yet considerable numbers also wound up working in higher-wage jobs. In 2009, 30 percent of New York City immigrants worked in service jobs, 25 percent in managerial and professional specialties, 23 percent in technical, sales, and administrative support, and 22 percent in blue-collar jobs.

By 2007, the city's economy had become so highly polarized that the top 1 percent of taxpayers received 44 percent of all income in the city—far more than the already record high 23 percent share of income controlled by the top 1 percent nationally (Fiscal Policy Institute 2010). There were immigrants at the top, bottom, and middle of this economic ladder, with immigrants generally living in families that were clustered in the middle. In 2005, 55 percent of New Yorkers living in immigrant families (those with at least one foreign-born adult) had annual family incomes of $20,000 to $80,000, compared to 44 percent of those living in U.S.-born families. New Yorkers living in families with only U.S.-born adults were more likely to be at the top and bottom—that is, in families making less than $20,000 or over $80,000 a year (Fiscal Policy Institute 2007).

WHAT ABOUT U.S-BORN WORKERS?

One frequently raised question is how U.S.-born workers have been affected by immigration. Did the economy grow to accommodate the added workforce, or did immigrants displace U.S.-born workers?

While the new jobs in New York have not all been good jobs, immigration does not seem to have increased faster than the city's ability to absorb immigrants and U.S.-born workers into the workforce together. Yet, while this is the overall trend, there is a significant exception: black men and women who did not finish high school.

The unemployment rate is one clear measure of whether U.S.-born workers are able to find jobs. The unemployment rate varies greatly in the course of the business cycle—it is lower (better) for all groups during an economic expansion, and is higher (worse) for all groups in a recession. To consider whether different groups of U.S.-born residents have had an easier or harder time finding a job during a period when the number of immigrants in the city was increasing, table 3.2 shows the unemployment rate for different groups at the top of each of the past four business cycles, the peak years, when unemployment could be expected to be lowest for all groups.

In all race and ethnic categories, and at all education levels, the unemployment rate for U.S.-born workers declined from 1980 to 2007, with just two exceptions: U.S.-born black men and women with less than a high school degree. For these black men, the unemployment rate went from an already alarmingly high 14.2 percent at the peak of the 1980 expansion to a staggering 20.2 percent

TABLE 3.2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR NEW YORK CITY WORKERS AT THE TOP OF EACH OF THE LAST FOUR BUSINESS CYCLES

	1980 (%)	1990 (%)	2000 (%)	2005–07 (%)	*Percentage Point Change 1980–2007*
All (U.S.- and foreign-born)	7.0	5.8	4.6	4.2	−2.8
All U.S.-born	6.8	5.5	4.6	4.4	−2.4
U.S.-born men					
White, non-Hispanic	4.9	3.6	2.4	2.9	−2.0
Less than high school	7.6	8.0	7.5	6.2	−1.4
High school	5.1	4.7	4.0	3.4	−1.7
Some college	5.2	3.9	2.6	4.2	−0.9
College graduate and higher	3.5	2.4	1.5	2.3	−1.2
Black, non-Hispanic	11.5	10.3	8.9	8.1	−3.4
Less than high school	14.2	16.7	20.2	17.0	2.8
High school	10.8	11.4	9.9	9.7	−1.1
Some college	10.4	8.4	6.9	6.6	−3.9
College graduate and higher	6.8	3.3	3.1	3.8	−3.0
Hispanic/Latino	10.1	8.9	6.5	6.0	−4.1
Less than high school	11.3	11.7	11.9	10.9	−0.4
High school	8.9	9.1	6.7	6.2	−2.8
Some college	10.0	6.4	4.1	5.2	−4.8
College graduate and higher	4.9	3.5	2.2	2.6	−2.3
U.S.-born women					
White	5.3	3.4	2.3	2.8	−2.5
Less than high school	8.5	7.8	12.1	4.1	−4.4
High school	5.1	4.5	3.9	3.4	−1.7
Some college	5.5	3.7	3.0	4.1	−1.4
College graduate and higher	4.2	2.3	1.4	2.3	−1.9
Black	8.3	7.4	7.5	6.0	−2.3
Less than high school	12.6	16.3	19.9	15.6	3.1
High school	7.9	8.8	10.6	7.1	−0.9
Some college	5.9	5.5	5.4	5.6	−0.2
College graduate and higher	3.9	2.3	2.5	3.1	−0.8
Hispanic/Latino	11.5	8.2	7.5	6.0	−5.5
Less than high school	14.9	13.8	15.9	11.7	−3.2
High school	9.5	9.0	9.0	6.2	−3.3
Some college	9.7	5.0	5.5	6.0	−3.7
College graduate and higher	5.9	3.8	2.5	3.0	−2.9

Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of decennial census and American Community Survey 2005–7. Unemployment rates adjusted using Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Asian and "other race" are not shown due to small sample size.

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at the peak of the 2000 expansion, retreating only a little to 17.0 percent at the most recent economic peak year. As for U.S.-born black women without a high school degree, the rate increased from 12.6 percent in 1980 to a high of 19.9 percent in 2000, falling back to 15.6 percent in 2007. It is worth noting that these groups are shrinking as blacks gain in educational attainment: there are considerably fewer black men and women without a high school degree in 2007 than in 1980. Still, the fact that these already very high unemployment rates grew even higher over time is a matter of serious concern.

The unemployment rate for immigrants at each of the past four economic peaks has been within one percentage point of the rate for U.S.-born, and has also seen long-term improvements, suggesting that there is room in the New York City labor market, at least in economic peak years, for both immigrants and U.S.-born workers.

How much of the predicament of black men and women without a high school degree can be explained by immigration is unclear. Econometric studies that look at data at the national level have found that immigration has had only a very modest negative impact on U.S.-born black men with a high school diploma or less (and have generally not found a negative effect for black women), even while U.S. workers overall have benefited from immigration (Shierholz 2010). These national studies are consistent with in-depth research on New York City (Waldinger 1996; Wright and Ellis 2001). What is most troubling about these findings is not the magnitude of the negative impact for black men and women without a high school diploma, which is generally relatively modest, but that the negative impact affects a group already at such a stark disadvantage in the labor market. Racial discrimination is no doubt part of the story; employers may prefer employees other than black men or women with little formal education. In addition, black men without a high school degree are far more likely than other groups to be affected by increasing incarceration rates. Not surprisingly, it is extremely difficult to find employment after serving in prison.

In considering the impact of immigrants on U.S.-born workers, it is important to bear in mind that in addition to taking available jobs, immigrants also create jobs in New York City—not just for other immigrants but for U.S.-born workers as well. It is sometimes assumed that new workers add to the labor force and do not otherwise change an economy, leading to the erroneous conclusion that they reduce the number of jobs available for the existing labor force. However, adding workers to an economy also adds people who buy goods and services, which in turn creates more consumer demand, and can create a positive feedback loop of job creation. Indeed, the large immigrant inflow to New York in recent decades has expanded the number of people shopping in stores, eating in restaurants, frequenting beauty salons, using the services of lawyers, sending children to schools and colleges, and purchasing all manner of

goods and services—and thus boosting job growth throughout the economy in the process.

IMMIGRANT BUSINESSES

Immigrants also have been among the entrepreneurs who found ways to meet new consumer demands. Between 1994 and 2004, the number of businesses in the city overall increased by 10 percent, while the number of businesses in neighborhoods with particularly high concentrations of immigrants grew far faster: Flushing had 55 percent more businesses at the end of that ten-year period than at the beginning; Sunset Park had 48 percent more; Sheepshead Bay–Brighton Beach had 34 percent more; and so on down the list (Bowles and Colton 2007).

