APR 23 2007

Building Gotham

Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 1898–1938

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The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore and London

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Conceiving the New Metropolis

Expertise, Public Policy, and the Problem of Civic Culture in New York City

> Invariably the newcomer to New York is puzzled to comprehend the city. From the bridge of an ocean liner coming up the harbor, the distant sky line of Manhattan is undoubtedly one of the greatest spectacles in the world, whether seen through the smoky blue mist of morning, or at night when the thousand windows of Wall Street glow through the darkness as though lit up by inner fires. No more impressive sight has ever been created solely by the industry and imagination of man. The superb majesty of the distant city at once gives the impression of possessing some inner unity and consistency. Yet when the vessel docks and we come to tread the crowded streets of the metropolis, this unity of New York City constantly eludes our search. So great has been [the city's] growth that year after year it has tended more and more to split up into separate communities, each with its own particular headquarters in the great city and its own particular interests and problems. Because of this fact we all tend, I feel, to lose our sense of citizenship in the metropolis itself.
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> —EDWARD H. H. SIMMONS, president, New York Stock Exchange, 1927

In 1898, the residents of New York City embarked on an ambitious project in collective living. That year, the state legislature created Greater New York, uniting Manhattan, Brooklyn, the communities of Queens County, Staten Island, and the Bronx—a total of ninety-six governmental units in all—into a new metropolis of nearly three and a half million people—twice as large as Chicago, its closest domestic rival. By the time of consolidation, New York had secured its position as the nation's busiest port, its corporate and financial headquarters, its undisputed intellectual capital, and the most ethnically diverse of American cities. But this city of superlatives, a testament to the vitality and heterogeneity of nineteenth-century America, struggled with the new dimensions of urban life it comprised. As Paul Bourget, a member of the

French Academy, exclaimed in 1893, "This is not even a city in the sense which we [Europeans] understand the word. This is a table of contents of unique character. It is so colossal, it encloses so formidable an accumulation of human efforts, as to overpass the bounds of the imagination."[1] This profusion of activity resulted in an array of unprecedented problems that seemed beyond the capacity of the city's institutions of collective decision making—courts, parties, corporations, markets, and local governments—and threatened New York's future as the great American metropolis.

No one had ever tried to manage a city of this magnitude, diversity, and complexity, at least not in the United States. Only London surpassed New York in population, but the capital of Great Britain did not exhibit the hallmarks of modernity—skyscrapers, immigration, concentrated corporate power—in the same degree as Gotham, the capital of capitalism.[2] New York led the way, as usual, creating and striving to resolve the problems of size, concentration, and proximity characteristic of megacities in the twentieth century. Even today, only a handful of places around the globe have attempted such a feat, and those that have, especially in the developing world, continue to wrestle with many of the questions posed by the consolidated city a century ago. New Yorkers were the first to address the consequences of collective living on this new scale and thus to determine whether American culture could be adapted to establish the bonds of community—the terms of interconnection and mutual obligation—for a city of four, six, eight million.

Consolidation itself emerged from a perception of shared problems facing the communities that would make up Greater New York. Gotham's merchants had long clamored for metropolitan government to reorganize New York harbor, which illustrated on a vast scale the shortcomings of large corporations and local officials as economic managers.[3] Between the 1870s and 1900, New York's share of the nation's foreign commerce declined (although the volume and value increased), igniting a heated public debate over how to insure the long-term prosperity of the port district. The competition for space and fragmented ownership of the waterfront created a chaotic, inefficient, and costly system of freight transportation between Manhattan piers and New Jersey rail lines, prompting shippers, manufacturers, politicians, and boosters on both sides of the Hudson River to question the railroads' ability to manage the harbor for their mutual benefit. When the port became paralyzed during World War I—with railcars backed up as far as Chicago—evidence of the need for new institutions to oversee the most important economic asset in the region became even clearer.

This crisis of overcrowding and uncoordinated growth did not stop at the waterfront. A downtown packed with skyscrapers and sweatshops, department stores and factories, high-class hotels and squalid tenements led to the uncomfortable mixing of native and immigrant cultures and competition for space between small entrepreneurs and corporate giants. Population in sections of Manhattan's Lower East Side (just blocks from the national nerve center of high finance and corporate capitalism) increased to more than one thousand people per acre by 1905, producing some of the most densely inhabited areas in the world. Reformers blamed overcrowding alternately on the moral failings of immigrant tenants and rapacious landlords, but the skyscraper boom provided a larger context in which to interpret congestion. The tallest buildings of the prewar era—Cass Gilbert's Woolworth Building (the fifty-story "Cathedral of Commerce" that overshadowed City Hall), Ernest Flagg's Singer Building, and Napoleon LeBrun's Metropolitan Life Tower—served as but a prelude for the giant structures of the 1920s. By 1929, the city bulged with an astounding 2,479 buildings of more than ten stories—two thousand more than Chicago, the birthplace of the skyscraper.[4] New Yorkers thus confronted an urban landscape entirely new in the history of civilization—one that illustrated for many observers that private property, given undue protection by the courts, had run amok in the great city, requiring stringent regulations on individual rights and real estate markets to prevent Gotham from choking itself to death.

Population densities downtown and the sheer size of Greater New York placed extraordinary demands on infrastructure, highlighting the shortcomings of the political parties, private companies, and municipal technicians working to make the city livable. In 1898, the Brooklyn Bridge remained the only direct link for the 143 million commuters crossing each year between the region's central business district in Manhattan and growing suburban areas in Brooklyn and Queens. More than 70 million commuters a year from New Jersey, which functioned increasingly as both the residential and industrial periphery of lower Manhattan, still made their way across the busy Hudson by boat—the same method used by the Dutch explorers who had settled the island nearly three centuries earlier. More pressing still, neither the Croton waterworks, built in the 1840s, nor its subsequent additions could keep pace with the vertical and horizontal expansion of the city. The steel and concrete skyscrapers that housed armies of white-collar workers at the turn of the century required as much as twenty times more water than the low-rise brick structures they replaced, and the buildings only got bigger. In many places in the city, pressure was so low that water did not rise into pipes above basement

level without supplemental pumping, causing considerable anxiety among insurance executives who knew just how much flammable wealth sat in midtown warehouses and factories. The citizens of Brooklyn, who relied on Long Island reservoirs, lived under an annual threat of water famine. Despite the shortage of water, the city dumped prodigious amounts of raw sewage into surrounding rivers—roughly 300 million gallons per day by the time of consolidation. With local officials unwilling and unable to remedy the problem—financially, technically, or politically—the pollution oozed its way beyond the harbor, forcing health authorities to close beaches on the outskirts of the city and prompting Robert Moses to build swimming pools to prevent outbreaks of typhoid and cholera. To clean up the pungent mess lapping at the city's waterfront, to provide enough water for domestic and industrial use (and public safety) in the five boroughs, and to cope with the ebb and flow of economic activity linking Manhattan to Long Island and New Jersey, municipal officials would have to think beyond electoral districts and significantly expand public claims on private wealth in spite of the lingering shadow of Tweedism.