Speaking about one heavily immigrant community—Richmond Hill, Queens—a community leader named Raymond Ally told a team of researchers, "Back in 1979–80, the area was depressed. There was nothing here and there were very few businesses." As the area attracted immigrants from Guyana and Trinidad and Sikhs from India, there was a gradual sprouting of roti stands, sari stores, jewelers, and groceries to serve those communities. Muslim mosques and a Sikh *mandir* helped root the communities, and as the area became more established as an immigrant center, it began to draw shoppers from the suburbs looking for Indo-Caribbean or Sikh products. Before long, Richmond Hill was buzzing with activity on the streets and in the stores. "Now, it's thriving," said Ally. "The number of businesses has quadrupled compared to what it was before." Rents have risen dramatically—reflecting increased demand—and the only vacancies researchers found were due to landlords holding out for even higher return on their investment (Bowles and Colton 2007:14).

CRIME

Immigrants not only have set up many businesses but also appear to have affected crime rates—another issue related to New York City's comeback from the 1970s low point. In the 1970s, '80s, and early '90s high crime rates were a frequently cited cause of concern for both businesses and residents. It is commonly agreed that the turnaround in crime in the 1990s was an important factor in the improved business climate in the city. Safer neighborhoods drew more residents, shoppers, and business owners.

Changes in policing policy were certainly important in reducing crime. Policies put in place by Mayor Rudy Giuliani such as "broken-windows" policing and the Compstat system of tracking crime were undeniably critical to this improvement. Important, too, though less commonly acknowledged was Mayor

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David Dinkins's Safe Streets, Safe Cities program that raised taxes to put more police on the street.

Immigration—sometimes associated in the public view with increasing crime—has been an underappreciated factor in reducing crime in New York City. In the 1980s and 1990s, many New Yorkers, both U.S.- and foreign-born, took part in projects to clean up parks, reinvent community institutions, and reclaim neighborhoods. This helped create a climate in which people moved into previously abandoned apartments and started to repopulate neighborhoods. As the neighborhoods became more densely populated, the streets became safer (as any New Yorker knows, a busy street is safer than an empty one). In neighborhood after neighborhood, population growth was driven by immigrants. Community policing may have prevented windows from being broken, but damaged windows were also more quickly fixed in areas where every apartment was occupied than in those where many buildings stood empty. Indeed, as safety improved and the popularity of many neighborhoods increased, the people who helped rebuild them frequently ended up being victims of their own success. In many cases, the problems of underinvestment gave way to the problems of gentrification, making neighborhoods increasingly difficult to afford for low- and moderate-income families, immigrant and U.S.-born alike.

In addition to helping crime prevention by adding eyes on the street, there is considerable evidence that, contrary to popularly held views, immigrants are less likely than their U.S.-born counterparts to commit crimes. An analysis of 2000 national census data shows that the incarceration rate of the foreign-born was four times lower than for the U.S.-born—though the longer immigrants have lived in the United States the more immigrant crime rates begin to look like those of U.S.-born residents (Rumbaut et al. 2006).

CHOOSING THE CITY

Also of significance in the post-1970s era has been immigrants' very willingness to live in central cities in general, and New York City in particular. There is a strong pull for city residents in the United States to move outward to the suburbs, especially when they have children approaching school age. Even in metropolitan areas with little overall growth, there is still a tendency for residents to move from the city to the suburb—a phenomenon Rolf Pendall (2003) terms "Sprawl without Growth." Although immigrants are also increasingly moving to the suburbs (Singer et al. 2008), they are nevertheless considerably more likely than their U.S.-born counterparts to live in central cities.

"Smart growth"—an alternative to sprawl that concentrates on town and city hubs, public transportation, walkable streets, and mixed commercial and residential neighborhoods—has numerous advantages for effective utilization of resources. This is particularly clear where cities have already developed infrastructure that is underutilized—as was the case in New York in the 1970s and '80s (and is still the case today in cities like Detroit and Buffalo). When public transportation, school buildings, sewers, and other major infrastructure investments are used at less than the capacity for which they were built, the money spent on them goes at least partially to waste. Worse, if the same population moves to sprawling suburbs, much of the same infrastructure has to be built anew there, at additional expense. As "Planning for Smart Growth," a report by the American Planning Association, summed it up, "Planning reforms and smart growth provide long-term savings by eliminating inefficiencies caused by inconsistent and uncoordinated planning. . . . There is a growing awareness, too, that poorly planned development is a hidden tax on citizens and communities alike" (2002:8).

The hundreds of thousands of immigrants, together with the U.S.-born residents who made a commitment to live in New York City in the 1970s and '80s, were critical to putting the city on a path toward fiscal sustainability. Among other things, they made efficient use of the city's already existing infrastructure, allowing their taxes to support other government services.

IMMIGRANTS' CENTRAL ROLE IN TODAY'S NEW YORK CITY ECONOMY

Having contributed to the city's rebound from the 1970s, immigrants are most certainly pulling their weight in the city's economy today.

In 2006 immigrants made up 21 percent of New York State's population and accounted for 22 percent of the state's $1 trillion gross domestic product (GDP) (Fiscal Policy Institute 2007). Zeroing in on New York City—where three-quarters of the state's immigrants live—figure 3.3 shows that immigrants in 2009 made up 36 percent of the city's population, and accounted for 35 percent of economic output, the broad equivalent of GDP for the city.[3]

The finding that immigrants contribute to the economy in almost exact proportion to their share of the population may seem surprising, since immigrants earn on average less than U.S.-born workers. Three main factors explain this apparent puzzle. First and simplest, immigrants make up a bigger share of the labor force than their share of the population. In New York City, immigrants are 36 percent of the population, but 45 percent of the resident labor force. Having proportionately more people working offsets immigrants' lower wages, resulting in the immigrant share of total earnings being the same as the immigrant share of population (see figure 3.3).

To some small extent, immigrants make up a disproportionate share of the labor force because they have slightly higher labor force participation rates than U.S.-born New Yorkers—66 percent of immigrants over age 16 are in the labor force, compared to 62 percent of U.S.-born New Yorkers. (What accounts for this difference is the higher labor force participation rate for immigrant men.

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

FIGURE 3.3. IMMIGRANT SHARE OF POPULATION, WORKING-AGE POPULATION, LABOR FORCE, AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT, NEW YORK CITY, 2009.
Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of 2009 American Community Survey. Working age is 16–64 years old. Immigrant share of earnings is a proxy for immigrant share of economic output.

U.S.-born and immigrant women in New York City have the same level of labor force participation; see figure 3.4.) A much bigger factor in the overrepresentation of immigrants in the labor force is that they are considerably more likely than U.S.-born New Yorkers to be in the prime working ages (16–64 years old). To put it another way, immigrant economic output is boosted by the fact there are proportionately more working-age immigrants than immigrant children or retirees. Immigrants generally come to the United States as young adults, and it is important to bear in mind that the U.S.-born children of immigrants are counted in the U.S.-born population.

The second factor that helps explain why immigrants' economic output is proportionate to their population share is that they are spread over a broad array of occupations; immigrants are not nearly as concentrated in low-wage occupations as one might imagine from reading the popular press. Immigrants who live in New York City work in a wide range of jobs across the economic spectrum, making up 28 percent of management analysts, for instance, half of accountants, a third of receptionists, and half of building cleaners. Indeed, immigrants make up between 25 and 80 percent of virtually all occupations, from the bottom to the top of the economic ladder.

Much of the media coverage, and even a good deal of scholarly literature, focuses on low-wage immigrants and those with less than a high school education, but it is a mistake to equate this narrow focus with the broader experience of immigrants in the city. Consider a few of the figures. In finance, immigrants represent a quarter of securities, commodities, and financial service sales



FIGURE 3.4 IMMIGRANT AND U.S.-BORN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES, NEW YORK CITY, 2009.
Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of 2009 American Community Survey.

agents, and a third of financial managers who live in New York City. In real estate, immigrants make up four out of ten brokers, four out of ten property managers, three out of ten architects, and three-quarters of construction laborers. In health care, four out of ten doctors, more than half of all registered nurses, and three-quarters of all nursing aides are foreign-born.