Responding to these challenges forced New Yorkers to face the limitations of their governing institutions and approaches to collective decision making. The failure of railroad executives, bankers, machine politicians, judges, elected officials, and real estate developers to resolve the problems of the modern city precipitated a crisis of legitimacy that opened the door for new actors—experts in engineering, law, finance, public health, and architecture, armed with specialized knowledge, technical skills, and a new perspective on the metropolis—who aspired to remake the institutional relationships necessary to build and manage Gotham. This book examines how those experts, working in conjunction and often at odds with powerful economic and political groups, fought to establish new terms of togetherness for New York City between the 1890s and 1940s and set an example for the rest of the world.

Civic Culture, Public Policy, and Institutional Change

New Yorkers had few cultural tools for conceptualizing community on this new scale. Like most Americans, they inherited from the nineteenth century a civic culture of privatism embedded in their institutions of collective decision making.[5] The complex of courts, parties, corporations, markets, and local governments that New Yorkers used to respond to common problems favored

voluntary over compulsory commitments to the public welfare, individual rights over collective needs, and parochial orientations to policy issues over more comprehensive perspectives. Even the greater city itself, the product of a compromise between machine politicians and reformers, strained to accommodate the broader conception of public good envisioned by Andrew Green, the father of consolidation; although the charter of 1898 did set up a centralized government, it gave way to a new charter in 1902, much to Green's dismay, which reestablished a leading role for borough officials, shifting power over city-building policies back to a more local level. New Yorkers thus approached the shared circumstances of modernity (problems that cut across electoral boundaries, class lines, economic interests, and ethnic ties) with a cultural inheritance that eschewed the institutionalized collective commitments that we now associate with urban life (at least in many places around the world), making it difficult for them to articulate and pursue general interests for so large and diverse a community.

By analyzing debates over commuter and freight transportation, municipal infrastructure and fiscal management, zoning and regional planning, this book shows how a civic culture of expertise developed as a response to the crisis of legitimacy of the city's institutions of collective decision making in the early years of the twentieth century. By virtue of living and working in a city of unique scale, density, and diversity, experts in business, government, academic, philanthropic, and consulting roles together formulated a distinctive *civic* culture—a shared way of seeing the interconnections among the multitudinous communities of the greater city. Their cultural outlook provided the context for discussion of the burdens and restrictions that an invigorated government could impose on private property, individual liberty, group prerogatives, and local autonomy in pursuit of collective interests.[6] In place of voluntarism, individualism, and localism, the civic culture of expertise offered centralization (the expansion and coordination of regulatory and administrative powers), interdependence, and a citywide perspective on urban problems.

The historical problem posed by this way of conceptualizing the new metropolis arose because cities, like nations, contain multiple cultures and thus multiple approaches to social integration. "American history has been in considerable measure a struggle between rival ways of getting together," historian John Higham noted in one of his most insightful arguments. "In actual experience the alternatives have overlapped very greatly. Instead of facing a clear choice between commensurate loyalties, Americans have commonly been en-

meshed in divergent systems of integration."[7] Metropolitan New York City exhibited many such forms of social integration at the turn of the century: ethnic, religious, and fraternal communities; communities of economic interest, such as labor unions, taxpayer associations, and producer groups; communities organized along geographical lines such as neighborhoods, wards, and boroughs; and of course political communities like Tammany Hall (the regular Democratic Party organization in Manhattan) and the Fusion (a perennial coalition of anti-Tammany forces, including Republicans, Independents, and reform Democrats). But New York also operated at more extensive levels of connectedness—at the level of the city as a whole and sometimes at a regional level—and the civic culture of expertise evolved around the notion (inherent in consolidation) that the city required a more comprehensive level of social integration to deal with problems that spanned carefully constructed political, ethnic, economic, and geographical boundaries. Citywide problems required citywide solutions; regional problems required regional solutions; and New York suffered from the limitations of institutions that could not quite manage to operate at those levels. Connecting the whole with the parts—finding ways to bring the larger-scale organization of urban life into existence while negotiating terms of coexistence with the less comprehensive forms of community—constituted the basic difficulty of civic culture and institutional change in early-twentieth-century New York City.

This process of cultural conflict and institutional innovation included, but was not limited to, the classic patterns of urban coalition building. Corporate executives, small businessmen, machine and reform politicians, neighborhood associations, real estate developers, civic leaders, and a variety of technically trained professionals contributed to the decisions necessary to construct railroad tunnels underneath the Hudson River, expand the city's borrowing capacity, create a regional sewage-treatment system, and regulate skyscrapers. But these projects involved more than power struggles and political alliances. Although experts often took the lead building coalitions in these policy debates, they also pushed for more fundamental change, redefining the values embedded in decision-making institutions and expanding the roles and perspectives they brought to bear on common problems. The institutions pushed back, of course, resisting and redirecting innovation by reasserting the values and prerogatives of private property, individual liberty, corporate and electoral power, local control, and fiscal conservatism that animated them. Institutional change and cultural conflict thus proceeded hand in hand, with a cycle of

punch/counterpunch driving the state-building process even more so than pluralistic bargaining.[8]

By shifting the focus of inquiry to the technical actors involved in this dual process, this book demonstrates how engineers, economists, public health specialists, architects, and lawyers attempted to change the terms of public policy discourse by reconceptualizing the metropolitan community. Through their efforts to solve the problems associated with railroad planning, public works construction, and land-use regulation, they fought existing approaches to decision making and the groups invested in them in order to establish alternative standards of governmental legitimacy, expand existing public powers, and create new municipal and regional institutions to implement their vision of a planned metropolis.[9] That process, riddled with conflicts and contradictions, produced neither a clear centralization of power nor an obvious triumph of any one political or economic group; instead, it generated a diffuse centralization of governmental authority—a multiplication of partially centralized, fragmented, and overlapping centers of public and quasi-public power governing a metropolitan community that struggled to achieve a marriage among divergent systems of integration. By the 1960s, the resulting intergovernmental problem had grown to breathtaking proportions, with 1,467 distinct public entities exercising political authority in the New York region—a thousand more than forty years earlier.[10]