There are hundreds of occupations at this level of detail, so the above numbers are just a sampling. Grouping all these detailed occupations into twenty-one occupational categories gives a more comprehensive view of where immigrants are clustered, and the extent to which they work in occupations across the entire spectrum. As table 3.3 shows, immigrants make up 45 percent of the New York City resident labor force. Their share of generally well-paid executive, administrative, and managerial jobs is 33 percent, and in professional specialties such as doctors and engineers, 31 percent. Immigrants are overrepresented at 49 percent of registered nurses, pharmacists, and health therapists. They are most starkly overrepresented in blue-collar jobs such as machine operators, fabricators, construction trades, drivers, and construction laborers and other material handlers. Immigrants are also starkly overrepresented in low-wage service jobs such as dental, health, and nursing aides and food preparation services, and among workers in private households and personal service. Yet only among firefighters, police, and supervisors of protective services are immigrants less than 25 percent of the workers, and in no instance do immigrants make up more than 75 percent of one of the twenty-one occupational categories.

These figures, as noted, are for New York City residents, but many of the people contributing to New York City's economic output live in the suburbs and commute to the city. Yet even among the commuters, immigrants play an important part. Nearly a third of the 868,000 commuters to New York City are immigrants, with immigrant commuters—like U.S.-born commuters—concentrated in

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TABLE 3.3. NEW YORK CITY OCCUPATIONS OF IMMIGRANTS

	Foreign-Born in Occupation (%)
White-collar jobs	
Executive, administrative, managerial	33
Professional specialty (incl. doctors, engineers, lawyers)	31
Registered nurses, pharmacists, and health therapists	49
Teachers, professors, librarians, social scientists, social workers, and artists	28
Technicians (incl. health, engineering, and science)	40
Sales (supervisors, real estate, finance, and insurance)	36
Sales (clerks and cashiers)	43
Administrative support (incl. clerical)	35
Service jobs	
Private household and personal service	67
Firefighters, police, and supervisors of protective services	21
Guards, cleaning, and building services	54
Food preparation services	69
Dental, health, and nursing aides	73
Blue-collar jobs	
Mechanics and repairers	55
Construction trades	63
Precision production	64
Machine operators	74
Fabricators	67
Drivers (incl. heavy equipment operators)	66
Construction laborers and other material handlers	67
Gardening	
Farming, forestry, and agriculture (incl. gardeners)	46
Total	**45**

Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of 2009 American Community Survey, New York City resident labor force. For detail on occupational categories, see *Immigrants and the Economy* (Fiscal Policy Institute 2009).

higher-wage jobs that contribute substantially to total economic output. (The calculation for immigrant share of New York State GDP includes commuters; the calculation for New York City is for the resident labor force, and so does not include commuters.)

Finally, the third factor in accounting for the unexpectedly high immigrant share of economic output is that many immigrants are business owners. Immigrants make up 48 percent of incorporated self-employed people living in New York City—a good indicator of small business ownership. Of the thirteen broad industrial sectors, immigrant small business ownership is highest in transportation and warehousing (81 percent, with Colombians and Dominicans playing the biggest role) and lowest in information and communications (19 percent), with levels between these two extremes in industries such as finance, insurance, and real estate (35 percent); educational, health, and social services (47 percent); and retail trade (64 percent). The overall immigrant share of these small business owners is well above the immigrant share of the population, and is slightly above the overall immigrant share of the labor force (see table 3.4).

Immigrants are making a particularly significant contribution in small businesses that shape the character of neighborhoods, including those that provide

TABLE 3.4. BROAD SECTORS OF IMMIGRANT SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS IN NEW YORK CITY

Sector	*Foreign-Born Business Owners*	*All Small Business Owners (U.S.- and Foreign-Born)*	*Small Business Owners Who Are Foreign-Born (%)*
Construction	8,089	13,059	62
Manufacturing	3,284	6,178	53
Wholesale trade	4,733	8,732	54
Retail trade	12,145	18,877	64
Transportation and warehousing	5,802	7,190	81
Information and communications	1,040	5,555	19
Finance, insurance, real estate	4,867	13,969	35
Professional and business services	9,497	31,891	30
Educational, health, and social services	6,564	13,971	47
Leisure and hospitality	7,582	16,421	46
Other services	5,685	8,677	66
Total	69,411	144,674	48

Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of American Community Survey 2005–09. "Small business owners" are people who live in New York City who own an incorporated business in the New York metro area and whose main job is to run that business. Small numbers of mining and agriculture, and forestry, fishing, and hunting businesses that are below the threshold of statistical significance are included in the total.

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TABLE 3.5. DETAILED TYPES OF SMALL BUSINESSES OWNED BY IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK CITY

Type of Business (Ranked by Immigrant Concentration in Industry)	*Foreign-Born Business Owners*	*All Small Business Owners (U.S.- and Foreign-Born)*	*Small Business Owners Who Are Foreign-Born (%)*
Dry cleaning and laundry services	1,381	1,536	90
Taxi and limousine service	3,777	4,214	90
Grocery stores	1,544	1,831	84
Child day care services	2,162	2,876	75
Beauty salons	1,475	2,097	70
Restaurants	5,574	8,032	69
Truck transportation	1,076	1,659	65
Clothing stores	1,370	2,162	63
Construction	8,089	13,059	62
Computer systems design	1,533	3,790	40
Architectural, engineering, and related services	1,046	2,635	40
Real estate	2,970	7,700	39
Offices of physicians	1,202	3,428	35
Specialized design services	1,375	4,209	33
Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial investments	1,105	3,975	28
Management, scientific, and technical consulting services	1,375	5,615	24
Independent artists, performing arts, and spectator sports	1,310	6,363	21
All other	31,047	69,493	45
Total	69,411	144,674	48

Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of American Community Survey 2005–9. Sectors with fewer than 1,000 small business owners are excluded from the analysis due to small sample size.

services that make life convenient for middle- and upper-class New Yorkers—though many immigrant businesses rely on long hours by family members or the low-wage labor of other immigrants. Table 3.5 shows that immigrants who live in New York City virtually monopolize certain small business fields in the New York metropolitan area: grocery stores (where immigrants represent 84 percent of local store owners), dry cleaning and laundry services (90 percent), and taxi and limousine services (90 percent). Immigrants make up a substantial share of small business owners in a range of other fields, from restaurants (69 percent) to construction (62 percent) to computer design services (40 percent).

Beyond small business ownership, immigrants also play an integral role in leading many of the city's larger businesses. There are 9,500 immigrant chief executive officers living in New York—comprising 30 percent of all CEOs living in the city. Both famous and notorious, former Citicorp CEO Vikram Pandit, media mogul Rupert Murdoch, and financier George Soros are all immigrants, as are well-known names in the fashion industry from Oscar de la Renta to Diane von Furstenberg.

OVERALL ECONOMIC STRENGTH, BUT GENUINE PROBLEMS

While immigrants are working in jobs across the economic spectrum, the popular image of immigrants working in low-wage jobs is not wholly unfounded. Pakistani cab drivers, Chinese apparel workers, Mexicans working in the back of the house in restaurants—these are very real experiences of daily life in New York City. And the census data bear out these images: in 2009, 82 percent of taxi drivers living in New York City were foreign-born, as were 90 percent of sewing machine operators and 67 percent of food preparation workers.

One reason for the disparity between popular images and reality is that it is a very different matter to speak of immigrants on average than to focus on particular groups of immigrants. On average, for example, as figure 3.5 shows, about half of all immigrants living in New York City work in white-collar jobs (as do 75 percent of U.S.-born New Yorkers). But this composite is made up of a wide range of immigrant experiences. Among immigrants born in India, Hong Kong, or Russia, for example, about three-quarters of workers are in white-collar jobs, matching the share for U.S.-born workers. Yet less than a quarter of Mexican or Ecuadorian workers are in white-collar jobs. And there is a wide range in the middle, with, for example, about half of Jamaican and Guyanese workers in white-collar jobs.

Looking in greater detail, it is clear that, while some immigrant groups are well spread across a range of occupations, others are strongly clustered in particular occupations, as the sociological literature has documented (Waldinger

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

FIGURE 3.5. PROPORTION OF NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRANTS IN WHITE-COLLAR AND ALL OTHER JOBS, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. *Source:* Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of 2009 American Community Survey, based on broad occupations as defined in *Immigrants and the Economy,* Fiscal Policy Institute, 2009. Universe is New York City residents 16 years and older, employed in the civilian labor force. The service and blue-collar category also includes a very small number of farm, fishing, and forestry jobs.

1996; Foner 2000; Logan and Alba 1999). In many cases, the clusters are in jobs at the lower end of the occupational ladder. Consider the most intensively concentrated immigrant groups. In 2009, fully 30 percent of all Mexican and 21 percent of Chinese immigrants living in New York City worked in food preparation services. Nearly a quarter of New York City workers born in Haiti were dental assistants, health aides, or nursing aides. Some immigrant clusters are at the higher end of the occupational ladder: a quarter of those born in Hong Kong were in executive, administrative, managerial, and management-related jobs; 21 percent of Filipino immigrants worked as registered nurses, pharmacists, and health therapists. Not all immigrant groups are so strongly concentrated at either the high or low end: Jamaicans, Guyanese, and Colombians, for example, are fairly evenly spread across the occupational spectrum.

Labor market outcomes in New York City are strongly shaped by the race and ethnicity of workers, whether they are U.S.- or foreign-born. Table 3.6 shows the earnings for full-time, year-round workers in different racial and ethnic groups compared to those of U.S.-born whites. At each level of educational attainment, white U.S.-born workers have the highest wage (this is thus shown as 100 percent). Even after accounting for differences in education levels, there are considerable disparities between the earnings of white, black, Latino, and Asian immigrants. U.S.-born whites earn more than all other groups, U.S.- or foreign-born, at every level of educational attainment. Using U.S.-born whites as a benchmark, we see that even at the same level of educational attainment, foreign-born workers consistently earn less than U.S.-born whites, generally between 50 and 80 percent of the amount of U.S.-born whites, and in one instance (Latinos with an advanced degree) as little as 40 percent of the level of U.S.-born whites. White immigrants also do uniformly better than immigrants of color, while Latino immigrants are at or near the bottom of earnings for each level of educational attainment.

American racial and ethnic categories (white, Black, Latino, Asian), of course, affect not only immigrants but also U.S.-born workers. Among the U.S.-born, whites have a decided advantage. The only instance in which a nonwhite U.S.-born group approaches the wages of the white group is Asians with an advanced degree, who typically earn 94 percent of the level of whites with an advanced degree. U.S.-born blacks and Latinos generally earn 70 to 80 percent the level of whites at the same level of educational attainment.

Nativity, in other words, is hardly the only dividing line in the New York economy. Race and ethnicity are significant predictors of how both U.S.- and foreign-born workers will fare in the economy. Indeed, it could be argued that race and ethnicity are more important than nativity in predicting earnings. White immigrants, for example, have higher earnings than U.S.-born blacks and Latinos at every level of educational attainment. Black immigrants at each

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TABLE 3.6. MEDIAN ANNUAL WAGES BY RACE OR ETHNICITY AND NATIVITY, INDEXED TO WAGES FOR U.S.-BORN WHITES

	Earnings Compared to U.S.-Born White Earnings (%)	
	Foreign-Born	*U.S.-Born*
Less than high school		
White	80	100
Black	75	70
Latino/Hispanic	52	75
Asian	55	50
High school		
White	82	100
Black	69	78
Latino/Hispanic	64	82
Asian	62	87
Some college		
White	82	100
Black	73	73
Latino/Hispanic	58	75
Asian	65	89
College completion		
White	88	100
Black	71	69
Latino/Hispanic	58	71
Asian	74	83
Advanced degree		
White	94	100
Black	66	72
Latino/Hispanic	58	76
Asian	79	94
All		
White	74	100
Black	54	60
Latino/Hispanic	40	57
Asian	57	83

Source: Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of American Community Survey 2009. Annual wages for full-time workers (at least fifty weeks per year and thirty-five hours per week), 25 years and older, in the civilian labor force.

educational level have earnings that are closer to those of U.S.-born blacks than they are to any other foreign-born group.

Then there is legal status, which also makes a difference in how immigrants fare, and in their role in the New York City economy. There were about a half million undocumented immigrants in New York City in 2010 (chapter 2, this volume). Using somewhat earlier data, combining the years 2000 to 2006, the Pew Hispanic Center showed the countries of birth of undocumented immigrants in New York City. About equal numbers came from Mexico and Central America (27 percent), South and East Asia (23 percent), and the Caribbean (23 percent), and the balance—about a quarter—were from other parts of the world (Pew Hispanic Center estimate using 2000–2006 Current Population Survey data, in Fiscal Policy Institute 2007).

Undocumented immigrants are highly concentrated at the bottom of the occupational and wage spectrum, enough to make up a very substantial portion of workers in some jobs. The Pew study estimated that 11,000 undocumented immigrants worked as dishwashers in New York City, making up more than half of all dishwashers. About a third of the city's sewing machine operators, painters, cooks, construction laborers, and food preparation workers were estimated to be undocumented, as were between a quarter and a third of waiters and waitresses, maids and housekeeping cleaners, automotive service technicians and mechanics, and carpenters.

Immigrants in low-wage jobs, and undocumented immigrants in particular, are vulnerable to being mistreated by employers—to receiving reduced wages and enduring severely trying, sometimes dangerous, working conditions in the low-wage labor market. Immigrants, and especially undocumented immigrants, are frequently caught in jobs where there is little enforcement of basic labor rights. Yet the plight of undocumented workers should not blind us to the fact that a remarkable number of workers in general have their basic labor rights violated on a daily basis. The prevalence of workers at the low end of the job ladder who are paid below minimum wage, do not receive overtime, or are simply not paid by employers upon completion of a job has led some researchers to talk about a "gloves-off economy" (Bernhardt et al. 2009).

A recent study of labor law violations in New York City found that labor violations are widespread in low-wage jobs. Although undocumented immigrants were the most likely to be victimized, other groups were clearly at high risk as well. Looking at minimum wage violations, for example, the survey found that among men, 17 percent of low-wage workers experienced violations—for U.S.-born workers, the figure was 10 percent; for legal immigrants, 15 percent; and for undocumented immigrants, 29 percent. Among women, 24 percent of all low-wage workers experienced minimum wage violations—13 percent for U.S.-born women, 24 percent for legal immigrants, and an astonishing 40 percent for undocumented immigrants (Bernhardt et al. 2010). Part of what keeps this

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unregulated labor market viable is that unscrupulous employers have not been prevented from taking advantage of workers in a precarious position in the labor market. Certain groups are especially vulnerable: undocumented immigrants, former welfare recipients, and ex-offenders, for example. But the problem is widespread enough that even removing the most vulnerable from this picture would not change its basic contours.

In addition to the external challenges facing undocumented immigrants, there is some evidence that they may also be less likely than legal immigrants to invest in education, job training, or English language skills that would help them advance—for the logical reason that they are uncertain of their future status in this country. A national study, done after the 1986 law providing amnesty to undocumented immigrants went into effect, found that an unexpected positive economic effect of the amnesty law was that once workers gained legal status they became more likely to invest in their own education, enabling them to advance in their careers, earn higher wages, and benefit the economy through higher productivity (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000).

CONCLUSION

Immigration has been centrally important to the economy of New York City in recent decades. Immigrants—driving overall population growth—have often been an important part of neighborhood revitalization and have helped the city as a whole rebound from the days of underinvestment, abandoned buildings, and fiscal crisis of the 1970s.