Problematizing the Civic Culture of Expertise: Beyond Efficiency

This book explores the institutional and cultural dynamics of organizing the modern city along the lines proposed by the experts who became such a force in late-nineteenth-century America by virtue of the central roles they played in big business, government, academia, and philanthropy. While myriad other actors and approaches to social integration shaped New York City, the civic culture of expertise provided the decisive linkages between the technical discourses of problem solving and the larger public life of the city that explain the diffuse centralization of authority that resulted from Progressive Era state building. Historians have typically relied on the concept of efficiency to demonstrate that connection, and the transformation of this powerful industrial principle into an influential social ideal certainly affected the governance of cities.[11] Although efficiency played an important role in the policy

debates explored here, it does not fully comprehend the alternative approach to urban problems offered by the civic culture of expertise. In addition to privileging an abstraction from engineering and economics over those from law, architecture, and public health, the idea of efficiency has lent itself to narratives of exploitation, which tend to collapse the complex problem of "divergent systems of integration" in large cities into a simplistic battle between democratic and undemocratic approaches to decision making, especially when coupled to tensions between native and immigrant cultures: efficiency versus democracy, rationality versus participation, top-down versus bottom-up.[12]

As compelling and illuminating as that formulation seems, the presumed conflict between efficiency and participatory democracy played at best a peripheral role in efforts to centralize public authority in New York. Most policies made in American cities, especially with regard to public monies and regulatory power, did not involve mass politics, either in the nineteenth century or in the twentieth, in spite of the successful movements for inclusion that reshaped part of our political landscape during this period.[13] Government with the consent of the governed, rather than government by the people directly, has generally characterized urban decision making in this country. The experiments in railroad regulation, infrastructure development, and land-use planning undertaken by experts in New York City did not rely on the suppression of mass political movements, although electoral changes affected state building (profoundly, but usually indirectly) and elected officials influenced every area of policy. Instead, the institutional changes examined in this book resulted in a transfer of decision-making power between intermediate forms of centralized authority—from the invisible government of corporations, party bosses, judges, and property owners to municipal bureaucrats—or established public controls over previously unregulated private choices or market processes.[14] To be sure, property owners did object to the use of newly centralized regulatory authority as "undemocratic," but they defended "democracy" as individual economic rights and the prerogatives of ownership rather than "democracy" as group rights of cultural self-determination and political participation.

To understand the nature of the conflicts and changes generated by the entrance of technical discourses to the public sphere, therefore, this book looks beyond efficiency to other concepts that experts brought to city building and that threatened the "ways of getting together" represented by courts, parties, corporations, markets, and local governments. Rather than producing a split between democratic and undemocratic forms of political interaction, the civic culture of expertise caused fractures along three interrelated fault lines of public discourse affecting the creation, operation, and structure of new governing institutions: the legacy of active government as a foundation for state building, the implications of interdependence for policy making, and the constitution of general interests vis-à-vis the structure and scope of government power.

The civic culture of expertise built on an ambiguous legacy of active government that served as both a starting point for state-building coalitions and a potential barrier to fundamental institutional change: The experts who wanted to expand the role of government to solve urban problems in the New York region did not start from scratch. Although it had long been something of a national conceit that Americans considered government a "necessary evil" and strove for minimal public interference in private affairs, cities generally, and New York especially, had an almost unbroken heritage of public activism—as evident in three of the most significant infrastructure achievements of nineteenth-century government: the Croton waterworks, Central Park, and the Brooklyn Bridge.[15] British observer James Bryce captured this contradiction in *The American Commonwealth* (1888): "Though the Americans have no theory of the State and take a narrow view of its functions, though they conceive themselves to be devoted to *laissez faire* in principle, and to be in practice the most self-reliant of peoples, they have grown no less accustomed than the English to carry the action of government into ever-widening fields."[16] This vernacular political philosophy of limited government had such a pervasive influence on the American mind that each generation had to discover the governmental habit anew. "Land grants, franchise steals, favorable court decisions, and supple politicians appeared in a bewildering array" during the nineteenth century, observed Queens-native Benjamin Parke De Witt in 1915; "long before the country realized it, the government *was* being used—not in the interests of the many, but in the interests of the few." Although muckrakers focused on the deals between political bosses and corporate moguls, businesses from transcontinental railroads to local saloons benefitted from some form of public assistance. "What these big and little businesses all had in common," journalist Lincoln Steffens concluded, "was not size but the need of privileges," from franchises and protective tariffs to lenient enforcement of blue laws. New

York's well-deserved reputation for political corruption—due largely to the brief but spectacular reign of boss Tweed—did result in a significant reduction of direct municipal spending, but businessmen continued to ask for public favors, politicians continued to grant them, and municipal government continued to pave streets, build parks, furnish street-car franchises, and construct and maintain waterfront facilities, among its many promotional activities.[17]

This division between the theory and practice of active government shaped the process of institutional innovation in New York City at every turn. On the one hand, assisting local businesses and promoting economic growth provided ready-to-hand strategies to garner support for expanded municipal powers, and experts interested in city building often enlarged the role of local government by linking their efforts to promotional purposes. On the other hand, this rather opportunistic approach to state building meant confronting the differences between pursuing some group's particular interests and creating a durable intellectual foundation and widely accepted political rationale for the regulatory state. While accessibility to public economic and legal assistance provided a consistent justification for governmental activism, more often than not it resulted in uncertain standards of bureaucratic legitimacy. Since they could rarely find allies pure in motive, the experts who tackled the problems of freight planning, water supply, and land-use regulation in New York City had to cut deals where they could and attempt to induce their fellow citizens to embrace a new understanding of the relationships between whole and parts in the modern metropolis. To what extent, they were forced to ask, could they rely on the parochial motives of collaborators to buttress their vision of the collective good before subverting that larger goal altogether?

The civic culture of expertise emphasized the physical and economic interdependence of the modern city—a concept with radical implications for policy making when employed by public sector institutions: The institutional implications of interdependence influenced every phase of city building in Greater New York as experts learned to think in terms of the larger trends and processes necessary to sustain the shared working and living environments of the regional metropolis. Engineers studied traffic flows between commercial centers and bedroom communities and responded with bridges, tunnels, rail lines, and highways. Sanitarians analyzed the combined effects of uncoordinated sewage-disposal programs and then devised the subterranean structures that linked tenements to skyscrapers and suburbs to factories in order to clean up the harbor. Comptrollers and bankers discerned and then tried to manage the reciprocal relationships between private real estate values and the city's capacity to fund subways and schools. Economists uncovered the developmental processes that linked downtown congestion to the diversification of cities on the metropolitan periphery in an effort to make the region—that "new dynamic Something" explored by the authors of the landmark *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs*—a more concrete concept and thus an imperative focus of public policy.[18] As their perception of interdependence blurred the boundaries between city and suburb, private property and public welfare, individual wealth and collective resources, the experts saw the political and legal distinctions that divided the metropolis as less and less meaningful. Instead, they thought in terms of the city as a whole and the city as a system, and other influential actors increasingly borrowed those concepts to describe urban problems and their solutions.[19] By the 1920s, even a career party politician like Mayor Jimmy Walker adopted the experts' language, urging his fellow citizens to "look upon the city as a whole" and "to plan our improvements with a view to the best development of the city as a whole."[20]