The city's growth over the past four decades has been highly polarized. Gains have been concentrated in high-wage finance and business headquarters and in low-wage service industries, while losses included many middle-wage unionized manufacturing jobs, and the top 1 percent of taxpayers have taken the lion's share of economic gains. Immigrants have been part of New York City's growth at all levels; they are particularly concentrated in low-wage jobs, but are also substantially represented in middle- and high-wage positions in the city. Although wages have been under pressure, there seems to be room in the labor market for both U.S.- and foreign-born workers. Over the past four business cycles, peak-to-peak unemployment rates for both foreign and U.S.-born workers have been declining. One notable exception is U.S.-born black men and women with less than a high school education, a shrinking group, but one that experienced higher unemployment rates as the immigrant share of the labor force grew.

Immigrants are playing a central role in the city economy today, contributing to the city's overall economic output in nearly exact correlation to their share of the population. Immigrants' economic role is so large because they are particularly likely to be of prime working age, because they play a big role as owners of small businesses and managers of businesses large as well as small, and because—contrary to common misperception—immigrants are significantly represented in jobs all across the occupational spectrum. Immigrants are a diverse group. It is easy to get the impression that immigrants as a whole are highly concentrated at the bottom of the economic ladder, but while this is true for some groups, it is not true overall—indeed, race and ethnicity may well be more important than nativity in predicting success in New York City's labor market.

Finally, although economic output is driven in large measure by wages earned, low-wage immigrants—and other low-wage workers—also play very significant roles in the New York economy. Low-wage workers—in particular immigrants, and most especially undocumented immigrants—often work under harsh conditions, and are frequently paid less than the law requires. But they also provide low-cost amenities of city life such as free delivery, keep bodegas open twenty-four-hours a day, add value to products in garment factories, wash dishes in New York's dynamic restaurant industry, provide child care to a large number of New York City families, and in numerous other ways contribute to the economy in the city. There is no reason these jobs have to pay low wages, and there have been numerous campaigns to change that (Ness 2005). Even when they are drastically underpaid, however, low-wage immigrants are greatly improving the quality of life of New Yorkers, and there is no denying that, as a whole, New Yorkers benefit.

NOTES

1. "Immigrant" is defined as a person born in another country and residing in the United States. Immigrants include both documented and undocumented persons, except where specified. U.S.-born includes people born in the United States, including U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents. "Immigrant" and "foreign-born" are used interchangeably. All data in this report come from the Fiscal Policy Institute analysis of the 2009 American Community Survey, except where otherwise noted. The author would like to thank Jonathan DeBusk for his meticulous work in preparing the data, James Parrott and Frank Mauro for their input on the content, and Nancy Foner for her sharp editorial eye.

2. Jonathan Mahler took the phrase "the Bronx is burning" as part of the title of his 2005 book, *Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bronx Is Burning: 1977, Baseball, Politics, and the Battle for the Soul of a City*; Spike Lee's film *The Summer of Sam* came out in 1999.

3. Total economic output of an area can be estimated by looking at the total earnings of residents—wage and salary earnings, as well as proprietors' earnings, data that are available from the American Community Survey. This is the way the Bureau of Economic Analysis makes official estimates for GDP by metro area. Here we use the

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same general method to estimate immigrant share of economic output. The New York State–level estimates were further refined by taking into consideration commuters and industries where immigrants are concentrated.

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11. The Next Generation Emerges

Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters

New York has long been known as a city of immigrants. With more than a third of its population and almost half of its adult population foreign-born, scarcely an area of contemporary New York life has not been reshaped by the resumption of mass immigration since the mid-1960s. And yet, when we think of how immigration is transforming the city's economic, cultural, and political life, we are reminded that we can see the importance of immigration not only in the lives of the immigrants themselves but also in those of their American-born children, the "second generation." When we ask what sort of New Yorkers the newcomers will be—and what sort of New York they are creating—we must look to this second generation for answers.

By 2009, this American-born second generation constituted approximately 22 percent of the city's population. They were, however, 24 percent of the young adult (aged 18–32) population of the city. Another 11 percent of this age group are members of what Ruben Rumbaut (1999) has termed the "1.5 generation"—born abroad but arriving as children and coming of age in the United States. (Another 23 percent migrated as young adults.) Together, these groups make up more than half of all young adult New Yorkers. They outnumber the children of natives and far outnumber the children of white natives, the group many Americans still think of as the mainstream. Indeed, the norm among young adult New Yorkers today is to have immigrant parents, thus setting the tone for what

it means to be a young adult New Yorker. As the oldest members of the second generation now enter their early 40s and the average age is in the early 20s, members of the second generation are beginning to make their impact felt on many arenas of New York life. The growth of this population is made all the more important by the aging of the native population and the impending retirement of the large baby boom cohort. Thus, for better or for worse, the children of immigrants will almost certainly play an expanding role in the city's life in the coming decades (Alba 2009; Myers 2007).

New York is also unusual in that immigration affects all of the city's racial groups. In most of the United States, we think of Asians and Latinos as newcomers and whites and blacks as the native population. Not so in New York, where, particularly in the younger age groups, nearly half of the black population and indeed a third of the white population are immigrants or have immigrant parents. This means that the immigrant versus native cleavage does not map onto racial difference in the ways that it does in most of the United States.

These demographic facts make some observers uneasy. Many worry how the city and nation will be able to adjust to a future without a white majority—indeed, a city in which no racial or ethnic group forms a majority. Others express concern as to whether the economy, particularly in the wake of the recent "great recession," will be able to provide enough job opportunities to absorb the young people now coming of age. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a strong manufacturing base allowed the integration of many newcomers into an expanding working and lower-middle class. Clearly this route is no longer available and employment must be found in the various service sectors, many of which are nonunionized and have a predominance of low-wage jobs. Can New York City's schools and higher educational system meet the challenge of preparing the newcomers and their children for the managerial and professional jobs of the twenty-first century? What will the more complicated racial and ethnic landscape mean for the city's always contentious politics? Finally, will the children of immigrants coming of age in a time of semiofficially recognized multiculturalism be willing, or able, to be fully incorporated into the city's social and cultural mainstream?

In an effort to understand the second generation and the challenges it faces, we undertook the largest study of this group in the New York metropolitan area to date, the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) project. Between 1999 and 2001, we surveyed about 2,000 young adult New Yorkers of Chinese, Dominican, Russian Jewish, South American (Colombian, Ecuadoran, and Peruvian), and West Indian immigrant parentage. For comparative purposes, we also surveyed young adult New Yorkers of native black and native white parentage as well as mainland-born Puerto Ricans. The survey was supplemented with in-depth life history interviews with about 10 percent of the respondents and a series of linked ethnographic projects (for details, see Kasinitz et al. 2004 and Kasinitz et al. 2008).

In general, our research suggests that many of the concerns about the incorporation of the new second generation are misplaced. By most measures, the second generation is assimilating into American society very rapidly. Language assimilation is particularly dramatic—a finding that is consistent with research in the rest of the country (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Tran 2010). Nor is there much reason to worry about "divided loyalties." Few children of immigrants stay deeply connected to their parents' homelands or follow national politics in their parents' countries, which, despite the relative ease of modern transportation, a third have never visited even once. Even fewer second-generation New Yorkers have ever seriously considered moving to their parents' homelands permanently. What is more, the second generation tends to see themselves as Americans and New Yorkers, albeit ethnic ones. They are more likely than other New York residents their age to have grown up in the city (many "native" young adult New Yorkers are, in fact, newcomers from other parts of the United States), and they often identify strongly with the city, its culture, and its institutions.