Armed with mounting evidence of metropolitan interdependence and its acceptance by powerful decision makers, technicians who took an interest in the broader issues of city building and urban management attempted to make "the city as a system" the operating principle of public sector institutions. They argued that public officials should treat building regulations demanded by Fifth Avenue merchants, sewer construction undertaken by borough officials in Queens, and land-use decisions made by real estate developers in Hoboken as opportunities to solve larger problems affecting metropolitan growth. Planning, as the coordination of city-building policies, became their primary goal. Toward that end, they pushed for even more explicit control over policy making to implement their vision removed from the parochialism built into the market decisions, interest-group lobbying, and urban political structures that seemed to undermine the very notion of citywide or regional interconnection; in so doing, they threatened established patterns of distributive politics carried on by business interests, party bosses, and property owners. Particular groups, localities, and institutions did not always fit into or want to contribute to the citywide and regional systems of freight and commuter transportation, underground infrastructure, or land use envisioned by experts. Who would compose those systems, at what level of organization (borough, city, region, nation), and at what cost put the city's emerging sense of togetherness to the test.

As they stepped from conceptualizing to institutionalizing, therefore, experts ran the risk of pitting the durability of interdependence against claims of legal and political autonomy, and urban planning against distributive policy making at multiple levels of aggregation. To what extent, they were forced to ask, could interdependence—as the necessary starting point for addressing the problems of the modern city—coexist with political and legal values that promoted independent, local, voluntary action (or inaction)? And to what extent would accommodating that independence interfere with the necessary coherence of the urban system?

The civic culture of expertise vacillated between aggregative and disaggregative approaches to the general interest: Because they saw New York in terms of economic and physical linkages among groups and localities, civil engineers, economists, and other professionals believed that the city possessed "some inner unity and consistency" in the form of identifiable general interests. Everyone in the greater metropolitan area relied on transportation, water, sewage, and land-use systems and everyone would benefit from better coordination of public and private resources. Whole and parts would fit together if properly configured, they imagined, which endowed the civic culture of expertise with a fundamental optimism about the potential coincidence of individual and collective welfare.[21]

This did not mean that experts tried to force urban diversity into the Procrustean bed of a unitary public interest. They knew too much about the city to think in such one-dimensional terms; they recognized that New York was a community of communities—subdivided down to the street level, with sense of place and group loyalties stronger for smaller units than for the city or region as a whole. Instead, their understanding of the city's essential interdependence contributed to a persistent faith that enlightened policy making could reconcile profit seeking and the public interest and permit distinctive local communities to coexist with assertive citywide and regional institutions. Experts in New York City tried to avoid casting policy battles in terms of stark choices between business and community, self-interest and public interest, individual and collective pursuits, by emphasizing the need for new policies and institutional tools to act on general interests when courts, parties, corporations, markets, and local governments—because of their limited perspectives on metropolitan life—could not.

These conflicts existed nonetheless, and state builders struggled to configure new institutions to reflect the illusive nature of the general interests they perceived; and this difficulty expressed itself as a constant tension between aggregative and disaggregative approaches to the general interest: that is, whether to treat the whole (city or region) merely as the sum of its parts, or as something more. In practice, the relationships between individual railroad facilities and the port system, local sewage networks and regional pollution problems, and neighborhood land-use preferences and metropolitan development needs did not mesh seamlessly, even when aided by the broader perspectives of enlightened business leaders and politicians; the parts added up to a collection of parts, not a coherent whole that resolved shared problems or improved standards of living or made the city more habitable. A more rational freight system, a cleaner harbor, and a less congested downtown all seemed like clear, widely supported general interests, but organizing railroads, municipalities, and real estate owners to pursue them involved changes in behavior that many did not desire or could not accommodate. Creating institutions predicated on a unity of interests only exposed the differences between individual and collective.

The time had come to move beyond existing institutions of collective decision making that could not adequately pursue general interests, in other words, but configuring new institutions to act on such interests raised difficult philosophical and practical questions. Was there a difference between recognizing and executing general interests where they existed by virtue of clear public agreement, and creating and enforcing general interests where that agreement remained weak or uncertain? Should government merely respond to conceptions of general interests as voiced by particular groups, or could it formulate its own? To what extent, the state builders had to determine, could they implement general interests against the wishes of groups whose interests they presumed to pursue? And to what extent did a timid approach to the general interest undermine the very notion of its existence? Did general interests cease to exist in the face of disagreement among the constituent groups of the city or did they exist permanently, waiting for sufficiently empowered institutions to act on them? If general interests did disappear into disagreement, what sort of institutions could capture that evanescence? In this sense, the protagonists of this book wrestled with the same vexing issues of political theory that concerned Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (how to distinguish between the General Will and the Will of All) and Madison in *Federalist 10* (how to structure government to compel social and economic factions to act in the general interest).[22] As such, they confronted one of the great institu-

tional problems of the twentieth century: are bureaucratic organizations the proper instruments for determining and carrying out the public interest in a democratic society?

This book thus captures the moment when the engineers, sanitarians, and other professionals who played important technical roles in many American cities in the nineteenth century transformed urban political culture. They did that even as traditional reform and muckraking generated more sound and fury. As Steffens, the greatest muckraker of them all, acknowledged in his autobiography, the argument that bad government was attributable to bad men and effective government a matter of moral character lost much of its explanatory power and political impact during the perennial good-government crusades that followed Tweed's downfall. Steffens saw most reformers as "merely destructive" since they lacked any credible plan for replacing the bosses, who often got things done in spite of rampant corruption, with constructive policymakers. "I did not find anybody with any intelligent plan for the reform of a city," he lamented; "facts we had, but no generalizations and no capacity to generalize." Steffens focused so intently on the battle between bosses and reformers that he did not see the impact that the new breed of experts had on the city.[23] But away from the limelight on the more sensational misdeeds of government and business, a new approach to urban problems had already emerged that did provide the generalizations Steffens knew American cities needed to survive.

The chapters that follow show how experts from various disciplines provided those generalizations in key policy areas, each with its own history, its own timing regarding the creation of administrative mechanisms, and its own institutional contexts within the city, state, region, and nation. Viewed together, they demonstrate how similarities between apparently unrelated debates emerged from a flawed but influential civic culture that explains the uneven, incomplete, and in many ways unsuccessful centralization of authority in the nation's leading metropolis in the early twentieth century.