Yet there are reasons to be concerned about the second generation's future. Racial differences among the groups we studied are marked, if somewhat less so than among the children of natives. By most measures of economic and educational achievement, the black and Latino children of immigrants, while generally better off than black and Latino natives, still lag well behind Asians and whites. Many report experiencing discrimination in daily life. For dark-skinned children of immigrants, negative encounters with the police are common and a source of considerable frustration and alienation (Waters and Kasinitz 2010). Perhaps because of their youth, the second generation also has yet to enter the city's political leadership proportionate to their numbers, although the recent emergence of several high-visibility second-generation politicians suggests that this may be changing.

GETTING AN EDUCATION

Second-generation groups vary in terms of educational attainment. In the ISGMNY sample, the Russian Jews and the Chinese were significantly more likely to have graduated from high school, completed a four-year college degree, or acquired postgraduate education than the other groups and significantly less likely to have dropped out of high school. Of those over 24, the percentage with a bachelor's degree ranged from 64 percent among the Chinese (10 percent higher than for native whites) down to only 26 percent among the Dominicans and South Americans—yet that is still 10 percent higher than the rate for native

blacks and Puerto Ricans, as well as much higher than the numbers for their own immigrant parents (Kasinitz et al. 2002).

It is noteworthy that the second-generation group with the highest level of educational achievement in the ISGMNY sample, the Chinese, are also the most likely to have attended New York City public schools. Indeed, while the most educationally ambitious white and African American parents often send their children to private or parochial schools (a pattern also seen, albeit to a lesser extent, among South Americans and Russian Jews), the Chinese seem to have found the islands of excellence within the highly uneven public school system. They are heavily overrepresented in the city's well-regarded selective and magnet schools (as are the Russian, Ukrainian, Korean, and other European- and Asian-origin second-generation groups) as well as in selective programs within neighborhood schools. Until recently, this often required that Chinese parents move to neighborhoods with better public schools. However, changes in New York's public school system in the last decade involving increased school choice and a reduction in the number of neighborhood-based schools, particularly at the high school level, has made it easier to access good schools and programs without moving. Thus in the ISGMNY study, among those who attended high school in the city, the Chinese second generation reported the longest commutes to school (Tran 2011), and this is probably even more true today since commuting long distances to attend high school has generally become more common. At the same time, Latino immigrant parents are often reluctant to have their children commute long distances to "better" schools, particularly when this means hours of travel on public transportation through sometimes dangerous neighborhoods. Thus, choice-based New York City school reforms have probably not served Latino groups as well.

For those who go on to college, there are also marked differences in the quality of schools attended. *U.S. News and World Report* ranks four-year institutions of higher learning on how selective they are, with Tier I as the most selective and Tier IV the least. Of those who went to college in the ISGMNY sample, 23 percent of the Chinese, 16 percent of Russian Jews, and 38 percent of native whites attended Tier I colleges—compared to only 6 percent of native African Americans, 8 percent of the Puerto Ricans, 7 percent of Dominicans, and 7 percent of West Indians. By contrast, 22 percent of college-educated Dominicans, 38 percent of native African Americans, 35 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 39 percent of West Indians had gone to Regional Tier IV schools—as opposed to only 4 percent of the Chinese and 9 percent of the Russian Jewish respondents (Kasinitz et al. 2008).

AVOIDING THE BOTTOM, NOT ALWAYS REACHING THE TOP: THE SECOND GENERATION IN THE WORKFORCE

In New York, as elsewhere, finding a foothold in the labor force is a crucial test for the successful incorporation of the second generation. As large numbers of the children of immigrants have come of age and embarked on independent careers, we can begin to see the roles they will play in the city's future. Nationally, many observers have expressed concern about how this entry into the labor force is being managed, and some scholars have noted the potential for "downward assimilation" of the children of immigrants into a multiethnic "underclass" of inner-city poverty (see Portes and Zhou 1993; Haller et al. 2011; Alba et al. 2011). Herbert Gans's notion of "second-generation decline" and the "segmented assimilation" theory developed by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators both suggest that while some immigrant groups will integrate into the mainstream labor force with relatively little trouble, others, particularly the children of poor and racially stigmatized labor migrants, will find themselves increasingly isolated from opportunities in the mainstream economy. Yet at the same time, the cultural assimilation of many members of these groups may lead to a situation where young people are unwilling or unable to take the generally low-status and low-wage jobs held by their immigrant parents (Gans 1992; Portes et al. 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993). Others suggest that a significant portion of the second generation is experiencing "racialization" (see Telles and Ortiz 2008) into an urban underclass that stands outside of the mainstream economy.

Our data generally suggest that this is not what is happening in New York. While groups clearly differ in how—and how well—they are being incorporated into the labor force, most of the second generation seems both more likely to be strongly attached to the labor force than the members of native minority groups and far less likely to work in distinctive ethnic niches than their immigrant parents.

Given the youth of most of the current second generation, however, standard measures of labor force participation are not always the best way to examine the question of labor market incorporation. After all, many young people in the United States today combine part-time work and part-time education and career training well into their late 20s and even later (see Waters et al. 2011). This is particularly true in New York, where the huge City University of New York (CUNY, with more than 270,000 students) encourages people to continue to slowly amass credentials often well past what we traditionally think of as college age (Attewell and Lavin 2008). Furthermore, those young adults who are pursuing educational credentials at older ages and who will eventually obtain relatively high-status

jobs may, in their 20s, still have low incomes and appear to have weak labor attachment.

One way to deal with this problem is to look at the proportion in various groups in the most danger of falling into an underclass outside of the mainstream labor force. We can do this by identifying those adults who are not currently employed, enrolled in higher education, or in training programs with a statistic known as the NEET (not in education, employment, or training) rate (Quintini and Martin 2006). First introduced in the United Kingdom, the NEET rate has been used in educational research to examine employability, labor market marginalization, and social exclusion among young people. This measure provides a more expansive, and we feel more useful, indicator of labor market marginality than official unemployment rates, given the age of the second-generation respondents.

Of course, not everyone counted in the NEET rate should be thought of as a potential member of a socially isolated underclass. There could be several reasons for being NEET. Some have chosen to stay home as homemakers or caretakers of young children while others might be trying to succeed in a field (such as the arts) without yet earning a living from it. Yet the existence of much higher NEET rates in certain groups clearly suggests the possibility of long-term social exclusion and is a serious reason for concern.

Looking at the ISGMNY data, we see dramatic differences in the NEET rate among the various second-generation and native groups. Native African Americans showed a NEET rate of nearly 30 percent and for mainland-born Puerto Ricans it was above 25 percent. Both groups were significantly above the rate for native whites (13.3 percent). Among the second-generation groups, however, only Dominicans, the worst off of the second-generation populations on most measures, were significantly more likely to be NEET than native whites, and even they, with a rate of 20.6 percent, were more likely to be in school or the labor force than were native blacks and Puerto Ricans. The Russian Jewish and the Chinese second generation were more likely to be working or in school than were the native whites. South Americans and West Indians showed NEET rates that were about the same as those of children of white natives.

If the second generation does seem to be entering the labor force, what sort of jobs are they taking? We found that the children of immigrants do not generally work in "immigrant jobs," nor, for that matter, do they live in isolated ethnic enclaves. Rather, they are moving quickly into the city's increasingly multiethnic mainstream. While their immigrant parents may run convenience stores, drive taxis, or work as nannies, the second generation is moving into financial services, civil service jobs, and mainstream retail work. The children of garment factory workers, for example, are increasingly making their mark among the city's younger fashion designers. In each of the five immigrant second-generation groups we studied, the most common jobs were retail work, white-collar managers, and clerical positions—exactly the same jobs most commonly held by the children of natives their age.

We compared the occupation and industry profile of the second-generation respondents in our study with those of their immigrant parents and with the city's labor force as a whole. As one might suspect, the immigrant parents were highly concentrated in ethnic niche occupations and were also very segregated by gender. Two out of every five fathers of Chinese respondents worked in restaurants, while more than a third of the mothers of West Indian respondents were nurses or nurse's aides. New York's beleaguered manufacturing sector has continued to play an important role for immigrants, particularly for those immigrant women who (unlike West Indians) do not speak English on arrival. Forty-six percent of the mothers of Dominican second-generation respondents, 43 percent of the South American mothers, and a staggering 57 percent of the Chinese mothers worked in manufacturing, primarily in the garment industry.

The second-generation respondents present a different picture. They are markedly less concentrated in certain occupations than their parents. For example, only 3 percent of the second-generation male Chinese respondents worked in restaurants, and only 9 percent of West Indian female respondents were nurses or nurse's aides. While greater economic opportunity has pushed the second generation away from their parents' jobs, they also report a distaste for stereotypical ethnic occupations. When asked what job he would never take, one Chinese respondent replied, "Delivering Chinese food." When the daughter of a Chinatown jewelry shop owner was asked if her father would like her to take over the business, she laughingly replied, "No, he doesn't hate me that much!"

Even the least successful groups have largely exited from parental niches. There is a striking drop-off in manufacturing employment between the generations. While manufacturing is an important employer of fathers, and particularly mothers, for all second-generation groups in our study except West Indians, second-generation employment in manufacturing is negligible—in fact, even less common than in the general population in the New York metropolitan area. As one Colombian respondent put it when asked if he would consider taking his father's job, "Hey, I don't do that factory thing." To be sure, the second generation has good reason for rejecting their parents' jobs, which they often see—rightly—as hard, low status, and unrewarding. The minority of the second generation that ended up employed in workplaces dominated by coethnics generally earned less and had fewer benefits than those who worked in ethnically mixed workplaces (Kasinitz et al. 2011). But beyond the material advantages of joining the mainstream, many of the young people we spoke to found immigrant jobs distasteful precisely because they were seen as immigrant jobs. As one young Chinese man put it:

> RESPONDENT: My father, he is always working [in a restaurant]. Never home. My mom works like six days a week and my dad works six. . . . I don't think he likes it. It is just to make money, pay my tuition, my brother's tuition, pay the bills.

INTERVIEWER: Would you ever work that job?
RESPONDENT: No! Too much running around. My parents work long, long hours. I want to work nine to five! I guess it's all right for someone with his level of education. For them it's good, but not for me. I would not want to do it.

Even among second-generation respondents with few other employment options, ethnicity plays a role in defining a job as appropriate, as the comments of a young Dominican woman, an unemployed high school dropout with an arrest record, indicate:

RESPONDENT: My mom, she didn't have papers. So she was working under the table . . . cleaning, ironing for people—that's like a Hispanic thing. [It] was a way of getting through rough times.
INTERVIEWER: Would you ever see yourself working that kind of job?
RESPONDENT: I never say never, but I wouldn't want to. Because I was raised here! I speak very good English. So, I don't know.

Not surprisingly, many of the second generation have been attracted to New York's large finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector. Indeed, Chinese and Russian respondents are more likely to work in this sector than native whites or New York City residents as a whole. The sector also employs many South American respondents. Interestingly, FIRE employment is higher among the second generation than among their immigrant parents in every group except West Indians, among whom many immigrant parents already in FIRE employment no doubt have lower status and relatively low-paying jobs within this high-paying sector.

For the most part, however, second-generation respondents report working in the same kinds of jobs most young people in New York City have. Given their age and the era in which they entered the labor market, retailing and clerical work are the first or second most common occupations for every group except native whites, for whom they are the second and third most common. A number of interesting ethnic particularities in the occupational distribution do suggest that some new ethnic niches may be forming: many Chinese work in finance as computer and design specialists; the Russians seem to specialize in work with computers; Dominicans, South Americans, and Puerto Ricans are often financial clerks; and many second-generation West Indians work in health care. The overwhelming story is nevertheless one of similarity with each other rather than recapitulating the group differences evident among their parents. Our education and occupation data show some evidence of downward mobility for mainland-born Puerto Ricans—which might suggest "third-generation decline." But for the most part the second generation are going to school and working with each other, and most do not show any signs of the second-generation decline that distressed some analysts.

How are they doing in terms of income? Generally the move out of the parents' ethnic niches and into the economic mainstream seems to be paying off, at least modestly. Chinese and Russian second-generation respondents have almost exactly the same hourly earnings as native white New Yorkers the same age. The West Indian and Latino second generation earns less, although they actually earn about the same as those native whites who were raised in New York City. They still make considerably more than native blacks and Puerto Ricans.

However, if few of the second generation seem to be clustered at the bottom of the New York City labor force, it is not as clear that they are making significant inroads at the very top. Of course, we can see a smattering of the children of immigrants in almost all of New York's most prestigious firms. This is true for all groups, but particularly so for Asians. For example, Goldman Sachs, the financial giant, now has a sufficient number of young Chinese executives to field a large team to compete in the Hong Kong–style dragon boat races now annually held in Queens. However, as Richard Alba's recent analysis of Wall Street employment shows, other groups are not doing as well in the top occupations. The children of black and Latino immigrants are far underrepresented in these firms relative to their proportion of the population and tend to be concentrated in lower-wage and lower-status positions within the generally high-wage financial sector (Alba and Pereira 2011).

FINDING THEIR VOICE: THE SECOND GENERATION IN NEW YORK POLITICS AND MULTIETHNIC URBAN CULTURE

Like other young people, members of the second generation, on the whole, are not particularly interested in politics, take a jaundiced view of politicians, and are not actively engaged in electoral politics. As immigrant communities have grown over the last decade, however, and as the next generation has come of age, young people from immigrant backgrounds are emerging as leaders of student groups, nonprofit organizations, and even as political candidates.

Perhaps the most dramatic political development in recent years in terms of the second generation's emergence as a political force was the election to Congress of Yvette Clarke, the New York–born child of Jamaican immigrants, in 2008 and Grace Meng, a second-generation Taiwanese American in 2012, as well as the election of John Liu, a 1.5-generation Taiwanese immigrant, as the city's comptroller in 2009. In all three cases, these relatively young politicians got their starts representing largely immigrant districts in the city council or the state legislature. Yet as they sought higher office, they managed to combine a strong appeal to coethnics with an ability to reach beyond their "natural" ethnic base and win

the votes of New Yorkers from a wide range of groups. Liu, in particular, was elected with significant African American support as well as the endorsement of many of the city's various ethnic newspapers and other media outlets, and has made little secret of his desire to move up even further in the city's political structure. Their success has been echoed in the election of second-generation members of the city council from Dominican, West Indian, and Korean backgrounds.

Finally, it is worth noting that as New York's second generation sets the tone for New York's urban culture, they may be changing the way that they and other New Yorkers view the city, in some cases in very positive ways. Many of the second-generation young people we spoke to demonstrated a fluid and nuanced approach to the oldest and most vexing of American social divides: race. Much of today's second generation does not fit easily into American racial boxes and categories. Race continues to be a central fact in American life, and racism continues to tragically circumscribe many people's life chances. But racial boundaries are blurring as the categories become more complicated. And young people—both the second generation and those who grow up with them—seem more comfortable with that fact than their elders.

Growing up in multiethnic neighborhoods, like Jackson Heights, Queens (where Indians, South Americans, Irish, and Pakistani immigrants live side by side), or Sunset Park, Brooklyn (where Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Arabic-speaking immigrants mix with old-timers with roots in Scandinavia), the young New Yorkers we spoke to were generally comfortable with racial and ethnic diversity. In a world where almost everyone's family is from somewhere else, ethnicity is a source of everyday banter. One 18-year-old told us about how often people tried to guess her identity: "I have been asked if I am Egyptian, Cuban, Greek, Pakistani. I say no, I am Peruvian, Spanish. I like my culture and I am proud to be Peruvian, the Incas and all that." This is not a world of balkanized groups huddled within their own enclaves, but rather of hybrids and fluid exchanges across group boundaries. Most of our respondents took it for granted that having friendships with people of a variety of backgrounds was a good thing, that it made one a better, more fully developed person.