Part 1 / Private Infrastructure and Public Policy

"An almost mystical unity"

Interdependence and the Public Interest in the Modern Metropolis

> The history of municipal politics shows in most cases a flare-up of intense interest followed by a period of indifference. Results come home to the masses of the people. But the very size, heterogeneity, and mobility of urban populations, the vast capital required, the technical character of the engineering problems involved, soon tire the attention of the average voter. The ramification of the issues before the public is so wide and intricate, the technical matters involved are so specialized, the details are so many and so shifting, that the public cannot for any length of time identify and hold itself. It is not that there is no public, no large body of persons having a common interest in the consequences of social transactions. There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in composition. And there are too many publics, for conjoint actions which have indirect, serious, and enduring consequences are multitudinous beyond comparison, and each one of them crosses the others and generates its own group of persons especially affected with little to hold these different publics together in an integrated whole.
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> —JOHN DEWEY, 1927

Cleveland Rodgers, who served on the New York City Planning Commission from 1938 to 1951, appreciated the apparent contradiction posed by the modern metropolis. "Anyone interested in promoting greater order and unity in New York should begin by studying multiplicity in all its manifestations," he recommended. "The metropolis is the epitome of multiplicity; the paradox of the phenomenon is that the city is made possible by an almost mystical unity."[1] Finding a way to institutionalize something "almost mystical" posed a considerable challenge to those engaged in building Gotham. Relating multiplicity to unity, parts to whole, in some specific institutional form occupied the attentions of experts in engineering, sanitation, architecture, public finance, and

law who attempted to improve the city's commuter and freight railroad systems, fund and build vital public works, and regulate private land uses to create a planned city. Rodgers's "mystical unity" represented their durable belief that Greater New York, in spite of its inexorable tendency to subdivide into distinct communities, did possess common interests that rose above mere collections of special or group interests. New York functioned as an interdependent social organism in many important ways, in addition to serving as a platform for more or less autonomous individuals and groups to conduct their lives unconcerned with each other or with any larger, shared project. When existing institutions of collective decision making failed to act on those common interests—when courts, parties, corporations, markets, and local governments bogged down in so many parochial motives and narrow perspectives—experts built new institutions that could respond to metropolitan interdependence as they saw it.

This question of how to institutionalize the pursuit of common interests in an exceptionally diverse city appeared in mundane guises but stimulated extraordinary changes. Moving goods and people across crowded rivers and through busy streets, digging tunnels underneath skyscrapers, managing the city's borrowing power, and looking for loopholes in obscure legal cases involved the banalities of technical discourses, but these tasks comprised the workaday details of much broader questions of mutual obligation and collective interests. Embedded in those solutions to practical problems were new terms of togetherness; to propose them meant confronting old notions of limited government, private property, and voluntary association.

This world of problem defining and problem solving nurtured the idea of the city as a system and made it seem as though the proper application of expertise could reconcile public and private interests. New Yorkers needed better ways to get across the Hudson: entrepreneur William Gibbs McAdoo and engineers John Vipond Davies and Charles M. Jacobs completed the first tunnels under the river, which to this day provide commuters with a faster, safer method of crossing between Manhattan and New Jersey. The city needed to overcome its long-time isolation from continental rail systems: The PRR's vice president, Samuel Rea, and some of the best engineering talent in the world directed a small army of laborers in the construction of Penn Station, the Hell Gate Bridge, and tunnels under the Hudson and East Rivers, creating the rail route that Amtrak still uses to transport passengers up and down the

eastern seaboard. Experts, nurtured by private industry, believed that bringing the principles of system building to the public sector would provide the solution to many of the city's problems—physical, economic, and political.

The application of expertise in its many forms to the practical difficulties of living in New York appeared to confirm that a properly configured and empowered metropolitan government could successfully manage the new scale and scope of urban life. In response to the expensive, unreliable procedures for moving freight at the port, attorney Julius Henry Cohen coaxed hundreds of public officials and railroad executives into supporting the establishment of the nation's first port authority, the bistate agency that built the Goethals Bridge, Outerbridge Crossing, Bayonne Bridge, and George Washington Bridge, among other projects, within ten years of its creation and served as a model for the Tennessee Valley Authority. To forestall water famine, multitalented engineer John Ripley Freeman helped empower a board of water supply to construct a tunnel and aqueduct system 160 miles long, extending 752 feet under the city. Dismayed with growing levels of pollution, sanitary engineer George Soper led the fight that produced an Interstate Sanitation Commission to coerce localities to take responsibility for cleaning up the rivers and the bay. The ubiquitous George McAneny—civil service reformer, Manhattan borough president, zoning sponsor, planning advocate—overcame the logjam between the traction moguls and politicians and added five hundred miles to the subway system, partially relieving the crush of traffic downtown and allowing the growth of new residential areas in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. Henry Bruère, a leading figure at the Bureau of Municipal Research, worked alongside economist E. R. A. Seligman and Comptrollers Herman Metz and William Prendergast to enlarge the city's borrowing capacity, expand its ability to tax, and thus increase its claims on private wealth, permitting billions of dollars in infrastructure spending during an unprecedented period of improvement in the city's physical plant. Attorney Edward Bassett, political scientist Robert Whitten, and architect George Ford articulated a new rationale for restricting the rights of property owners and convinced the courts to allow zoning of land uses and building heights; their achievement not only reshaped the New York skyline, it also gave planners an indispensable tool for controlling the development of cities and contributed to a major change in constitutional jurisprudence. Chicago businessmen Charles Dyer Norton and Frederic Delano, convinced that the greater city made sense only in a larger geographical context, launched the Committee on the Regional Plan that set a national standard for the analysis and vision required to plan a metropolis. Thanks to their sponsorship, economist Robert Murray Haig and planner Thomas Adams documented the system of growth driving the dual process of overcrowding and decentralization in the region and thereby laid the groundwork for the establishment of planning commissions in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Their work raised awareness of the need for public control of urban development, providing the rationale for the creation of the New York City Planning Commission in 1938, which fulfilled (at least on paper) the vision of coordinated city-building policies for the interdependent regional metropolis that motivated the work of this varied group of experts.

While the civic culture of expertise clearly had a profound impact on the physical and institutional structure of the city, it did not achieve the broader goals of formalizing a new approach to the public interest or making the city as a whole the primary focus of public policy. Although the railroads thought of the city as a system and reacted to the same larger patterns of growth as municipal authorities, freight planning remained trapped within many different institutional contexts with incompatible approaches to interdependence. The Port Authority could never consolidate its power over the private freight systems at the harbor and had to abandon its rail plans to concentrate on building bridges and tunnels for trucks and automobiles. Thanks to the Catskill aqueduct system, the city had abundant water (at least for a time), but engineers could never convince the public or elected officials to address the problem of leakage; New York continued to waste millions of gallons of water even after spending millions of dollars and reaching far upstate to get it. A comprehensive sewage-treatment program took almost a century to bring to fruition, with localities resisting every effort to get them to prevent downstream problems. Hatred of traction companies starved the subway system of needed revenues and restricted its continued growth. Experts in public finance did significantly expand the city's taxing and borrowing power, but never persuaded decision makers to plan the use of precious debt-incurring capacity; they empowered New York to spend beyond its means and left it perpetually teetering near fiscal collapse. Zoning changed the legal and physical landscape in New York and beyond, but it tended to reflect narrow local preferences rather than citywide planning objectives. The *Regional Plan*, though influential, did not quite inspire the sense of metropolitan patriotism that would encourage elected officials to think regionally and act locally, and Greater New York tended to sprawl rather than cohere in spite of the plan's national reputa-

tion. How the experts saw the city, it turned out, had more to do with their approach to problem solving than with the interests of the groups with whom they formed temporary partnerships, and the institutions they created received only provisional support from their conditional allies.

Most disappointing of all, while the experts intended the planning commission as a truly centralized city-building authority, it never did play the role of coordinating public works, capital budgeting, and land-use regulation in pursuit of common interests as they had hoped. Instead, it became yet another locus of fragmented, partially centralized public authority, among hundreds of others. The heir apparent to this legacy of institutional change, Robert Moses, showed nothing but contempt for planning, even though he looked at the city the same way planners did. He believed in the centralization of power—in his own hands, at least—but used that power increasingly to make decisions about the city's welfare cynically and unilaterally. Moses believed that New Yorkers had collective interests, but gave up on the notion that the public would ever agree to them.

This mixed record of achievement seemed to undermine the idea of common interests that inspired it, in spite of ample evidence of urban and regional interdependence. The sense of optimism that accompanied the growing recognition of the city as a whole and the belief in the concurrence of individual and collective welfare nurtured by the civic discourse of experts in public and private roles gave way to more pessimistic conceptions of New York's chances in the face of the compromises and failures of state building. The city institutionalized hundreds of different formulations and approaches to interests, common and special, rather than coordinating city-building policies toward the fulfillment of widely shared goals. The prospect of unified development gave way to blight, sprawl, fiscal stress, and divided public authority.

It would be easy to conclude from this very mixed record of Progressive Era state building that the public has no common interests at all or that it has none that governing institutions can meaningfully separate in practice from special or local interests. Other studies of urban policy making seem to suggest as much. For example, the defenders of Chicago's "segmented" system of government in the mid-nineteenth century argued that "there was no such thing as a public interest that city government could pursue citywide" for the simple reason that "when a government's constituency became sufficiently complex, the sum of all 'local' interests no longer added to a 'public' interest," historian Robin L. Einhorn has observed. The reformers who attempted to remove that

barrier to a more active role for local government insisted that the city did have "public" interests, but reserved to themselves the right to define what those were.[2] The fiction of public interest rhetoric, historian Harold L. Platt concluded of late-nineteenth-century city building in Houston, Texas, delivered government into the hands of commercial-civic elites who served their own interests under a veil of common concerns. "Metropolitans," led by planning experts representing progrowth interests, emphasized investment in public works that boosted Houston as a regional oil and commercial center, rather than building up services in residential areas as "parochials" wanted—resulting in blatant inequalities between downtown and neighborhoods, white and black, rich and poor, that set the stage for the urban crisis of the second half of the century.[3] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, borrowing from historian Richard Hofstadter, maintained that the notion of the "city as a whole" was so completely an outgrowth of middle-class Protestant moralizing that it was "fundamentally incompatible" with the style of politics practiced by immigrants in big cities.[4] Especially for a city as large and diverse as New York, one could argue, the concept of the city as a whole might be so hopelessly abstract that it lulls us into believing that there are applications of it that rise above particular interests.

In our rush to deconstruct the cultural inventions that experts employed to justify the expansion of municipal authority a century ago, we run the risk of missing just how powerful the idea of common interests created by interdependence seemed in the fight to establish new methods, philosophies, and institutions to manage mass society and large cities. Outdated notions of individualism and local autonomy, contradictory claims on government power, and persistent tendencies toward parochial organization made it difficult to respond to the shared problems that emerged from divisive large-scale economic and social transformations, and a belief in common interests served as a vital bulwark against despair in the face of seemingly uncontrollable changes.

In *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), for example, philosopher John Dewey tried to identify the conditions under which a new "Public" could organize itself in an age of interdependence and thus liberate the notion of common interests from the limits of inherited social philosophy. Dewey argued that the technical and organizational transformations of the industrial age had created a "Great Society"—a world of "intricate and interdependent economic relations" that infiltrated small-scale community life and undermined the old verities of individualism. Farmers operated within global markets far beyond

their reach or understanding; networks of power and transportation crisscrossed cities and regions; giant corporations produced for national and international consumption—all with profound consequences for individuals and communities that still did not recognize their interdependence. "Indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling these consequences," Dewey observed. "But the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences, [which] have formed such immense and consolidated unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself." Dewey thus saw on a national scale the same linkages that experts perceived in the New York region—connections that reached under the city and throughout the metropolitan area, uniting skyscrapers and suburbs, rich and poor, congestion and sprawl, crowded lower Manhattan and bucolic Putnam County, even while local officials, corporate executives, judges, and the public remained unaware of or unmoved by them.[5]

For Dewey, a new understanding of the public interest had to emerge from a recognition of those ties of interdependence since the new forms of association themselves did not create a "Great Community" capable of harnessing them and endowing them with moral purpose. "The Great Society created by steam and electricity may be a society, but it is no community," he insisted, since "no amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes a community"—the central problem facing experts in New York City who attempted to build new institutional forms and encourage regional patriotism to act on the realities of physical and economic interconnection.[6]

Dewey did not believe in turning away from those new forms of aggregation for answers even though he never gave up on the idea that face-to-face relations would always provide the "deepest and richest" sense of community. Reestablishing the fiction of individual autonomy—salvaging the absurd "image of a residual individual who is not a member of any association at all"—only distracted attention from the real question: how to comprehend and choose among the consequences of different forms and configurations of interdependent relationships in an effort to provide everyone with a "fuller and deeper experience" of life. Instead, the Great Society had to expose those interconnections and make them plain to the public since "such perception creates a common interest. Then there exists something truly social and not merely associative." To accomplish that, the experts who did understand (albeit imperfectly) the powerful but invisible linkages of cause and effect in the modern world had to disseminate that knowledge through new methods of "debate, discussion and persuasion." Only "when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication" would the Great Society become a Great Community.[7] Along these lines, the rhetoric and spirit of the *Regional Plan* found common ground with the great philosopher of American democracy.