Ironically, in this hyperdiverse world, assimilation—if that is the right word—seems to happen faster and with less angst than in the past. The children of European immigrants who arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century often felt forced to choose between their parents' ways and those of American society. Many were embarrassed when their parents could not speak English and even changed their names to fit in. As the Italian American educator Leonard Covello recalled, "We were becoming American by learning how to be ashamed of our parents" (cited in Foner 2000:207).

By contrast, today's second generation is far more at ease with both their American and ethnic identities. One woman told us that learning Russian from her parents has been beneficial for her because "there's a certain richness that comes along with having another culture to fall back on. People are always intrigued. They ask what does it mean to be Russian and you feel a little special to explain and it adds color to you." Far from being "torn between two worlds," the children of immigrants increasingly make use of the second generation's natural advantage: the ability to combine the best of their parents' culture with the best that America has to offer. Maria, age 23, said that being both American and Colombian was "the best of two worlds. Like being able to keep and appreciate those things in my culture that I enjoy and that I think are beautiful, and, at the same time, being able to change those things which I think are bad."

Unfortunately, the intergenerational progress and rapid assimilation of these young people is often missed in immigration debates that are focused only on recent arrivals. A more long-term view, one that takes into account the progress of the second generation, would do much to inform our local and national conversations over immigration. Our research suggests that such a view would lead to a far more optimistic assessment of the role of immigration in American life.

DARK CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON?

Lest we draw too optimistic a portrait about the incorporation of the new second-generation New Yorkers, a few notes of caution are in order. The first is economic. The data for the ISGMNY study were collected during very good economic times—indeed, toward the end of what was, for the city, a remarkable period of economic growth. We still do not know how the ISGMNY respondents fared in the great recession and the long period of stagnation that has followed. It is worth noting, however, that many of the most successful respondents were concentrated in industries that were particularly hard hit—high tech, construction, and finance (although, of course, New York's finance industry recovered remarkably quickly from a crisis that it had a significant role in creating, to the consternation of its many critics). Since the best-off of the second generation have come the furthest from the lives of their immigrant parents, they usually have had far fewer parental and familial resources to fall back on than their native white contemporaries and colleagues. And what of their younger siblings and cousins—the very large cohort of second-generation New Yorkers who had the historical misfortune to enter the labor force just when the recession hit? Will the second-generation resilience of these relative newcomers help them reinvent themselves in a changing economy? Will the ethnic enclaves they previously avoided suddenly seem more attractive? Or will they find themselves locked out of opportunities by better-established groups, now anxious to safeguard their own position in leaner and meaner times? As of this writing it is too early to say, but there are certainly reasons for concern. Yet it is worth remembering that many members of the previous comparable second generation—the children of the great wave of early twentieth-century immigrants—entered

the labor force during the Great Depression. In the long run, that seemingly tragic historical timing eventually turned out to be fortuitous, as this group experienced massive upward mobility and economic assimilation in the great economic expansion of the postwar years.

Even after the present downturn passes, the need to integrate such a large number of young people from immigrant backgrounds into a twenty-first-century labor force presents profound challenges for the city's public educational system and CUNY at a moment when fiscal shortfalls are leading to cutbacks at both institutions. As Alba (2009) has argued, nothing could be more in the interest of the city's elites than the successful incorporation of the next generation of the city's leaders, and as such investment in education at this moment would seem crucial. Yet how to fund this investment during a time of austerity and increased popular reluctance to pay for public goods represents a serious challenge.

There is also the question of emerging differences among various second-generation groups, and between second-generation and native minority groups, in the degree to which they have been able to successfully make use of the educational system. Moves toward greater diversity and increased choice in public education at all levels in the city have, on the one hand, guaranteed that some students from extremely modest backgrounds have access to an excellent education. Yet they have also deepened inequalities within the system (Corcoran 2011). The children of Asian and, to a lesser extent, former Soviet immigrants seem to have done extremely well under this system—better by most measures than the children of native whites. At one of the city's most elite public high schools, the children of East and South Asians and Russians are now the majority. Yet, while their achievements are to be celebrated, it is distressing that that the number of native black and Latino students at such elite high schools—and the highest-regarded CUNY campuses—has fallen in recent years. Even among blacks and Latinos, real cleavages are emerging—although the use of racial terms like "black" and "Latino" tends to obscure this fact. By most measures, the children of some Latino immigrant groups (notably South Americans) are doing better than others, and the children of all immigrant groups, including those from South America and the West Indies, seem to be doing better than native African Americans and Puerto Ricans. It should also be noted that women are doing better in school than men in most of these groups (Lopez 2003). We urgently need new research to understand the different rates of educational success. But we also may need new politics and policies to address these new inequities. In general, we should not let the success of large parts of New York's second generation obscure the problems of the less successful or mask the continuing failure of New York City's institutions to address poverty and social isolation among large parts of native minority communities.

Finally, we should note the effects of legal status. While New York City has never had as large a concentration of undocumented immigrants as have those parts of the country closer to the southern border, many parents of the ISGMNY respondents came to the United States without papers or lived here as undocumented immigrants for some years while their children were growing up. Indeed, it was not at all uncommon for these second- and 1.5-generation New Yorkers to grow up in mixed-status households that included undocumented immigrants, people holding legal temporary visas (such as tourist or student visas), legal permanent residents, naturalized citizens, and birthright citizens. Up until the mid-1990s, this diversity of legal statuses seems to have had fairly little impact on the children raised in such households. Deportation was rare and largely restricted to those with serious criminal records. And while regularizing legal status was never easy for undocumented immigrants, opportunities to do so did exist. Eventually most of those who wanted to become legal were able to do so.

Since the mid-1990s (and at least until this writing in late 2012), this has no longer been the case. The United States has been engaged in what Robert C. Smith has termed a cruel "natural experiment" (chapter 10, this volume). By restricting the opportunities of technically illegal immigrants to obtain legal status, the United States has created an unprecedentedly large population of long-standing semipermanent undocumented workers who are part of the city economically, socially, and culturally but not legally or politically. This is a profoundly troubling situation for a democratic society—one that seems far more likely than downward assimilation to produce an underclass.

For the U.S.-born second generation, despite birthright citizenship, having an undocumented parent often means growing up with economic insecurity and the threat of deportation and, whatever their own parents' legal status, coming of age in communities in which many of the adults are undocumented and lack a political voice (Yoshikawa 2011). As for those members of the 1.5 generation who themselves are undocumented, they confront and must cope with their own lack of basic rights and opportunities in the only country they have ever really known (Gonzales 2011). Having siblings who enjoy many advantages because they were born in the United States or were able to regularize their status by virtue of having arrived earlier underlines the harsh realities and barriers that come with their own undocumented status.

New York City, it must be said, is probably facing the challenges we have mentioned more successfully than most of the United States. New York politicians have not generally stooped to anti-immigrant demagoguery and most of the population seems convinced that the successful incorporation of the children of immigrants is in the city's best interest. The presence of CUNY, with its overwhelmingly immigrant and second-generation students and its tradition of celebrating immigrant achievement, has undoubtedly played an important role in the relative success of the second generation up until now. How it will continue to serve this population in more constrained fiscal circumstances is a key question to be faced in the years to come. More generally, New York City governments

have tended to take pro-immigrant stands, even under the Republican administration of Rudolph Giuliani and the Republican/independent administration of Michael Bloomberg. Both mayors criticized their party's national leadership on the immigration issue and both sought to promote the image of the city as a place friendly to immigrants, a stance that was frequently at odds with that taken by local government leaders in other parts of the country. Still, as the current situation regarding legal status makes clear, the incorporation of immigrants—and of the second generation—remains a national problem, one the city cannot solve on its own.

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