Where Dewey stressed communication to clarify that interdependence created common interests, political scientist Pendleton Herring argued in *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (1936) that bureaucracies had to establish terms of togetherness in the face of contradictory claims on government power. Focusing on the growth of the federal government, Herring concluded that "the purpose of the democratic state is the free reconciliation of group interests and that the attainment of this end necessitates the development of a great administrative machine." The conflicts of industrial society created winners and losers who competed for state assistance, each demanding that the work of government advance their own special interest and each conceiving of the general interest as merely an extension of their own concerns. "Groups have demanded special consideration from the federal government for themselves while condemning the general encroachment of the state into private affairs," Herring observed, echoing Bryce. Thanks to those interests, a large but uncoordinated bureaucracy already existed, but "a collection of federal bureaus created at the behest of aggressive minority groups cannot envisage the general welfare"—a problem experienced, in modified form, by Cohen with the port, McAneny with the subways, Soper with the sewage system, and Bassett, Adams, and Tugwell with planning.[8]

Herein lay the great task of bureaucracy in a democratic society and the fundamental challenge of state building in New York City. In spite of divergent social and economic interests, citizens did share "a basic community of purpose." Expert administrators had to allow special interests and organized minorities a voice in government, "since it is their concerns that provide the substance out of which the public welfare is formulated," but they could not reduce that basic community of purpose to the goals of those groups. Here they faced the essential dilemma of representative bureaucracy. In a democratic society, expert administrators had to determine the proper relationship between community of purpose and group ends by reference to the "public

interest," and this put the bureaucrat in the position of Rousseau's citizen: trying to distinguish between the General Will and particularistic interests in the guise of public interests. To do that, the bureaucracy had to see the work of government comprehensively and attempt to coordinate its multifarious interventions into economic and social relations toward clear collective objectives—just as planning advocates in New York City had long urged. Herring, who thought planning went too far, wanted to avoid an approach to common interests that collapsed into a directionless struggle between interest groups (as occurred in distributive politics) or one that verged on the threat of tyranny inherent in a purely disaggregative approach to policy making. And the stakes were high: "This Gordian knot in some countries has been cut by the sword of dictatorship."[9] Only by reference to some eventual resolution of these conflicts—the elusive, mystical common welfare—could bureaucratic institutions, freed of the constraints of limited government, resolve the dilemma within an American framework.

For political scientist E. E. Schattschneider, political parties, rather than bureaucracies, provided the best means to establish those linkages between whole and parts, even though they remained locked in a constant battle against parochial approaches to larger organizational problems. Like Dewey and Herring, Schattschneider remained fully convinced of the existence of common interests in spite of the conflicts of modern industrial society. In *Party Government* (1942), he argued that "the raw materials of politics are not all antisocial. Alongside of Madison's statement that differences in wealth are the most durable causes of faction there should be placed a corollary that the common possessions of the people are the most durable causes of unity." Without a recognition of those common interests, politics became the most cynical of games. "To assume that people have merely conflicting interests and nothing else is to invent a political nightmare that has only a superficial relation to reality," Schattschneider warned. "The body of agreement underlying the conflicts of a modern society ought to be sufficient to sustain the social order provided only that the common interests supporting this unity are mobilized." In his view, "public policy could never be the mere sum of the demands of organized special interests," and he insisted that political parties, in their role as mobilizers of majorities, "are never mere aggregates of special interests." Parties had to build majorities around common interests, and their success in that effort would allow them to resist parochialism.[10]

In practice, however, parties often became the creatures of special interests, sectional coalitions, and political bosses, none of which provided a lasting basis for governance. No society had resources enough to respond to all of these interests—something the consolidated city discovered when it took collective responsibility for the public borrowing of its constituent communities in 1898. Neither could those factions organize to act on "vital common interests," preoccupied as they were with their own ends. "Local bosses," because of their proprietary attitude toward government power, "are hardly conscious of the fact that there is a problem of planning, integration, and overall management of public affairs for the protection of the great interests of the nation"—as Boss Murphy showed during the PRR franchise battles.[11] Someone had to think about discriminating between claims on government power to make sure that common interests would be addressed. Although Schattschneider believed that parties could best perform that task while experts in New York City had lost their faith in that approach to collective decision making, the problem of sorting through competing claims to identify and promote common interests remained the same as the one confronting Bruère and Seligman.

These devices, whether social inquiry wedded to democratic communication, independent but responsive bureaucracies, or truly majoritarian parties, stemmed from the belief that common purposes did exist in modern society. For Dewey, Herring, and Schattschneider, the public interest was not merely a ruse or disguise; nor did it emerge from pluralistic bargaining; nor was it reducible to configurations of private interests or the interests of groups who claimed it from time to time. Obsolete conceptions of individual autonomy hampered social inquiry, special interests captured the bureaucracies that tried to regulate them, and local and sectional concerns dominated the political parties that attempted to rise above them, but such difficulties did not mean that common interests did not exist or that those institutions should abandon the pursuit of them. The difficulty of finding a satisfactory answer to the question of how to organize to act on the general interest in a diverse and conflict-ridden world did not invalidate the search for meaningful expressions of common concerns.

Large cities like New York, where the failure of new and old approaches to social integration had become increasingly evident by midcentury, faced this problem in its most acute and tangible form. In this regard, perhaps the most surprising use of the idea of common interests appeared in Jane Jacobs's *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), a book that is usually thought of

as a defense of the smaller-scale of urban life. Jacobs uncovered the intricate dance of street life that modern city planners had not appreciated and thus destroyed by their actions, but she also understood that cities operated on other levels of self-government—as the city as whole, as street neighborhoods, and as districts linking the two. "It is impossible to say that one is more important than the others," she noted; "all three are necessary." In this scheme, the city as a whole was more than an abstraction—more than a convenient way to characterize collections of street neighborhoods. "We must never forget or minimize this parent community while thinking of the city's smaller parts," Jacobs emphasized. "A city's very wholeness in bringing together people with communities of interest is one of its greatest assets, possibly the greatest." That broader focus clearly did not substitute for an appreciation of community at less comprehensive levels, and that is where planners made their fateful mistake. "Planners like to think they deal in grand terms with the city as a whole, and that their value is great because they 'grasp the whole picture.' But the notion that they are needed to deal with their city 'as a whole' is principally a delusion," she maintained. "Aside from highway planning and the almost purely budgetary responsibility for rationalizing and allocating the sum of capital improvement expenditures presented in tentative budgets, the work of city planning commissions and their staffs seldom deals, in truth, with a big city as a total organism."[12]

Of course, Jacobs wrote during a time when the city had a capital budget and a planning commission (although not very good ones). Sixty years earlier—even twenty-five years earlier—those institutions did not exist and a vital level of social integration remained neglected. Jacobs believed that planners had to change their thinking to connect whole and parts effectively, but the previous generation of planning advocates faced the same problem without any institutional forms capable of addressing the city as a whole. In this sense, *Death and Life* has more in common with the Regional Plan, and Jane Jacobs is more similar to Thomas Adams, than it would first appear.

The experts in this book felt the absence of those citywide institutions most keenly because the problems they addressed in their professional lives convinced them that the interdependence of the modern metropolis served as an obvious and essential starting point for effective public policy. Because of the city's size and complexity, because of the natural obstacles to its physical coherence, because its problems had regional, national, and even international implications (especially port and financial management), because its power structure was so divided, and because consolidation explicitly raised issues of institutional fragmentation (unlike Chicago, where a single government oversaw the entire city), New York confronted the basic challenges of metropolitan integration before many other urban areas in the United States. Linking New York and New Jersey, Manhattan and Long Island, downtown and suburbs, water users and watersheds, private wealth and public need, center and periphery—these tasks resolved what often appeared as strictly private or local problems from less comprehensive perspectives. Making a buck from commuters and improving the efficiency of corporate freight operations forced engineers to consider regional growth patterns; cleaning up the harbor and overcoming the water crisis encouraged similarly broad perspectives; the overwhelming need for public works fostered the notion that real estate values represented a collective resource; and addressing congestion yielded an understanding of the intimate connections between centralization and decentralization. Inherited distinctions of property rights and political jurisdictions did not make sense from this new perspective; such notions stood in the way of approaches to integration based on the reality of togetherness, rather than the fictions of individualism or autonomy.

In this milieu of problem solving, expertise took on a distinctly civic dimension. The application of technical skill and specialized knowledge to the challenges of living in the crowded metropolis did more than create remarkable structures linking different parts of the city and region. It generated new bonds of political obligation—in the form of expanded municipal claims on private wealth and regulatory powers over private property—and redrew the boundaries between citizens and among units of government. Embracing interdependence thus resulted in a more definite institutional articulation of what community entailed at this new level of aggregation, exceeding anything courts, parties, corporations, markets, and local governments had ever offered.

By no means did the civic culture of expertise exhaust the possibilities of community in the modern city. Even on its own terms, it could not always deliver on its promises. Neither could shared problems provide the only basis for social cohesion. By the time regional planners took up the challenge of linking center to periphery, they had fully embraced the notion that large-scale interconnections coexisted alongside even more compelling forms of local interaction based on other grounds. Their experiences confirm that livable, clean, efficient, successful, humane, interesting, diverse cities require multiple levels and systems of social integration with different standards of legitimacy.

Only by recognizing and organizing for the essential simultaneity of community can citizens and decision makers sustain those qualities over time.

All cities are experiments in the dealing with the implications of collective living. More so than in most other forms of organization, cities force us to come to grips with the possibility that we have a common interest in the consequences of social transactions, remote though many of them seem. To an even greater extent than in nation-states, in cities we negotiate the most palpable terms of togetherness and political obligation and relate multiplicity to unity in explicit institutional relationships. If, in the end, we do not find fully satisfactory responses to these issues in the civic culture of expertise created by engineers, lawyers, architects, and planners in New York City at the turn of the twentieth century, we can still acknowledge that their efforts provide one important part of the answer—for they posed the question correctly—as we attempt to reconcile autonomy (cultural and political) and interdependence in a world that seems to be demanding more of both.

Appendix

The graphs below and the discussion of New York City's finances in chapter 4 are based on an analysis of annual expenditures, tax rates, debt, and price indices drawn from Henry De Forest Baldwin, "The City's Purse," *Municipal Affairs* 1 (1897): 354; Edward Dana Durand, *The Finances of New York City* (New York: Macmillan, 1898), 372–76; Frederick L. Bird, *The Municipal Debt* (New York: Mayor's Committee on Management Survey of the City of New York, 1951), 28–30; *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International, 1989); and the *New York Times.*



Graph 1. New York City Debt per Capita, 1870–1895

In the wake of the Tweed scandal, New York entered a twenty-year period of fiscal conservatism, setting the stage for a new era of taxing, spending, and borrowing for the consolidated city.

Notes

Abbreviations

BCM	Benjamin C. Marsh Papers, Acc. No. 10,353, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
CFC	*Commercial and Financial Chronicle*
CWS	Catskill Water Supply for New York City, Division of Engineering and Industry, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
EMB	Edward Murray Bassett Papers, Acc. No. 2708, Cornell University Library, Ithaca, N.Y.
EMS	Edward Morse Shepard Papers, Columbia University, NYC
ERAS	E. R. A. Seligman Papers, Columbia University Library, NYC
GBF	George B. Ford Papers, Francis Leob Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
GBM	George B. McClellan Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
GCW	George C. Whipple Papers, HUG 1876.3005, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Mass.
GMC	George McAneny Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, NYC
GMP	George McAneny Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
HBC	Heights of Buildings Commission Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
ICCNA	Records of the Interstate Commerce Commission, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
JF	James Forgie Papers, Division of Engineering and Industry, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
JFH	John Francis Hylan Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
JFS	John F. Sullivan Papers, Manuscript and Archives Section, New York Public Library, NYC
JJW	James J. Walker Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
JPM	John Purroy Mitchel Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
JRF	John Ripley Freeman Papers, MC-51, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

MES	Marc Eidlitz and Sons Papers, Manuscript and Archives Section, New York Public Library, NYC
ML	Metropolitan Life Insurance Archives, Metropolitan Life Building, NYC
NPL	Nelson Peter Lewis Papers, Acc. No. 2712, Cornell University Library, Ithaca, N.Y.
NYH	*New York Herald*
NYHC	*New York Harbor* case
NYT	*New York Times*
NYTr	*New York Tribune*
PBQD	Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas Collection, Division of Engineering and Industry, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
PNYA	*Port of New York Authority v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway*
PRR	Pennsylvania Railroad Co., department records, Executive Department, Acc. No. 1810, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Del.
RH	Rudolph Hering Collection, Division of Engineering and Industry, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
RHW	Robert H. Whitten Papers, Francis Leob Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
RPA	Regional Plan Association Papers, Acc. No. 2688, Cornell University Library, Ithaca, N.Y.
RVW	Robert Van Wyck Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
SW	Schultze-Weaver Papers, Wolfsonian Museum, Florida International University, Miami Beach, Florida
TASCE	*Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers*
WGM	William Gibbs McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
WJG	William J. Gaynor Papers, Municipal Archives, NYC
WJW	William J. Wilgus Papers, Manuscript and Archives Section, New York Public Library, NYC
WWE	*Who's Who in Engineering*
WWNY	*Who's Who in New York*

INTRODUCTION: Conceiving the New Metropolis

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CONCLUSION: "An almost mystical unity"

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